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ABSTRACT
This project interrogates unequal power relations that underlie newspaper representation
of terrorism and reinforced Orientalism discourse following the 13 November 2015 mass
murders in Saint-Denis and Paris, France, and following the 12 June 2016 mass shooting in
Orlando, Florida, United States of America (U.S.A.). It was not surprising to bear witness to the
ways national media took hold of these major socio-political events. These events, and the stories
that have been published about them, are interpreted through the prism of terrorism, moral panic,
and Orientalism, in the sense that the media tend to transcribe the shock of the attacks as a
sounding board that freezes in time not only collective emotions, but also moral concerns based
on a certain perception of those responsible for these acts.
Using comparative thematic analysis, the events and their representation in the national
press as terrorism are critically engaged in this dissertation. Rooted in critical cultural studies,
political theory, and international and intercultural communication, this project analyzes articles
in French published by two national newspapers the week following the attacks in Saint-Denis
and Paris, France, from 13 to 20 November 2015, by Le Monde and Le Figaro and articles
published the week following the attacks in Orlando, Florida, so from 12 to 19 June 2016, by The
New York Times and The Washington Post. These days were selected because they offer an
understanding of representational strategies used by newspapers to instantiate these events.
This project ultimately contributes to the study of how media frame terrorism following
these terrorist events, what meanings are assigned to identity, and the place of people who are
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traditionally marginalized within contemporary articulation of terrorism. I contend that news
reinforced Orientalism in a construction of "folk devils" that often turns out to be
disproportionate in the face of the global threat. France and the U.S.A. are then constantly
presented in a Western continuum that finds the West threatened by a common enemy. This
dissertation seeks to understand who benefits from the acts of terrorism and how examining
media reports through the lens of moral panic provides auto-generative mechanisms and
platforms for additional media and political attention and subsequent terrorist acts. These
findings encourage scholars to consider the multiplicity of ways that Orientalism is reified
despite strong calls to unity.

v

CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

On the night of Friday, 13 November 2015, bombs started exploding in a suburban city
north of Paris, France, by a stadium where an international soccer game between France and
Germany took place. The suicidal bombings that started in Saint-Denis, France, triggered a series
of other attacks from another group of perpetrators who struck in multiple places in downtown
Paris as mass shootings started being reported by people at coffee shops, bars, and restaurants.
This series of attacks ended at the Bataclan concert hall where people attending a concert were
being held hostage by a third group of attackers, many of whom were killed on site. That night,
139 people died, including the perpetrators, and hundreds of other people were injured.
A few months later, on the night between Saturday, 11 June 2016, and Sunday, 12 June
2016, gunshots were fired inside the Pulse nightclub not long before closing time at one of the
most inclusive gay nightclubs in Orlando, Florida, a traditionally conservative state and region in
the U.S.A. Patrons and employees who, for the most part, identified with the Queer Latin
experience of people living in the community surrounding Pulse, were trapped inside the club for
hours, held hostage at gunpoint by a single perpetrator, Omar Mateen, who identified himself in
a call to 9-1-1 operators shortly after the beginning of the attack. Some hostages were shot and
injured. People died from the bullets of both Mateen and the police. Survivors of the attack,
bystanders, and hostages filed outside onto the streets to search for help as soon as alerts of the
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attack were posted on the social media profile of the nightclub. In less than four hours before
Mateen was cornered and killed by officers that night, 49 people were killed and 58 wounded.
In these two events, the signification of a strong nation was presented at prey with
terrorism. In the minutes that followed the first of many 13 November 2015 attacks,
"#prayforParis" became one of the (if not the number one) trending hashtag on Instagram
(Laurent, 2015). A "Safety Check" option was even made available for users of Facebook, a
featured deployed for the first time in the case of human-caused disaster (Schafer et al., 2019).
The multiple levels of images, information, organization, and compassion shared on social
media, made available to online users as either one of the attacks were still unfolding, indicated a
lot about the power of social media to represent such acts. It was not surprising to observe, at the
time, the inflammatory social media accounts intertwine or contradict the live coverage of both
events. One of the precursors in bringing violence inside households since the first and early
1990s Gulf War, namely the infamous multinational broadcast news agency based in Atlanta,
Georgia, U.S.A., the 24/7 Cable News Network (CNN), rapidly instantiated each one of the
events.1 Its not-so-for-profit counterpart owned entirely by the nation-state of France, France24,
also instantiated both of the acts with a privileged attention to archiving news produced about the
13 November 2015 attacks. The mediatization of coordinated or isolated acts of mass murders
has traditionally relied on the inescapable journalistic logic of answering the "who, what, where,
when, how, why" questions by amplifying stories told in response by first responders, survivors,
witnesses, and other possible targets. Media representation has traditionally placed readers in
such an immersive experience, according to Garcin-Marrou and Hare (2019), that the readers

1

For an updated version of the immersive account published live as media coverage of the 13 November 2015
attacks on CNN, see Almasy et al. (2015). For the same live coverage about the 12 June 2016 attacks, see Fantz et
al. (2016).
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might find themselves almost automatically immersed in, "une position spectatorielle
paradoxale, le plongeant dans le chaos post-tuerie mais l'en extirpant également par la distance
(imposée aussi par les forces de sécurité)" (p. 161), a passage that reads in English as such, "a
paradoxical spectatorial position, plunging it [the reader] into post-killing chaos but also
extirpating it [the reader] by distance (also imposed by security forces)" (p. 161). This
dissertation is therefore attentive to the immersive experience that invites the reader to assume
this paradoxical spectatorial position, especially since presidents and other public officials have
increasingly occupied centerstage of media representation following these acts (Guigo, 2019).
In response to the 13 November 2015 attacks, then-president of the French Republic
François Hollande gave a public address deploring the “horror” and urging people to consider
that “[f]ace à la terreur, la France doit être forte, elle doit être grande et les autorités de l'Etat
fermes, nous le serons” (Cornevin et al., 2015). This passage literally translates as, “In the face
of terror, France must remain strong, and the state authorities remain firm, we will be.” Once
again having to face the threat posed by terrorism a few months after Charlie Hebdo, the
executive branch of the government is presented again in a demonstration of strength, in the
sense that the dominant responses to the acts in the public sphere and the instantiation of the
January 2015 attacks as terrorism in the media, reverberated a demonstration of state monopoly
on violence (Weber, 1963/1919).
In the wake of the 12 June 2016 attacks, then-president of the U.S.A. Barack H. Obama
deplored “an act of terror and an act of hate” before inviting people to come “united […] to
defend our people (Obama, as cited in “Read President,” 2016). Obama further declared that the
attack at Pulse is “an attack on all of us and on the fundamental values of equality and dignity
that define us as a country […] the values that make us Americans” (“Read President,” 2016).
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With Obama nearing the end of his presidential term, the Presidential candidates at the time used
the attacks in their campaign strategy. For example, Donald J. Trump reacted to the attacks by
demanding that Obama name the source of the attacks as “radical Islam” before suggesting a
travel ban on Muslims. Hillary Clinton’s comments on the attacks supported Obama’s stance,
calling for national unity. Newspaper reports of the Pulse attacks mention the “horror” that adds
up to a series of other violent attacks imprinted in the nation’s recent past (Shear, 2016). The
“horror” of the Pulse shooting saturated media with media pundits, politicians, and others who
coined the attack as one of the deadliest since 11 September 2001 (called 9/11 thereon) a tragic
comparison that was later overshadowed by the shooting in Las Vegas, Nevada, in 2017.
Comparisons to 9/11 and more recent events, like the 2 December 2015 attacks in San
Bernardino, California, were used to frame the Pulse shooting and revived debates about gun
control, immigration, and violence.
At the time of the attacks, a co-investigator and I were already investigating the dominant
discourse unfolding in the responses to the 7 January 2015 attacks of Charlie Hebdo headquarters
and the 9 January 2015 hostage situation at a Kosher supermarket that took place in France. We
were specifically interested in interpreting the post-Charlie events as terrorism by deconstructing
the dominant responses to the acts through the lens of social drama sequences (Rousset & Maret,
2016). This lens interrogates the socio-cultural repercussions of events that breached societal
expectations about violence. We had concluded by interrogating the paradoxes of recourse to
secularism in the wake of the January 2015 events and the stigmatization of Muslims in France,
and arguably in the U.S.A., that underlined the injunction to be Charlie. "La responsabilité
collective de la non-intégration d’individus (les terroristes) dans la communauté nationale
revient paradoxalement à un groupe plus restreint stigmatisé et réifié (la communauté

4

musulmane)," Rousset and Maret (2016) explained about the paradox of secularism in France
post-Charlie. A passage that translates best in English as followed, "the collective responsibility
for the non-integration of individuals (terrorists) into the national community paradoxically falls
on a smaller stigmatized and reified group (the Muslim community). "Les dominés," they
continued, "étant dans ce cas bien spécifique les responsables sous-entendus d’un acte qu’ils
n’ont pas commis" (Rousset & Maret, 2016, p. 247), or "The dominated being, in this very
specific case, those responsible for an act that they did not commit."
Secularism, as a taken-for-granted term often used to denote the separation of church and
state, refers to the political discourse that has shifted drastically in the turn of the twenty-first
century as,
a discourse about the articulation of the sovereign identity of Western European nationstates” with at its heart an articulation of “racialized gender […] a problem of difference
that is not external to the national body, but whose conceptualization nonetheless affects
the way all outsiders are perceived, how their handling of differences of sex and sexuality
establish their place on the evolutionary scale of civilization. (Scott, 2018, p. 24)
In the address to the nation broadcasted moments after the attacks, however, Hollande
appealed to principles of laicité – French articulation of secularism – implicitly. The president
announced the decision by the political body to reactivate the state of emergency, which stands
for the state of exception that grants greater administrative power to people who have the
authority to restrain liberties by imposing the closure of certain places and prohibiting
demonstrations among other security measures. Some news reports even mentioned that the
French colonial past and its contemporary deployment of secular values in reaction to the
January 2015 attacks constituted a fertile ground for the “djihadistes” behind the 13 November
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2015 attacks. Perpetrators who “jouent, avec un plaisir pervers, sur les fractures sociales et
identitaires francaises,” a passage which translates as: “plays, with a perverse pleasure, on the
French social and identity fractures” (Barthe & Guibert, 2015). The numerous comparisons made
to the Charlie Hebdo events saturated newspaper reports that described the “scenario” that once
again plunged the nation into a state of horror.
Following Hall’s (1992) claim that “media play a part in the formation, in the
constitution, of the things that they reflect,” or “the discourses of representation” (p. 14), this
project interrogates the discursive practices of representation unfolding in these two specific
attacks. Each of these events was perceived and coined by politicians and represented in the
media at the time as a series of “unprecedented” events in the history of France (Nossiter &
Goldstone, 2015) and the “worst mass shooting” in the history of the U.S.A. (Stack, 2016).
These events were selected for analysis for the apparent similarity in the insistence by news
editors to coin these attacks as such, that is, “unprecedented,” which would suggest a common
injunction to exceptionality for nation-states that operate under different conditions.
This project contends that such a dominant way of interpreting terrorist events is not new,
especially since 9/11, and even more so since the Charlie Hebdo attacks in France. Yet, the
dominant interpretation of the Bataclan and Pulse massacres and the unfolding media spectacle
about terrorism underlie deeper cultural issues that permeates the everyday “quotidien” of people
in France and in the U.S.A. today.2 This project attends to the discourse of representation
introduced in Hall’s methodological approach by analyzing national newspaper articles with the
highest national readership at home, with a high visibility online, with easily accessibility even if

2

According to the Centre National de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales, a comprehensive French dictionary,
quotidien refers both to what takes place on a daily basis and to the news press published every day in France about
current events.
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one were to buy a newspaper in Relay© street kiosks – that is, those newsstands one might
encounter after going through the security control processes found in many airports in France
and probably in the U.S.A. as well (Balbastre & Kergoat, 2011). This global outreach, even for
national newspapers, offers a unique vantage point for a critical intervention from scholarships
found in communication, culture, and identity.
This intervention connects media reports, cultural understandings of events, and identity.
For many people, identity is the fluid discursive formation of the Self, an “emotionally charged”
understanding of the self always in relation to other people; an embodiment of multiple selves
who always understand the self/selves within the cultural fabric of societies. That is to say,
identity is a communicative process. It is common to assume that people constantly attempt to
make sense of a shared lived reality. The goal of this project is to understand how
communication – as the “symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired,
and transformed” (Carey, 1989, p. 8; see also Fassett & Warren, 2015) – intervenes in the
understanding of power that shapes the cultural terrain following the Bataclan and Orlando
attacks.
In understanding power dynamics and how communication constitutes identities in
cultural mediated realities, the main topic is terrorism. By analyzing articles published the week
following the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, by Le Monde and Le Figaro and articles
published the week following the attacks in Orlando on 12 June 2016 by The New York Times
and The Washington Post, this project interrogates (inter)national press coverage of terrorism in
the so-called West. Said (2004) urged consideration of Orientalism – commonly understood in
the field of cultural studies as the set of discursive practices that have traditionally pitted East
and West and that have posited people from the East as Oriental Others (Barker, 2012) – as an
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appropriate lens because it “is very much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of contemporary
history,” “when the mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust and resurgent self-pride and arrogance
[…] are very large-scale enterprises” (Said, 2004, p. 870). This project turns to Orientalism as a
framework to understand the underlying issues of identity, representation, and violence by
analyzing how national newspaper articles reveal the underlying discourses and politics of two
events that happened in two different nation-states.
The events selected for this study are chosen among other events that appeared to have
breached the boundaries of Western societal values and morals, like the Charlie Hebdo attacks
(January 2015), the failed attacks on the Thalys train in between Paris and Brussels (August
2015), the attacks at a regional administrative center in San Bernardino, California (December
2015), the truck rampage on the promenade des anglais in Nice, France (July 2016), the shooting
at a concert in Las Vegas, Nevada (October 2017), to recall a few tragic events that marked the
latest part of histories of France and the U.S.A. This study deconstructs terrorism in the news by
tracing the role of media in making Muslims to be the culprit, always and already operating
outside and in opposition to Western universalist ideals of freedom, and thus a marker of
difference for the enactment of secular assimilationist policies (Jansen, 2013) that have been the
center of debates in the public spheres of France and the U.S.A. since before 9/11.
The critical approach to Orientalism offered by Said becomes the theoretical lens to
understand these trends, and to de-center the Western-centric assumptions that underlie
contemporary terrorism discourse about identity and communication. Considered to be a leading
postcolonial theory for the ways Said challenged traditional canons of Western scholarship,
media, and literature that have constructed the image of Arabs and Muslims in dehumanizing
ways, Orientalism is used in this dissertation to deconstruct terrorism. Situating news press
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articulation of terrorism following the Bataclan and Pulse attacks within contemporary discursive
practices of Orientalism, this study examines how newspapers perpetuated the mythological and
essentialist distinctions between people from superior, progressive, liberal, and enlightened
Western societies pitted against the inferior, backwards, barbaric, and uneducated non-Western
societies. The main concerns that motivated this dissertation were how the identity of the
perpetrators of both the 13 November 2015 and the 12 June 2016 attacks was represented in
dominant responses by politicians and media pundits as “radical Islamic” terrorists, or islamistes
in French news, because of revendications or demands made by and for the Islamic State during
or after the attacks. The focus on the identity of the perpetrators as being from “over there”,
coupled with the use of the language of the war on terror that depicted Muslims as culprits, that
associated Islam with terrorism, and conflated counterterrorism policies with immigration,
underlined how Orientalism could be reified dogmatically, “that the Orient is at bottom
something either to be feared […] or to be controlled” (Said, 1978, p. 301).
This dissertation stems out of concerns for the ways in which laws, policies, and
regulations have constructed people who identify as Muslim, or who are identified as such, as the
target of racializing practices. Specifically, what drives this study are concerns about the
surveillance practices and policies that have targeted Muslims in France under the state of
emergency since the Bataclan, and the anti-Muslim political agenda pushed by Trump with the
call for a travel ban – a call that was later turned into an executive order upheld by the Supreme
Court (2017, February 7) – in the U.S.A. By deconstructing news representation of terrorism
through the lens of Orientalism, this project seeks to better understand the transnational
continuities and discontinuities of colonial legacies that continue to shape communication about
religion, national identity, race, and sexuality in contemporary France and in the U.S.A. Drawing
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from Orientalism to deconstruct newspaper representation of terrorism in France and the U.S.A.
also allows this project to respond to the call by scholars in cultural studies and communication
to deconstruct Orientalizing discourses that articulate Muslim and Arab as one and the same,
because “in today’s post 9/11 context, the War on Terror racializes Muslims as brown threats”
(Yousuf & Calafell, 2018, p. 314).
Summary and Statement of Sensitizing Questions
To summarize this dissertation, the goals are threefold. First, this project seeks to
understand the significance of acts that challenged the authority of a nation-state in the use of
legitimate violence. Second, this project interrogates newspaper representation of terrorism
following these acts that breached societal expectations about the use of political violence. Third,
this project challenges the reinforcement of Orientalism by studying what terrorism means and
how cultural identities are constituted communicatively in two specific national contexts. More
specifically attentive to this latter and more specific purpose, the dissertation project deconstructs
Orientalism by comparing themes in media reports that underlie unequal power relations within
the contemporary cultural politics of contested and misrepresented Eastern-Western identities
and the set of antagonistic relationships that are instantiated in the backdrop of terrorist episodes
and their aftermath. As Orientalism is constructed discursively and materially in mediated
contexts, one part of the second goal (mentioned above) is to determine how codes and
languages made salient in the analysis of national newspaper strike this deeper logic related to
Orientalism.
In light of these three goals, this project contributes theoretically and practically to the
role of media in constructions of cultural identities of nation states informed by Orientalism.
Specifically, this project pays attention to questions related to issues about identity made salient
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in the analysis of news discourse. It is possible to witness how media narratives about the
perpetrators are constructed in ways that revive a certain hostility towards people responsible for
the acts as folk devils, defined as the scapegoats (Cohen, 2002), which then are also embedded in
the amalgam between immigration and terrorism. These narratives allow scholars and
practitioners to better understand how France and the U.S.A. are always and already presented in
a Western-centric continuum that presents itself as threatened by a common enemy. We also
address the war-like security discourse that saturated the news as an element that contributed to
increasing concerns about the terrorist threat and expectations in terms of public policy. We
make visible the paradox with which the press and political authorities are confronted. This
paradox lies between unity and distinctions, consensus and dissensus, belonging and exclusion.
In other words, the paradox operates between the consensus on “the need to come together” and
the explicit and symbolic relegation of people who are Muslims (or identified as such) and/or
people who identify with a “fluid” sexual identity (in the case of the shooting in Pulse) and who
are already often marginalized (Alimahomed-Wilson, 2019; Puar, 2017; Welch, 2004). This
rhetoric appears throughout the documents analyzed even though the sense of belonging
(especially towards the "nation") is also promulgated as a bulwark against "radicalization" and
possible actions.
To develop this contribution, this project attends to the following questions as entrée
points into the media texts about terrorism. These questions are sensitizing frames: (1) How do
national newspapers in the U.S.A. deploy the notion of terrorism the week following the 12 June
2016 attacks at Pulse nightclub in Orlando? and (2) How do national newspapers in France
deploy the notion of terrorism the week following the 13 November 2015 attacks at the Bataclan
concert hall in Paris? Examining the answers to these questions then enables study of the main
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research question (RQ): In what ways do national newspapers in France and the U.S.A. reinforce
Orientalism? This research question both extends the theoretical underpinnings of Orientalism
as a framework to understand the historic specificity of terrorism in the media today and serves
to highlight the assumptions about terrorist acts as working in isolation from or parallel to the
doing of nation-states.
In addition to addressing issues related to terrorism in the media, this examination of
newspaper articles contributes to the field of critical cultural studies in communication in several
ways by deconstructing newspaper codes and conventions used to construct terrorism, and by
offering a comparative analysis of national newspaper articles respectively published in France
about the Bataclan attacks and in the U.S.A. about the Pulse attacks.

Overview of Chapters
The dissertation opens with a review of the literature on terrorism, moral panic, and
Orientalism in the media (Chapter Two). This section offers the theoretical background of this
project anchored in critical cultural studies, political theory, and international and intercultural
communication scholarships. The interdisciplinarity of this project is inspired by anglophone and
francophone studies that challenge dominant understandings of identity, communication, and
culture. I continue with the methodological foundation for a comparative thematic analysis of
newspaper articles (Chapter Three).
The first analytical chapter (Chapter Four) investigates the representation of the attacks
that ended at the Bataclan. I begin with an analysis of narratives published by the newspapers
about the perpetrators of the attacks. These narratives work to fuel a sentiment of hostility
against people who identify as Muslims or who are identified as such. I continue by analyzing
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how the description of the events and the dominant responses by politicians, media pundits, and
other moral entrepreneurs like police officers and investigators published in French newspapers,
vehicle justifications for the prolongation of a state of emergency. I contend that the war-like
discourse post-Bataclan is a central theme of newspaper representation. A set of accounts that
speak to a growing fear in France and the necessity to face the threat posed by terrorism. I
conclude by analyzing the ways in which news media make of the desire by some to stigmatize
Muslims in France as undeniable in the face of terror.
In the second analytical chapter (Chapter Five) I analyze the articles published by the two
national newspapers about terrorism in the U.S.A. post-Pulse. I begin with an analysis of the
description of the attacks that marked an incomprehension. I pay specific attention to the ways
newspapers make sense of the dominant responses to the Pulse attack by politicians a central
theme. A way for readers to feel concerned, worried, and seized with a need to make dominant
responses by people like then-presidential candidate Trump a plausible reality at all times for
everyone. I continue by examining the amplification by media of what comes across as a rush on
the part of the police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and politicians, to rationalize the
motives of the perpetrator.
The third analytical chapter (Chapter Six) draws out differences and similarities between
newspaper accounts of the events in France and in the U.S.A. I begin with an observation of
similarities between the national press in France and the U.S.A., which relay dominant discourse
marked by incomprehension and difficulties in defining a problem which is nevertheless
condemned. It appears that hostile discursive tendencies reinforce the climate of fear. One of the
main differences, between the dominant discourses in response to the Bataclan attacks and those
in response to the Pulse attack, is the volatile effect of panic. Indeed, post-Bataclan rhetoric seem
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to be anchored in the long term and the media convey justifications for the enactment and
prolongation of the state of emergency. In the U.S.A., the effects of panic wear off much faster
over time. This temporal difference is observed by the attempted and unsuccessful passage of a
law to prevent the purchase of firearms from people appearing on “watch lists” (Corso, 2017). I
conclude by interrogating the media appeal to people who identify or are identified as Muslims
to testify on the presidential candidacy, for example. From a critical point of view of
Orientalism, this way of narrating the lived experience of Muslims in the U.S.A. supports the
dualistic hypothesis characteristic of Orientalist discourses according to which there is a "good"
and a “bad” Muslim (Maira, 2009; Mamdani, 2002).
In the concluding chapter (Chapter Seven), I discuss the findings before offering insights
into the implications of this research project. I conclude with a reflexive understanding of
limitations and a discussion hopefully useful for future projects.
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CHAPTER TWO:
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The influences of Hall and Said on this research project are significant for the
understanding of research about language and communication in newspaper representation of
terrorism. The transformative calls from the Birmingham tradition in cultural studies (Hall et al.,
1980) invite an interrogation of the articulations of oppressive policing practices in nation-states
by studying newspaper articles. In a sense, this dissertation project aims to contribute to the more
contemporary call for the study of newspaper representation of terrorism through the lens of
moral panic sequences conceptualized under the aegis of Hall. This allows me to address events
that constituted a breach in contemporary society and to investigate the role of newspapers in the
reinforcement of Orientalism discourse post-Bataclan and post-Pulse.
In this section of my project, I begin by exploring the history of terrorism research and
the tensions in the definitions of the phenomenon before looking at how terrorism research
focuses on terrorism in the media as a moment of moral panic, or the role played by media in the
construction of an image of “folk devils” disproportionate to the global threat (Cohen, 2002). As
mentioned earlier in the cases of the Bataclan and Pulse, the perpetrators were identified as
Muslims far removed from the norms and values of societies in France and the U.S.A. It is
important to consider such stunning events because, taken as a whole, these events underlie the
way “folk devils” have cultivated panic (Walsh, 2017). After this conceptual discussion, I focus
on terrorism in the media and the underlying issues of violence related to representation and
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identity. If this dissertation focuses on the role of media in perpetuating the panic for the week
that followed the Bataclan and Pulse shooting, it contends that the dominant discourses and
moral panic dynamics can be traced back to historical processes that have been a trademark of
the societies being studied here.
At the time of the 2016 attacks in Orlando, Trump was a candidate to become the next
president of the U.S.A. This is what he said after the incident:
The bottom line is that the only reason the killer was in America in the first place, was
because we allowed his family to come here […]. We have a dysfunctional immigration
system, which does not permit us to know who we let into our country, and it does not
permit us to protect our citizens properly.
(Donald J. Trump address on the Pulse attacks, in Beckwith, 2016)
Trump’s response to the Pulse attack is making reference to the shooter’s nationality as
Afghan and shows how such political discourse functions to marginalize Brown bodies. The
argument states that the reason why Mateen perpetrated the attacks in Orlando is because his
parents immigrated to the U.S.A. Mateen’s father, who had fled Afghanistan after the invasion of
the Soviet Union and who moved to the U.S.A. in the early 1980s, became the focus of attention
after the shooting for posting social media commentaries about current political issues in
Afghanistan (Torbati & Landay, 2016). In addition, Trump’s call dismisses the fact that the
perpetrator identifies as a person from the U.S.A., by using “us/we” as different from him/they
(his parents). Not only does Trump’s speech perpetuate the dichotomous “us” vs. “them”
peculiar to orientalist discursive practices – that I later describe - it also supports Silva’s (2016)
claim that contemporary issues underlying the topic of terrorism in the media further alienates
Brown bodies in “the language of security and securitization,” that “becomes the basic
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terminology of rights and citizenships” (p. 5). I argue that terrorism in the media contributes to
the production of a culture of anxiety that subjectifies Black and Brown bodies, particularly
individuals who might self-identify as queers of color, following the Bataclan and Pulse attacks.

Terrorism Discourse in France and the U.S.A.
To understand terrorism in the media, this project begins by addressing the numerous
contradictions found in the definitions being given of the term “terrorism” in French and English.
I begin with the authoritative sources for everyday usages of the term terrorism before paying
attention to how scholars defined the term. The Oxford English Dictionary lists French as the
etymon to define terrorism in English. OED first defines the term by tracing its roots back from
the use of terror during the Revolution and the symbol of political violence. A contradiction
emerged when examining other definitions. Specifically, a contradiction lies in the second
understanding of terrorism that OED defines as: The unofficial or unauthorized use of violence
and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims; (originally) such practices used by a government
or ruling group (frequently through paramilitary or informal armed groups) to maintain its
control over a population; (now usually) such practices used by a clandestine or expatriate
organization as a means of furthering its aims.
This contradiction is particularly evident when one stops to question whether there exists
an official or authorized use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims. It is not
surprising to find a similar ambiguity in the French definitions found on the Centre National de
Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales (CNRTL). However, a difference in defining terrorism can be
found when terrorism and terror are used as an analogy in literature and the arts (e.g.,
“intellectual terrorism”). Intellectual terrorism stands for the set of practices aimed to intimidate
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or limit the distribution of ideas perceived as embarrassing ("Terrorisme," 2021). However, the
definition itself is not the issue per se. It simply highlights a contemporary paradox in society.
The point is to interrogate--in conducting a comparison of two thematic analyses of national
responses to two historically, specific, and exceptional events--where the responsibility
associated with terrorism is attributed. The issues in defining the term terrorism become, as
Dubuisson (2017) demonstrates, how nation-states apply different legal variations to the term.
The notion of terrorism becomes symbolic when nation-states like France or the U.S.A.:
souhaitent l’exclure de manière radicale pour des modes d’actions qu’ils estiment
légitimes par principe, qu’il s’agisse de l'usage de leurs forces armées pour les Etats les
plus puissants, ou de l’exercice du droit des peuples à l’autodétermination, pour les Etats
issus de la décolonisation. (Dubuisson, 2017, p. 31)
The English translation of this passage is as follows,
wish to exclude it in a radical way for modes of action that they consider legitimate in
principle, whether through the use of their armed forces for the most powerful states, or
the exercise of people’s right for self-determination, for the States that emerged from
decolonization.
The attempts at defining terrorism by nation-states communicatively shape the practices of
institutions like the police, the military, and the law and mobilize people with such power. Yet
those people and the institutions they represent operate outside of the legal field of terrorism.
This would mean that by disseminating a definition of terrorism in the legal apparatus, nationstates disengage with any forms of responsibility. A critical cultural studies approach becomes
critical to investigate the publicized privatization of nation-states that emerge from a
comprehensive contextualization of the events. It would illuminate the oppressive conditions of

18

institutional practices that sediment practices of racism about which Hall (Jhally, 2006b) talks.
The author, Dubuisson (2017), specifies that in France, following the attacks at Charlie Hebdo
and the Kosher supermarket hostage situation, penal law prevailed, and the legal treatment of
terrorism relied, at the time of the 13 November 2015 in France, on “règles relatives à la garde à
vue, à la détention provisoire, à la surveillance, à l’interception de communications, à la
prescription” (pp. 36-37), or “rules relating to police custody, pre-trial detention, surveillance,
interception of communications, prescription.”
In other words, the acts of 13 November 2015 have a deeper repercussion on people in
France who are already the targets of a society that preys on terrorism. A nation-state that grants
people in the judicial branches the authority is tempted to use the flexibility of counter terrorism
to converge interests in the definition of the threat posed by terrorism. This is important to
consider because, following these acts of extreme violence, we understand why newspaper
representation focused heavily on the state of emergency, the declarations of war, and other
escalations of violence. The quote by Dubuisson reminds us of the differential treatments made
in the context of terrorism. A reminder of the reality of people who identify with Islam and who
live under the policing practices of social institutions of police, education, media in France,
that disproportionately target and incarcerate young Muslim men; Muslim children
attended crowded, underfunded public schools; Muslim families are disproportionately
represented in public housing projects; and Muslims are themselves the targets of
Islamophobic intolerance, as is clear in the growing instances of physical assault, verbal
abuse, job discrimination, and legal sanction. (Fernando, 2014, p. 240)
Although terrorism resists a singular definition (Mooney & Young, 2005), researchers
agree on certain characteristics of the term. According to Anderson and Sloan (2009), terrorism
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consists of using violence, with the intention of creating fear, to reach a broader audience. In that
sense, technological advances in communications leads to new forms of terrorism-“nonterritorial terrorism” (p. v)—thus making terrorism an even more pervasive phenomenon
that blurs the lines between types of terrorist actors (state, revolutionary, entrepreneurial), their
goals, and their modus operandi. By modus operandi, scholars who study terrorism refer to the
instantiation of a moment as a crisis by the ensemble of discursive practices that shape labor
relations following attacks marked as terrorism. These discursive practices would include, for
example, the deployment of a militaristic articulation of the state of emergency that was at the
center of media representation of terrorism following the 13 November 2015 attacks. For
another example of discursive practices, one could consider the increasing deployment of public
and private security forces in already highly securitized places across an already highly
weaponized U.S.A. Folks might remember the outrage expressed by politicians in France3 after
the mimicry made about the 13 November 2015 attacks by Trump, close to three years after the
events. Folks might also remember that some of the families of the patrons who died at Pulse and
other survivors of the 12 June 2016 attacks sued the security officer on duty that night, for failing
to provide security.

3

The outrage was not only about the actual act of mimicry, or imitation of a "terrorist" shooting down one person
after the other. The outrage was spurred by what Trump Donald J. Trump, then-president of the U.S.A., stated after
this mimic in the 4 May 2018 speech delivered in front of an audience gathered for a National Rifle Association
convention. In front of people who Trump claimed "stand strong for those sacred rights given to us by God,
including the right to self-defense" the president then claimed that "if one employee or just one patron had a gun. Or,
if just one person in this room had been there with a gun aimed at the opposite direction, the terrorist would have
fled, would have been shot, and it would have been a whole different story. I mean, right?" before the crowd clapped
in ovation (see McIntee, 2018; Rushworth, 2018). s
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The Media in Terrorism: Fabricating the Panic
This definitional perspective highlights the symbolic and political violence that informs
this project rooted in communication and cultural studies research. This project shares a
communication scholarship perspective that often considers how media frame certain events
(Cannizzaro & Gholami, 2018; Chauhani & Foster, 2014), especially in the wake of terrorist
events (Altheide, 2002; Decker & Rainey 1982; Dunn et al., 2005; Hogan, 2006; Iqbal, 2017;
Kabir & Bourk 2012; Lewis, 2005; Mahoni, 2010; Morin, 2016). To situate this project in the
scholarship that focuses on terrorism in the media, this project pays attention to the ways in
which scholars like Artrip and Debrix (2018) talk about “effects of terroristic imagery” as a
condition “to overstimulate the global media system to the point of what we call its saturation,
exhaustion, and reversal” (p. 75). By mobilizing scholarship in communication and cultural
studies, this project interrogates media in terrorism to understand the articulation of oppressive
surveillance practices that followed the Bataclan and Pulse attacks.
This project draws from the concept of moral panic as it is approached by Hall et al.
(1978) in their book Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order. Their
conceptualization of a moral panic is important to understand the role of media in times of crisis.
To specify, Hall et al. (1978) relied on the concept coined by Cohen (2002) in Folk Devils and
Moral Panic known as moral panic, a moment in which,
[a] condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat
to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical
fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops,
politicians and other right thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their
diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the
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condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible.
Sometimes the subject of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which
has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the
panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other
times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes
as those in legal or social policy or even in the way society conceives itself. (Cohen,
2002, p. 1)
To paraphrase this passage, moral panic refers to the dominant perception of concerns
following a specific event through representation of a threat to the normative foundations of
society. Media, to refer back to Cohen cited above, play a role in the definition of a threat by
presenting people who are defined as such in “stylized and stereotypical fashion.” A threat posed
by “folk devils” who are perceived in society as real, symbolic danger, by moral entrepreneurs
and that is amplified by media (Pece, 2018). For Hall et al., media played a crucial role in the
legitimation of decisions by the ruling elite class in Britain to assert authority and sovereign
power over the “monopoly of legitimate violence” (Hall et al., 1978, p. 225). Drawing from the
interdisciplinary scholarships of Policing to study terrorism in the media means to position the
legal, social, and cultural responses to the Bataclan and Pulse attacks as terrorist events that
“come to serve as the articulator of the crisis, as its ideological conductor” (Hall et al., 1978, p.
viii). By analyzing national newspaper articles as a site of analysis, this project argues that the
official reactions to the terrorist events following the Bataclan attacks in France and the Pulse
attacks in the U.S.A. speak to a moment of crisis.
In this study, the sequential model of moral panic (Goode & Ben Yehuda, 2009, pp. 4849; see also Hall et al., 1978; Walsh, 2017) is mobilized to understand the role of media
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representation of terrorism in amplifying the panic following the 2015 and 2016 attacks.4 The
moral panic model determines five major temporal trends. These trends are: a concern for the
behavior of a group and its consequences on society; an increase in hostility towards the affected
group, the focus of concern; the presence of a substantial or generalized consensus on the reality
of the threat caused by the identified group; the assumption that a larger number of the identified
population is capable of these acts, and the immeasurability of public concern about the threat;
and the volatile nature of moral panic which translates into the institutionalization of societal
concerns, normalizing the punitive nature of panic that targets transgressors (Goode & Ben
Yehuda, 2009, pp. 37-43).
It is possible to observe how strong emotional reactions from presidents, ministers, and
other stakeholders evoking Charlie, coupled with the social media resonance of popular trends
like #Pray for Paris in the wake of the attacks, invoked the enactment of laws and reforms on
national identity, security, and surveillance that highlighted the construction of a deeper societal
problem signifying a moral panic. After the shock of the events, the national press also conveyed
a strong hostility towards the “scapegoats.” France is then constantly presented within a Western
continuum that finds itself threatened by a common enemy. As such, the purpose is to show how
questions about identity feed the moral panic.

4

According to Hall et al. (1978), the moral panic process implies “at least five essential conditions: a state of
anticipatory mobilization and preparedness in the control apparatuses; a sensitizing of official circles and of the
public through the mass media; a perceived danger to social stability- such as when the crime rate is read as
indexing a general break-down in social authority and control ; the identification of a vulnerable ‘target’ group’
(e.g., black youth) involved in dramatic incidents (‘muggings’) which trigger public alarm; the setting in motion of
the mechanisms by which conspiratorial demons and criminal folk-devils are projected on to the public stage” (p.
305).
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The Reinforcement of Orientalism Discourse in Newspaper Representation
As mentioned previously, Orientalism is used as a theoretical framework to deconstruct
media representation of terrorism following the Bataclan and Pulse attacks. In this section of the
dissertation, I show how Orientalism is defined and explained by leading scholars in the fields of
postcolonial theory, cultural studies, and communication before drawing out the facets through
which the corpus is analyzed.
It is with the publication of Orientalism by Said (1978) that the theory has known a long
career in the academic realm, even though Said was not the person who coined the term.5 He
demonstrated, from a humanist standpoint (Radakrishnan, 2007), how canonical Western texts
constructed limiting and negatively stereotypical representations of the East, now commonly
mistaken as the Middle East, in literature, academic scholarship, and the press. Drawing from his
positionality as an Arab Palestinian American literary critic and leading political theorist, Said
analyzed and challenged how texts produced by scholars in the field of philology like de Sacy or
Renan, were perceived as objective, but were shaped by and conversely worked in tandem with
imperialist domination. For Said, “[O]rientalism […] has less to do with the Orient than it does
with “our” world” (emphasis in original, Said, 1978, p. 12). To paraphrase Said, Orientalism is
the diffusion of Otherness and the set of related discourse that diffuses in the cultural imaginary.
This orientalist discourse is a mechanism that relies on,

5

The tenets of Orientalism were ethically attributed by Said to Anouar Abdel-Malek (1963), writer, journalist,
doctor in philosophy, sociologist, from Egypt who occupied a seat as a leader in charge of research hosted by the
CNRS, the French National Center for Scientific Research, for some time. This study recognizes the significance of
this visionary scholar who, already in 1963, deconstructed the "two faces of neo-Orientalism" that manifested in "the
rebirth of the nations and peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America" post-WWII (p. 112). Neo-Orientalism refers to
this historical escalation into nationalist movements and the myths of socialist states erupting post-WWII era,
leading to the confrontation of what Abdel-Malek conceptualized as "Two Europes" that "are rethinking this
complex: the Europe (and European America) of the colonial powers; the Europe of the socialist states and
movements, soon joined by the revolutions on the three forgotten continents" (p. 112).
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a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic […] texts […] an elaboration not
only of a basic geographical distinction but also of a whole series of “interests” which
[…] it not only creates but also maintains; it is […] a certain will or intention to
understand […] to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different
[…] world. (Said, 1978, p. 12)
By studying the production of academic and non-academic texts from Western countries such as
France, Britain, and the U.S.A., Said argued that Orientalism subjugated and objectified people
from studied areas through narratives that emerged from the logic of imperialism. He argued that
these texts (e.g., reports from military officers and ethnographers on the ground, artists and
novelists) created (and arguably, continue to create) systematic representations of people in the
East as different from people in the West, as Others. Essentializing the lived experiences of
people in and of the regions from now contemporarily known Western sub-Sahara to Western
China and Japan, these representations were characterized by language used to mark difference
(Barker, 2012).
To study these discourses and representations, this dissertation project investigates
newspapers as the “aesthetic texts” that continue to draw a “geographical distinction” between
the West and the East by elaborating on the “series of interests” underlying terrorism discourse
that centers people in position of power, such as presidents, security experts, and other media
pundits, following the Bataclan and the Pulse attacks. To interrogate issues of power as they
emerge in discursive formations, this project relies on an understanding of the different layers of
power that fuel Orientalism,
a discourse that is […] produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of
power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial or
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imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative
linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with
orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what
“we” do and what “they” cannot do to understand as “we” do). (Said, 1978, p. 12)
The goal for this project is to understand how these different layers of power materialize in the
wake of terrorism by analyzing articles published in national newspaper.
A type of power that, in the case of the phenomenon of terrorism studied here, has tended
to solidify a convergence of interests that resonates more with the notion of “necropower”
introduced by Mbembe (2003, 2019), that accounts for ”contemporary forms of the subjugation
of life to the power of death” and
for the various ways in which, in our contemporary world, weapons are deployed in the
interest of maximally destroying persons and creating death-worlds, that is new and
unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to living
conditions that confer upon them the status of the living dead. (Mbembe, 2019, p. 92)
This research thus situates necropower as a contemporary understanding of discursive regime of
power, political and moral underlying the discourse of Orientalism. Necropower should come
across newspaper representation of terrorism in the response made to acts in which people use
the body to blur the line between freedom and suicide, and to challenge the state and state
sovereignty over technological warfare. I am not comparing France and the U.S.A. to the
apartheid-like conditions of Palestine that led Mbembe to deconstruct necropower. However, I
bring necropower to offer a context of contemporary formations of terror that reinforced
Orientalism since Said challenged its dogmas.
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At the time of the Bataclan and Pulse events, I was already building interests in
conducting research that addressed three problematics of political concerns: about acts of
violence, about limiting images and representation in media, and primarily about the
perpetuation of racism through the reinforcement of Orientalism.
The first problematic revolved around the desire to better understand what leads people to
use their own bodies to commit horrific acts of violence in the name of religion, the state, or
simply the self. I am also equally nauseated by the responses that come from leaders of nationstates to resort to a similar type of violence, only difference is that state use of violence is made
legal. The concern is therefore about the a priori conditions that have made of the acts of
violence studied here, a possibility for its use and its justification. In that sense, I am interested in
studying even further (after the dissertation) the phenomenon of violence which is, in my
opinion, a global concern.
The second problematic that boosted my research interests was about the role of
newspaper in particular, and media in general, in offering very little understanding of specific
articulations of violence. That is mostly due to my standpoint as a participant observer invested
in keeping track of contemporary identity politics in France and the U.S.A. It is also due to my
background growing up in a household in which news was always put on trial. Jumping forward
to the era in which the Pulse and Bataclan attacks took place, I was beginning to learn from
Black feminist epistemologies, about the dehumanizing language used in media and the
controlling images in the post-race era, meaning after the abolition of slavery in 1865 in the
U.S.A. and in 1848 in France.6

6

Note that the most recent utterance of post-race could be attributed to Christiane Taubira who was instrumental in
passing a law that recognized human trafficking and slavery as a crime against humanity (see Tendant a la
reconnaissance de la traite et de l’esclavage en tant que crime contre l’humanité, 87 Sénat § 2001–434. (2001).
http://www.senat.fr/leg/tas00-087.html).
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Which leads me to the third problematic that animates my research agenda, the concern
about the perpetuation of racism through Orientalism. One could only imagine how easily the
dehumanization of people in Egypt took place and how the depiction of people who had to face
the imperialistic violence of Napoleon and its troops, saturated journals and press of the late
1790s (e.g., Courrier de l'Égypte).7 Related to the third and final problematic is how the first two
weave together as elements that reinforce Orientalism and perpetuate racism. In this final
challenge, the question is about the role of newspapers in the representation of specific acts of
violence and the state response to these events. My contribution is to question what Said
contended in the late 1980s but within different schemes of violence:
“The border wars” that are an expression of essentializations - Africanizing the African,
Orientalizing the Oriental, Westernizing the Western, Americanizing the American, for
an indefinite time and with no alternative (since African, Oriental, Western essences can
only remain essences) – a pattern that has been held over from the era of classic
imperialism and its systems. (Said, p. 312)
The goal here is to draw from previous research that has shown how certain acts, when marked
as terrorism in media, escalate the fear of the “barbaric” Islamic otherized Other. The central
problem of Orientalism is, as pointed out by Said with regard to literature from Orientalists -deemed experts on questions about the Orient -- with textual attitudes that normalize “expression
of essentializations” and, concomitantly, amplify the justification made by experts for the
legitimate use of sovereign rights over life and death, border and citizenships.

7

See: Courrier de l’Égypte. (1798). https://data.bnf.fr/fr/32750347/courrier_de_l_egypte/
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In Orientalism, Said distinguished between manifest and latent Orientalism. This
distinction was marked over time, by the transition from an abstract and unconscious process that
otherized the Orient through the production of an imaginary about people from the Orient as
exotic, promiscuous, backwards. This was what Said coined as latent Orientalism, which shifted
in the late nineteenth century at a time when novelists, artists, philologists, sociologists,
anthropologists, and political theories (tied to Colonialism) disseminated these unconscious
ideals into public life and materialized this othering process. This is what Said called manifest
Orientalism, the process that brought stereotypical and dehumanizing assumptions about the
Orient into public life for people in the West to consume through images and writings. Such a
distinction is important for this study because, according to Said, the notion of objectivity that
was at the center of knowledge produced under latent Orientalism remained almost untouched in
its more manifest forms. For example, the manifestation of latent Orientalism doesn't stop at
newspapers, 24/7 broadcast news, radio shows, and other means in the mass production of news
today. One could be subjected to manifestation of Orientalism in the diffusion of advertisements
for chemically induced products with the sole purpose of whitening skin, in the distribution of
scripts and mise en scene in contemporary western cinema and television series narratives with
villains (Jhally, 2006b; Shaheen, 2003; Smith et al., 1998), and most importantly for Said, I
think, in the decision-making processes of nation-states that hold sovereign powers over life and
death, border and identity. In this regard, Orientalism discourse cannot be separated from the
“biological determinism and moral political admonishment” that have racialized and alienated
“Orientals” and “all other peoples variously designated as backward, degenerate, uncivilized”
(Said, pp. 206-207). I highlight how mass media in general and the national newspapers under
analysis often perceive themselves and are often perceived as objective agents reporting facts.
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The challenge is to deconstruct how latent Orientalism continues to be a constant, that is,
continues to be manifest in contemporary news discourse about terrorism.
To do so, this study follows the methodological devices offered by Said in the study of
Orientalism. The goal is to examine contrasted discursive practices that pit the West against the
East and the dehumanizing ways these adversarial relationships are made apparent. As a residue
of this othering, “the Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture as
Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of
discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial
bureaucracies and colonial styles” (pp. 3-5). It is based on these assumptions that Said offered
the methodological devices to understand Orientalism within specific contemporary histories.
That is, this project intends to distinguish between various forms of knowledge and the politics
of knowledge production in/about the study of terrorism, to draw from sound methodological
devices to challenge the authority of dominant subjectification of the Other found in the analysis
of national newspapers, and to investigate the personal dimension and examine the current
processes of identification that are permeating the everyday lived experiences of people in
France and in the U.S.A.

Criticisms of Said on Orientalism
Overt or contemporary manifestations of latent Orientalism are not, in a sense, new.
Other theorists, poets, revolutionaries, and decolonial scholars, have sought to challenge the
conditions imposed by colonialism. As a case in point, Césaire (1955) who wrote in the seminal
work, Discours sur le Colonialisme, about the realities of the colonized by posing the equation:
“colonisation=chosification” – or, in English, colonization=thingification – as a metaphor to
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speak about “sociétés vidées d’elles-memes, des cultures piétinées, de terres confisquées, de
religions assassinées, de magnificiences artistiques anéanties, d’extraordinaire possibilités
supprimées” (p. 23). This passage best translates as follows: “societies emptied of themselves,
cultures trampled, lands confiscated, religions assassinated, artistic magnificence destroyed,
extraordinary possibilities suppressed.” This passage is also best understood as an entry point to
frame the criticisms to Said's critique of Orientalism.
There are different facets of the theory on Orientalism discourse coined by Said that have
been questioned, challenged, and expanded since its inception as a leading approach to
understand the reality of the colonized conditioned by the dehumanizing, and at times
exoticizing, perception of the colonizer. These productive critiques often revolved around the
question of agency of the so-called Oriental subjects and around the role of the construction of
gender in the discursive frames that buttress Orientalism discourse. I now address some of these
critiques and explain how they pertain to this project.
Feminist scholars have expanded on Said’s critique of Orientalism, especially as it relates
to the representation of Arabs and Muslim women in literature, the arts, and academic texts
(Lowe, 1992). Yeğenoğlu (1998) aligned with Said’s critique of an Orientalism that serves to
mark and vilify Arabs and Muslims as barbaric while upholding Western superiority. In Colonial
Fantaisies: Towards a feminist reading of Orientalism, Yeğenoğlu deconstructs the ways in
which Western femininity upheld Orientalism. Yeğenoğlu examined how, through their status as
white women, artists were able to portray lives of Arab and Muslim women, a feature originally
forbidden to White men. In a sense, Yeğenoğlu argued that through the lens of Western (read as
White) femininity, representation of Arab and Muslim women shifted Orientalist representations
through the process of unveiling. Using the harem trope, white women seeking
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acknowledgments in the artistic realm, broadened the imaginary of people in the West about the
East (Dubrofsky, 2006).
By participating in the portrayal of the harem, for instance, Western femininity responded
to the demand of a dominant White male gaze to unveil the elite Muslim women. Lewis (1996)
pays attention to the ways in which women authors and artists who struggled to carve a space for
women’s representation in the West, did so by upholding Orientalism. In Gendering
Orientalism: Race, Femininity, and Representation, Lewis (1996) analyzed the works of artists
like Henriette Browne and George Eliot to deconstruct the colonial gaze, arguably the lens
portrayed in Browne’s and Eliot’s artwork. For Lewis (1996) orientalist discourse stands for the
way power is diffused, “as an ordering of knowledge [that] produces positionalities (enunciative
modalities) into which individuals are interpellated and from which they may speak or act (as
policemen, lawyers, mothers) but which are never the truth of themselves” (pp. 18-19). From my
perspective, this definition reinforces the idea that invites a Western audience to imagine the
need for people from the so-called Orient to be “civilized” or become more like the West. It also
offers a more complex understanding about communication and identity underlying Orientalism.

Orientalism in Context: Contemporary Manifestations
The theoretical framework of Orientalism has been deployed and operationalized by
scholars of postcolonial theory (Malreddy, 2015), especially those interested in expanding this
groundbreaking theory on issues related to citizenship (Isin, 2015; Maira, 2009) and
globalization (Turner, 1994). The critical lens provided by Said in Orientalism – which he
further expanded in Culture and Imperialism – became a meaningful perspective to deconstruct
how media today participate in the perpetuation of Orientalizing discourse (Said, 1992).
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According to Said, Orientalism was more than just discourse that organized knowledge as
objective and rational epistemologies that ordered academic thoughts. Orientalist texts
constructed an imaginary Other in need of civilization for and by people in the West who
consumed these truths. The essentializing aspects and effects of these texts served as a fertile
ground for political decisions of empires and nation-states in the West to colonize the so-called
Orient. Through the lens of Orientalism, the West is always perceived as civilized and
progressive while the East is always already perceived as barbaric and backward. Contemporary
terrorism discourse, as Said explains at length in his book Culture and Imperialism, maintains
this imaginary hierarchy. The following passage illustrates the concerns raised by Said at the end
of Culture and Imperialism about the challenges faced by conscious intellectuals who seek to
challenge dominant discourses that continuously reinforce Orientalism, that,
The fear and terror induced by the overscale images of “terrorism” and “fundamentalism”
– call them the figures of an international or transnational imaginary made up of foreign
devils – hastens the individual’s subordination to the dominant norms of the moment.
This is as true in the new post-colonial societies as it is in the West generally and the
United States particularly. Thus to oppose the abnormality and extremism embedded in
terrorism and fundamentalism […] is also to uphold the moderation, rationality,
executive centrality of a vaguely designated “Western” (or otherwise local and
patriotically assumed) ethos. The irony is that far from endowing the Western ethos with
confidence and securing the “normality” commonly associated with privilege and
rectitude, this dynamic imbues “us” with a righteous anger and defensiveness in which
“others” are finally seen as enemies, bent on destroying our civilization and way of life.
(Said, 1978, p. 310)
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The significance of this passage by Said for this dissertation is twofold. First, Said
highlighted the role played by media in constructing the figure of terrorism through
representational modes and strategies that fuel the imaginary of people in Western nations with
the image of “made up” folk devils. Second, it speaks also to the paradoxes of Western
rationality that seek to find any justification available to resort to political violence in the defense
of ideals that appear to be irreconcilable with the reality imposed by this normative and
essentialist myth of a clash of civilization. This passage also shows the irony of the dominant
discourse that tends to appeal to audiences in the wake of events marked as terrorism. This irony,
to paraphrase Said, lies in the fact that responses to such violent events result, at least for nations
in the West, in the reinforcement of legitimate violence (e.g., bombings in Raqqa by the French
military forces, or the state of emergency in France that featured military occupation of public
spaces). Scholars often questioned the meaning of these responses and wonder what it would
mean for presidents and first responders to listening to – even for a minute – demands made by
the perpetrators during or in the revendications made public after the Bataclan attacks and Pulse
shooting. The demands made by the perpetrators during the attacks, often read in news from
stories of people who survived the attacks, were to withdraw troops from nations like
Afghanistan and/or to stop bombing Syria.
Orientalism discourse was observed by Said in the texts written by military officers
during colonial occupations. These texts were embedded in the composition of story lines,
published in and/or broadcasted by popular, traditional, and mass media. The way Said
conceptualized Orientalism in the form of a trilogy – Covering Islam, Question of Palestine, and
Orientalism – allowed for interpretations of character developments, plots, and the cultural
significance of narratives written by novelists, politicians, and media pundits, as meaningful
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ways to understand how Western control of resources, national imaginary, and class
consciousness created the conditions for the contemporary issues related to racialized identity at
the intersection of religion, nationality, and sexuality. Orientalism functions like a web in the
racializing matrix. Orientalism, from a Black Feminist and Postcolonial theorical standpoint,
normalized oppressive and dehumanizing language that have perpetuated essentialist discourse
asserting Western modes of dominance. Orientalism is what Andrea Smith (2016) coined as a
pillar of White Supremacy in heteropatriarchal societies like France and the U.S.A. (see also
Fleming, 2017).
As a pillar of White Supremacist Heteropatriarchy, Orientalism discourse was reinforced
in newspaper representation of terrorism following events marked as terrorism by an
intensification of the media consumer experiences with mediatized “textual attitudes” like the
one about terrorism following the 13 November 2015 attacks. It is fair to assume with Said that
terrorism as text in newspapers, purported “to contain knowledge about something actual” (Said,
1978, p. 94). “Such texts,” Said continues, can “create not only knowledge but also the very
reality they appear to describe” (p. 94). Texts that, in the context of newspaper representation of
terrorism post-Bataclan, convey how “a human being confronts something […] threatening and
previously distant” (p. 93) and the ones that convey appearances of successes that can only
inherently intensify the threat posed by terrorism, and that terrorism post-Bataclan is “what in
essence we know or can only know about it” (p. 94). Using Said’s methodological devices in my
parallel analysis of French and English articles published by influential national newspapers
respectively in France and in the U.S.A, it is possible to observe how national newspapers
exerted a lot of energy to draw out the figure of terrorism.
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Orientalism also acts as a theoretical foundation for understanding terrorism as a
phenomenon with historic specificity. The assumption here is that the articles analyzed for this
project serve as a platform to understand how Orientalist discursive formations materialize in
societies today. In this part of the project, I combine Orientalism with the work of theorists who
address issues of representation and identity in terrorism today, like Silva (2016), who talks
about a sudden shift in the cultural process of "identification” (p. 51),8 or Alsultany (2012) who
writes about the “simplified complex representations” and more specifically the “simplified
complex explanations” encountered in traditional news outlets (p. 128) that shape our realities
today.9
In other words, this project looks at the aesthetics of newspapers and seeks to challenge
conventions and codes to construct objectivity in news media. This approach questions how
broad concepts of culture and freedom are deployed in news and how they are deeply anchored
in newspaper representation of terrorism. The central problematic of this research is guided by
the following research question: how or in what ways did newspaper representation of terrorism
after the 13 November 2015 and the 12 June 2016 “terrorist” events, reinforce Orientalism? This
question is broken down into two distinct point of comparisons essential for the understanding of

8

For Silva (2016), "the level of individual agency that one assumes in identity has been reinscribed with additional
powers when it becomes identification. With the latter comes the ability to identify self and other as insider and
outsider, essentially creating regimes of identification: discourses that create categories of identities that converge
under the rubric of security and terror" (p. 51). Vital for this project is how Silva informs our understanding of
consensus-building - implied in these processes of identification - and moral panic. "Identification strategies," Silva
continues, " form a system of consensus surrounding identity that naturalizes the system of racialized hierarchies
that we come to accept as 'normal.' Thus, the identification produces the categorical criteria of popular tropes of
identity." Equally important is then to draw from Silva and interrogate newspaper representation of terrorism that
may have fallen under the trap of naturalizing hierarchies of race and may have participated in the production of
tropes of identity that have always and already existed.
9
For Alsultany (2012), the portrayals of the perpetrators of acts marked as terrorism "and the media's implication
that we should abstain from a sympathetic response" have consequences. "First, 'going Muslim' is not an adequate
explanation for the actions of these men. Political violence at its core is not about symbolical castration, or sexism,
or heterosexual failure, but rather about complex political and historical problems. Second, affect is configured to
support empire. A lack of sympathy for 'supposed' terrorists like these goes hand in hand with the delegitimization
of any discussion of how U.S. foreign policies contribute to contemporary political problems" (p. 128).
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contemporary textual attitudes reinforcing Orientalism. The problematic questions one side of
the Atlantic and the representation of terrorism on national news in France after the 13
November 2015 attacks, and the other side of the Atlantic and the question about the
representation of terrorism on national news in the U.S.A. after the 12 June 2016 mass shooting.
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CHAPTER THREE:
METHODOLOGY
Orientalism stands for the sets of discourse that have produced epistemological and
ontological assumptions about what it means to be from the Orient from the perspective of
people in positions of authority in the so-called West. As Alsultany (2012) argued, the use of the
term terrorism by media following 9/11 was a subtle way to conflate all events perpetrated by
Muslims and Arabs as terrorism and conversely, “masks terrorism perpetrated by people who are
not Arab or Muslim” (p. 101). For example, media representation of the acts committed by far or
alt-right organizations who use violence do not necessarily refer to the perpetrators as terrorists
(DeFoster, 2017). Conditioned by 9/11, “media accounts”, Alsultany argued, have traditionally
focused on “what drove these men to violence, and yet they ultimately offer reductive
explanations” (p. 128). The ways that media representations of acts marked as terror tend to
“decontextualize and dehistoricize terrorism while offering a root cause that signals complexity”
(p. 128), is important for the broader purpose of the dissertation. This project seeks to
deconstruct the ways newspaper reify Orientalism by looking at how news reporters and editors
covered terrorism in ways that simplified complex notions of identity in the coverage of the
Bataclan and Pulse. Thus, I seek to shed lights on the dynamic processes of decontextualization
and identity formation underlying terrorism discourse in France and in the U.S.A.
To study the representation of terrorism in media and to understand how Orientalism may
be reified in news, requires establishing conceptual frameworks that can be identified in
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discourse. As explained earlier in this dissertation, moral panic is useful to understand the
ideological displacement that unfolded following the attacks at the Bataclan and Pulse. Moral
panic is defined as the process through which a group of people are essentialized and categorized
as a threat after a breach in societal expectations about political violence (see Chapter Two).
People turned into folk devils, or in this case, Muslims who are from the U.S.A. and France or
Western Europe but who don’t comply to the secularist values of the nation– through the
definition of a problem. What fuels the moral panic is the discrepancy between threat and
reactions, or as Hall et al. (1978) state “between what is perceived and what that is a perception
of” (p. 29). When Hall et al. (1978) studied the mugging panic in Britain,10 they revealed how
the definition and representation of specific types of crimes served as a justification for the
criminalization of Black youths. Thus, it is possible to assume that there are “signifying
mechanisms in the media and the sources on which they depend” and that newspaper
representation of terrorism “sustain the generation of the moral panic” (p. 222). This project thus
pays attention to the ways in which media representation of the events at the Bataclan and Pulse
work in tandem with the dominant control culture perpetuated by the police and the law in
defining and explaining the events. Hence, the necessity to situate the cultural context within
which the events, and their representations in media, unfolded for a week in media.
So, when the groups of perpetrators attacked the Stade de France, restaurants, bars, and
the Bataclan concert hall in Paris - people like Bilal Hadfi, Brahim Abdeslam, Chakib Akrouh,
Abdelhamid Abaaoud, Ismael Omar Mostefai, Samy Aminour, Foued Mohamed-Aggad, among

10

I would like to thank Steve Wilson for pointing out that there is an important parallel here, but also some
differences in the use of moral panic as a framework. The term “muggers” was not used to refer to mass shooters.
This dissertation draws from the conceptual framework of moral panic derived from the study about the mugging
panic to interrogate the signifying mechanisms in media, "a way of signifying events which also intrinsically
escalates their threat" (Hall et al., 1978, p. 223).
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others – supposedly orchestrated by Daech, and when Mateen shot the workers and patrons at
Pulse inspired by and with similar revendication than the 13 November 2015 attacks in France, it
was not surprising to observe how media instantiated these moments through frames of crime
and terror (Meyer, 2020; Truc et al., 2018). The conceptual framework of moral panic
illuminates how these events breached thresholds of violence for the way they challenged the
moral and legal basis of French and U.S.American societies. Moments of violence highlight “the
highest of the limits of societal tolerance, since violent acts can be seen as constituting a threat to
the future existence of the whole state itself (which holds the monopoly of legitimate violence)”
(Hall et al., 1978, p. 225). The events themselves, and their representation in media, and the
dominant responses by politicians, thus freeze violence over time. The signifying practices of
media in general, and of traditional media such as newspapers in particular, used to represent
terrorism linger over time and become the recurring imageries through which people make sense
of and remember events.
In summary, the purpose of this project is to show how Orientalism is reified through (a)
the reinforcement of civilizational discourse, (b) the us/them binary, and (c) the conflation of
terrorism with Islam and radicalism. To do so requires understanding themes highlighted from
data analysis and to understand how they reinforce Orientalism. In the following section, I
construct a map of meaning by offering a rationale. I explain why it is important to use
newspaper articles as a site of inquiry. Next, I turn to the step-by-step process of conducting a
comparative thematic analysis towards the critique of Orientalism.
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Newspapers as a Site of Inquiry and the Definition of Societal Problems
This project pays attention to the journalistic style and editorial choices for the
publication of newspapers articles during the seven days that followed the events. I chose to
study newspapers because they are an important medium that societies in the West rely on for
information. There are many reasons why it is important to focus on newspaper representation to
understand how Orientalism is reified following events marked as terrorism. News accounts
printed by mainstream newspapers constitute a fertile ground to grow our understanding of
issues related to representation following such events. Newspaper articles become a site of
inquiry for research that focuses on the way dramatic events like mass shootings hold news
values. Print news about specific events is more likely to bring into the “realm of meanings”
what are perceived as unusual and unexpected events. Moments in time and space are referred to
and by “maps of meaning” that are socially identified, classified, and contextualized, making the
event intelligible in the public sphere (Hall et al., 1978, pp. 54-55).
To trace this map of meaning following the Bataclan and Pulse in newspaper means to
highlight the articulations of terror, terrorist, and terrorism within the realm of meanings about
which Hall et al. talk. National news, print press included, played an important role in
assembling the mugging panic in Britain by “recruiting the powerful in the initial stages where
topics are structured [and] by favouring certain ways of setting up topics and maintaining certain
strategic areas of silence” (p. 65). It is the first methodological assumption, namely that news
favor certain perspectives over others. To understand how the events at the Bataclan and Pulse
were made somewhat intelligible by the ruling class, this study thus shows what was made
absent and how these absences intertwined with what was most visible in national newspapers.
Newspapers constitute a springboard to understand how certain truths are made universal and

41

other truths are omitted, erased, or even silenced. Media in general, and newspapers in particular,
play a secondary role to shape society’s perception of societal problems.
Numerous scholars in communication and cultural studies have already demonstrated
how news outlets including newspapers participate in the definition of societal problems such as
terrorism. News functions as an ideological vehicle, or as Altheide (2006) points out:
“Journalistic accounts about terrorism reflect news organizations’ reliance on official news
sources to provide entertaining reports compatible with long-established symbols of fear, crime,
and victimization about the threats to individuals” and Western societies like France and the
U.S.A. in the war on terror (p. 417). The recurrent use of experts by news outlets invites
audiences, or readers, to perceive and define a threat. The frame of the war on terror has
reverberated in media since 9/11 when events marked as terrorism took place. It constitutes the
fertile ground for Western nations to make sense of terror-related events. In that sense, the
contemporary ways in which news travel, and the stronghold of media corporations from the
U.S.A. and arguably from France, which controls the manufacture of news, is dangerously
striking because, as Said already posited in Culture and Imperialism, “it can mobilize passions
atavistically, throwing people back to an earlier imperial time when the west and its opponents
championed and even embodied virtues designed not as virtues so to speak but for war” (Said,
1993, p. 37). The ways in which fear underlies terrorism in France following the January 2015
Charlie Hebdo events was only confounded when the attacks that ended at the Bataclan took
place a few months later. The ways media framed the events at Charlie reinforced the discursive
practices that associated Muslims with terrorism, regardless of whether the individual was
associated with the acts perpetrated by the brothers Kouachi.
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Recent research conducted about news framing of events marked as terrorism pointed to
the ways 9/11 marked a turning point in the representations of Muslims and people who identify
as such. As I explained above, the global media construction of Muslims as the figure of
terrorism took roots in the early 1970s. Roche (2019) showed that there are similarities in media
sequences between two international news magazines L’Express and the Time and two picture
magazines Paris Match and Life, in their representation of the hostage situation of Israeli
professional athletes by Black September during the 1972 Olympic Games. Roche argued that it
is possible to observe,
un dialogue formel entre journaux français et américains qui nous autorise a penser des
strategies éditoriales communes; une intericonicité qui fixe durablement les
representations et les imaginaires occidentaux de cet attentat redoublant en cela le récit
télévisuel; l’émergence d’une image qui aujourd’hui encore symbolique de cet episode.
(p. 117)11
The English translation of this passage is as follows:
a formal dialogue between French and American newspapers which allows us to think of
common editorial strategies; an intericonicity that permanently fixes the Western
representations and imaginaries of this attack, thereby redoubling the televisual narrative;
the emergence of an image which today still symbolizes this episode.
The intericonicity mentioned by Roche refers to the concept of intertextuality. The notion
in poststructuralism that has traditionally rejected "the idea of an underlying structure which
founds meaning" (Barker, p. 84). In other words, meaning "has no single originatory source.

11

This passage translates as followed: “a formal dialogue between French and American newspapers which allows
us to think of common editorial strategies; an intericonicity which permanently fixes the Western representations
and imaginaries of this attack, thereby redoubling the televisual narrative; the emergence of an image which today
still symbolizes this episode”
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Rather, it is the outcome of relationships between texts, that is, intertextuality" (Barker, p. 84). In
this study, I compare the news frames and dominant themes in and between national news about
terrorism following the Bataclan in France and in the national news about terrorism following
Pulse, in the U.S.A. Since the tragic Munich episode of the early 1970s and the 9/11 attacks in
the 2000s took place, representational strategies shifted drastically to reinforce the religionterrorism nexus. As Morin (2016) reminds us, “the repetitive use of Orientalist framing”
following 9/11, continued to invoke civilizational discourse (p. 989). This study draws from
Morin (2016), who compared news coverage of the 2009 attacks at Fort Hood, Texas, with the
news coverage of the 2013 shooting at the Navy Yard in Washington, D.C., to show the
differential representations between the perpetrators and to reveal how news media frame an
event as terrorism and another as crime. Morin illustrated how news framed the Fort Hood
shooting attack as terrorism by narrativizing the life of the perpetrator and by conflating the
shooting with an act of Islamic terrorism. Conversely, news framed the Navy Yard shooting as a
crime which was demonstrated by the story line about the perpetrator that focused on mental
illness, gun controls, and security.

Data Selection
To understand newspapers representation of terrorism following the Bataclan and Pulse,
and to show how Orientalism is perpetuated in the news following these events marked as
terrorism, data were collected from four different newspapers circulating in France and in the
U.S.A. I selected these countries for data collection because that is where the events took place,
and because these countries are located in what is known as the West.
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My social location as a bicultural and bilingual researcher allowed for the study of
newspaper articles in both English and in French. For each country, newspapers with one of the
highest circulation rates were used to collect data. Table 1 shows the 2016 figures of circulation
for each of the newspapers selected. More specifically related to the representation of terrorism
following the Bataclan, Le Monde and Le Figaro were selected (“Les performances,” 2017). For
the shooting at Pulse, articles published in The New York Times and The Washington Post were
collected for analysis (Pew Research Center, 2019). Combining these outlets allowed a glance at
dominant discourse about terrorism following these events. It also offered somewhat of a
variation in political leaning from different outlets known for their editorial lines.

Table 1. Newspaper circulation figures12
Newspaper

Circulation size in 2015

Circulation size in 2016

Le Monde13

267,89614

269,584

Le Figaro

300,266

305,701

The New York Times15

528,00016

551,579

The Washington Post

330,000

206,824

Sources French national newspapers:
Les clés de la presse, reporting numbers published by ACPM;
Source US national newspapers:
PressGazette reporting numbers from Alliance for Audited Media and Statista17

12

Statistics are only available through subscription; these numbers could only be obtained via secondary sources.
Numbers are based on paid diffusion in France, not including individually paid print circulation.
14
Numbers are calculated based on the 2015-2016 evolution of paid diffusion in France.
15
Numbers are published for the first three quarters of the year 2016.
16
This is the average weekday individually paid print circulation in the U.S.A. as of September 2015 (“Circulation,”
2016).
17
This is the circulation of select newspapers in the U.S.A. 2015. (2016). Statista. Retrieved January 20, 2021, from
https://www.statista.com/statistics/272790/circulation-of-the-biggest-daily-newspapers-in-the-us/
13
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Timeframe for Selection of Data and Search Term
Articles published in Le Figaro and Le Monde between and including 13 and 20
November 2015 and articles published in The Washington Post and The New York Times
between and including 12 and 19 June 2016, were collected from the LexisNexis database (now
NexisUni) using the keyword “terrorism.” The time frame for data collection corresponds to the
week that followed events marked as terrorism that took place in France and in the U.S.A. Data
were collected from the day the events took place (the series of attacks at the Bataclan started
late evening, 13 November 2015, and the Pulse shooting occurred early morning, 12 June 2016)
until the week after the event, when institutional responses deployed by people in positions of
power started to take effect. In France, 20 November 2015 marks the day when the state of
emergency was extended. In the U.S.A., 19 June 2016 marks the day right before the Senate
voted on amendments to gun control laws. Tables 2 and 3 present a breakdown of the number of
articles collected for everyday of the week that followed each event.

Table 2. Number of articles published using the term terrorism by outlet in November 2015

Le Monde
Le Figaro
Total

13 Nov.

14 Nov.

15 Nov.

16 Nov.

17 Nov.

18 Nov.

19 Nov.

20 Nov.

Total

4
5
9

5
13
18

22
0
22

0
52
52

50
47
97

34
36
70

33
30
63

28
28
56

176
211
387

Table 3. Number of articles published using the term terrorism by outlet in June 2016

The Washington
Post
The New York Times
Total

12 Jun.

13 Jun.

14 Jun.

15 Jun.

16 Jun.

17 Jun.

18 Jun.

19 Jun.

Total

8

14

22

20

14

13

9

12

112

6
14

11
25

24
46

20
40

20
34

29
42

20
29

17
29

147
259
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Types of Articles
Only articles published in specific sections of each newspaper were selected for the
analysis. Since this project challenges the claims made by newspapers about the objectivity of
news, articles published as editorials, opinion pieces, and letters to editors were not selected.
More specifically, I selected articles published in international, national, society, economy,
business, sports, and other A-sections of The New York Times and The Washington Post. Articles
published in the international, médias, politique, reportage, sciences, société, télévision, and
other major sections traditionally encountered when reading Le Monde and Le Figaro. Collecting
articles published in these sections allowed to understand the stances from primary definers who
are often quoted in the news. Primary definers are, according to the term used in the sequences of
a moral panic and defined by Harcup (2014), "powerful and influential voices who tend to be
afforded disproportionate access to the media." For instance, primary definers are the experts,
official sources, politicians, etc. Additionally, only articles over 150 words were selected for
analysis because, after careful examination, articles under that word count were previews of
longer articles also selected for the corpus of analysis.

Final Corpus of Data
After the initial search for articles were retrieved, the corpus of data was finalized.
Following the procedure mentioned above, the final sample included: 212 articles published in
Le Figaro and Le Monde between 13 and 20 November and 180 articles published in The New
York Times and The Washington Post between 12 and 19 June 2016. Tables 4 and 5 present the
articles selected for analysis.
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Table 4. Number of articles selected for dataset by outlet in November 2015

Le Monde
Le Figaro
Total

13 Nov.

14 Nov.

15 Nov.

16 Nov.

17 Nov.

18 Nov.

19 Nov.

20 Nov.

Total

2
2
4

3
8
11

11
0
11

0
29
29

25
29
54

12
20
32

22
17
39

11
21
32

86
126
212

Table 5. Number of articles selected for dataset by outlet in June 2016

The Washington
Post
The New York Times
Total

12 Jun.

13 Jun.

14 Jun.

15 Jun.

16 Jun.

17 Jun.

18 Jun.

19 Jun.

Total

7

9

18

16

10

8

5

10

83

2
9

7
16

19
37

13
29

13
23

25
33

10
15

8
18

97
180

The Method of Comparative Thematic Analysis
I drew from comparative thematic analysis to provide an understanding of the patterns
that are recurrent in the selected data and that might indicate how taken-for-granted terrorism is
in newspaper representations. Thematic analysis, or the method used to identify, analyze,
describe, and report themes within data, is often overlooked as a qualitative research method
(Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Roulston, 2001). Yet, this method became a logical
approach to reveal patterns within a large data set and to complement the broader framing
analysis conducted for this study. It is a method that is iterative (Braun & Clarke, 2006),
meaning that there is constant re-evaluation of themes, codes, and categories, throughout the
research process made possible by the navigation between data, researcher’s notes, and theory.
The process I undertook to understand the thematic structures was informed by Braun and Clarke
(2006; see also Reynolds, 2016; Sommier 2019; Testerman, 2015). By definition, thematic
analysis consists of analysis of texts to highlight patterns in a set of data, and to examine its
saturation. According to Testerman (2015), “themes emerge from data through repetition,
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saliency, and emphasis” (p. 41). For Arasaratnam (2015), “[t]hemes are identified on the basis of
substantive significance in that there is consistency in the content/focus of the articles in each
theme” (pp. 291-292). Based on these understandings, this study seeks to locate patterns of
repetition highlighted in data. I contend that the themes emerging from the analysis of newspaper
articles about terrorism following the Bataclan and Pulse attacks, can contribute to researchers’
and non-academicians’ understandings of how Orientalism is reified in the media. Each data set
corresponding with one specific incident would be analyzed first and then the second incident’s
data set would be analyzed for themes. Only after the themes are located for each individual data
set separately would I then move onto the comparative thematic analysis.
This project relies specifically on the comparative thematic analysis method suggested by
Sommier (2019) who drew out differences and similarities between articles published in
newspapers in Britain, Canada, Republic of Ireland, and the United Kingdom published about the
ban of burqinis in France. Sommier highlighted the underlying tensions in representations of the
burqini ban that indicated “a complex interplay between persistence of established
representations and emergence of new groupings” (p. 257). These new groupings, Sommier
argues, continue to signify dominant assumptions about what it means to be French. The author
deconstructed newspaper representation that, from the perspective of other Western nations,
constructed the burqini as an “appropriate difference” and that posited France as deviant for its
relation to religion. In other words, Sommier highlighted the ways in which news from Englishspeaking nations depicted the burqini ban as inescapable, a logic that puts France as an exception
for the articulation of secularism, or laicité, and that has always and already relegated Muslims. I
draw from this comparative approach to thematic analysis by examining differences and
similarities because it enables me to show the complexity of representation (see also Alsultany,
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2012). The focus on similarities and differences is useful for this study to identify the
construction of socio-political realities in newspapers from two different terrorist events in two
different countries (Sommier, 2019, p. 253).
As a sound qualitative method, thematic analysis requires specific steps, detailed by
Braun and Clarke (2006). After the collection, gathering, and selection of newspaper articles, it is
important for the researcher to become familiar with the data. While the process of collecting and
selecting data may imply an inductive reasoning process, it is important to note that the analysis
of data was deductive. In other words, since this study follows the literature in terrorism, moral
panic, and Orientalism, to develop coding categories, I used an abductive (inductive-deductive)
approach to identify those themes (that I then use to categorize and critique in terms of the
assumptions underlying those themes, using Orientalism and moral panic as frameworks for
doing so). Immersing myself with the dataset didn’t mean aligning my research orientation with
the ideas expressed in the news. The process of collecting, archiving, selecting, and analyzing
articles in the dataset can only really provide a partial snapshot of the multiple truths that
collided following these tragic events and in the saturation of media with terrorism. Data
interpretation relied primarily on deductive reasoning insofar as key scholars, postcolonial
thinkers, and other people tirelessly engaged in combatting the conditions of modernity, have
already challenged the themes that I present in this dissertation project.
The concern of this dissertation is therefore to understand how the logic of Orientalism
discourse is perpetuated in newspapers within two unique sets of data fragments. Remember,
Said used his social location to compare literature and dismantle Orientalism produced in a
specific (read sarcastically, imperialistic) French and British English language. The coding of
data was based on how passages for this dissertation might have hailed, or called out, consumers
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of U.S.A.-based English and French news in the contemporary Western reality conditioned by
the phenomenon of violence in terrorism. To take an “abductive” approach to the argument
posed here might dangerously veer towards the conclusion that the reinforcement of Orientalism
discourse is a viable objective. That is not the point of this project. Rather, the goal is to
disentangle from texts (or, news articles) that which spoke to, with, and in contradiction with
theory and reality. I engage in dialogic thinking about the ways in which selected data come to
strike the deeper logic of Orientalism. A dialogic thinking that takes seriously concerns raised in
newspapers with the conscious distance from what is produced in the text and with skeptical
assumptions about news values. This is when I redirect you to the review of literature.
This is different from Braun and Clarke who write that, codes emerge from the data
themselves to form themes. Yet, in Charmaz’s (2008) grounded theory approach, a constant
comparison analysis that seeks to uncover themes can use pre-existing theoretical frameworks or
constructs to examine data. The advantage of such theoretical guidance is a focus on particular
phenomena determined a priori, like the terrorist attacks and moral panic. The grounded
theoretical approach takes form in the understanding that the interpretation of this specific data news articles published about terrorism following these specific acts - must reconcile the
explanatory objective of news with the understanding of acts of extreme violence. Indeed,
grounded theory coincides with the theoretical assumptions about Orientalism, in a sense that
thematic analysis rooted in grounded theory also includes elements such as (1) the attention to
context; (2) the locating of actors, situations, and actions; (3) the assumption of multiple realities;
and (4) the subjectivity of the researcher, noted previously” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 408). As such,
this dissertation project seeks to make of this comparative thematic analysis, a form of resistance
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against the simplification of difference and against dominant articulations of ideals, democracy,
and the meaning of life.

Table 6. Phases of thematic analysis
Phase

Description

Familiarize oneself with the data

Reading articles and taking notes

Generate initial codes

Coding the entire data set “in a systematic
fashion” and collate data relevant to each
code

Searching for themes

Collate codes into potential themes, gather
data relevant to potential theme

Review themes

Check if “themes work in relation to the
coded extracts and the entire data set”

Define and name themes

Refine specifics of each theme with an
ongoing analysis, and the overall story the
analysis tells; generate clear definitions and
names for each theme

Produce report/analysis

Select extract examples, analyze the extracts,
relate back to research question and literature,
produce the report

(table paraphrased from Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 87; see also Reynolds, 2016, p. 117).
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Familiarizing myself with the data required three different readings of the data. I decided
to first read the articles published the seventh day after the events, so as to get a sense of how
themes could speak to and with theoretical assumptions. I started with the seventh day because I
assumed that newspapers would have more detailed reports about the attacks after a week’s time
and would also have access to institutional reports unavailable during the first day(s) that
followed the attacks. These days corresponded to the day when the vote for the prolongation of
the state of emergency took place in France, 20 November 2015, and to the day prior to the
Senate vote for gun control amendments, 19 June 2016, in the U.S.A. I analyzed one day’s worth
of data to conduct the preliminary coding. Tables 7 and 8 show the preliminary codes generated
for each national newspaper corpus and the corresponding example. To clarify, I used sentences
as unit of analysis. These sentences and their translation appear verbatim in the tables below. A
total of 13 codes were generated in the analysis of articles published 19 June 2016 by The
Washington Post and The New York Times. In comparison, 22 codes were generated in the
analysis of the articles published 20 November 2015 by Le Monde and Le Figaro. The high
number of codes generated corresponds to the way the researcher split the data so as to bring
more nuance to the analysis (Saldaña, 2013). The difference in number of codes coincides, in my
opinion, with the difference in the number of articles published and analyzed for that specific day
(see Tables 4 and 5). I used these preliminary codes as precursors for the analysis of the entire
data set, which were useful to generate initial codes.
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Table 7. Preliminary codes used to label passages from articles published 20 November 2015 in
Le Monde and Le Figaro

Open coding – label

Example

Translation

(french/english)
Politiques publiques autres pays Depuis quelques jours, la

In recent days, Turkey has

Public policy other nations

Turquie se montre

been particularly active in

particulièrement active dans

its anti-Daesh hunt.

sa traque anti-Daech.
Autres bombes suicidaires

Samedi soir, un kamikaze s'est

On Saturday evening, a

Other suicide attacks

fait exploser lors d'un assaut

suicide bomber blew

des forces antiterroristes

himself up during an

contre un appartement de

assault by counterterrorism

Gaziantep, ville proche de la

forces on an apartment in

Syrie

Gaziantep, a town near
Syria
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Table 7. (Continued)
Affrontements

Le même jour, quatre

On the same day, four

Confrontation

personnes identifiées comme

people identified as

des militants de l'organisation

militants of the IS

EI ont également été tuées par

organization were also

l'armée turque, à l'approche

killed by the Turkish army,

d'un poste militaire frontalier

as it approached a military

avec la Syrie.

post on the border with
Syria.

Expertise securité

Ces efforts s'accompagnent

These efforts are

Security expertise

d'une prise de conscience, au

accompanied by an

sein des renseignements turcs,

awareness within Turkish

du risque sécuritaire posé par

intelligence of the security

les combattants étrangers qui

risk posed by foreign

vont et viennent entre la Syrie

fighters who come and go

et l'Europe via la Turquie.

between Syria and Europe
via Turkey.
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Table 7. (Continued)
Occupation militaire

Lancée par la force

Launched by the

Military occupation

"Barkhane" le 26 octobre,

"Barkhane" force on

l'opération "Vignemale"

October 26, Operation

prendra fin ce dimanche.

"Vignemale" will end this

Menée simultanément au

Sunday. Carried out

Niger et au Mali, elle se

simultaneously in Niger

singularise à la fois par sa

and Mali, it is

durée - un mois - et son

distinguished both by its

volume - un millier d'hommes.

duration - one month - and

La force "Barkhane," présente

its volume - a thoU.S.A.nd

dans cinq pays du Sahel,

men. The "Barkhane"

cherche ainsi à juguler les flux

force, present in five

interfrontaliers des groupes

countries of the Sahel, is

terroristes et, au Mali, à

thus seeking to curb the

empêcher les katibas

inter-border flows of

djihadistes qui avaient occupé

terrorist groups and, in

le nord du pays pendant près

Mali, to prevent the jihadist

d'un an d'y reprendre pied.

katibas who had occupied
the north of the country for
nearly a year from
resuming there.
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Table 7. (Continued)
Rationalisation Bataclan

Élément humain : toujours ou

Human element: almost

Rationalization Bataclan

presque il s'agit de criminels

always, they are fanatic

fanatisés basculant dans la

criminals falling into

rage homicide. Élément

homicidal rage. Collective

collectif : de Merah en

element: from Merah to

Kouachi et en Abdeslam, on

Kouachi and Abdeslam,

constate une prédominance de

there is a predominance of

fratries dans lesquelles

brotherhood in which is

s'instaure ce que la psychiatrie established what psychiatry
nomme un "délire à plusieurs." calls a "collective
Élément topographique :

delirium". Topographical

toujours en cause, comme lieu

element: always in

de naissance ou de vie, comme

question, as a place of birth

bases de prédations et de repli, or life, as bases of
les territoires de la "politique

predation and withdrawal,

de la ville," trop souvent

the territories of "city

devenus des pépinières à

policy", too often become

fanatiques.

breeding grounds for
fanatics.
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Table 7. (Continued)
Responsabilités institutionnelles

Ces mois de préparatifs ; ces

These months of

Institutional responsibilities

multiples allées et venues, de

preparations; these

la zone grise de Molenbeek

multiple comings and

(dans ce qu'on appelait voici

goings, from the gray area

dix ans déjà le "Bruxellistan")

of Molenbeek (in what was

à nos propres ghettos

called “Bruxellistan” ten

suburbains ; ces véhicules

years ago) to our own

chargés d'armes et d'explosifs

suburban ghettos; these

; ces appartements

vehicles loaded with

conspiratifs ; l'agitation

weapons and explosives;

d'individus dix fois fichés,

these conspiratorial

repérés, parfois condamnés...

apartments; the agitation of

sans que nul ne s'en avise

individuals ten times listed,

vraiment dans le

identified, sometimes

renseignement intérieur

condemned ... without

français ?

anyone really realizing it in
French internal
intelligence?
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Table 7. (Continued)
Charlie

Un exemple : les Kouachi

An example: the Kouachi

rôdant et repérés autour de

prowling and spotted

Charlie Hebdo ; les Kouachi

around Charlie Hebdo; the

entreprenant de se procurer

Kouachi undertaking to

des fusils d'assaut et des

procure assault rifles and

cagoules ; les Kouachi volant

balaclavas; the Kouachi

un véhicule et le chargeant de

stealing a vehicle and

tout un mortel outillage ; ces

loading it with a whole lot

mêmes Kouachi, dix fois fichés

of deadly tools; these same

et signalés, cheminant,

Kouachi, ten times filed

fortement armés, vers leur

and signaled, walking,

cible. Cela peut, doit, se

heavily armed, towards

détecter. La police a essayé et

their target. It can, must, be

échoué. Mais Coulibaly, déjà

detected. The police have

connu, y compris comme

tried and failed. But in the

artificier d'une cellule

case of Coulibaly, already

terroriste : comment a-t-il pu

known as a manufacturer

totalement échapper à la

of a terrorist cell: how

vigilance des services ?

could he have completely
escaped the vigilance of
the services?

59

Table 7. (Continued)
Agresseurs Bataclan

On s'interroge sur les raisons

One wonders about the

Bataclan attackers

qui ont, de nouveau, permis à

reasons that once again

des délinquants faisant l'objet

allowed delinquents

d'une fiche S, de pouvoir

subject to an S file18 to be

préparer et conduire des

able to prepare and conduct

opérations terroristes en

terrorist operations in the

pleine capitale.

heart of the capital.

Présenté comme ayant "joué

Presented as having

d'évidence un rôle

"obviously played a

déterminant," dans les

determining role" in the

attaques de vendredi, Abaaoud attacks on Friday, for
n'en est pas à son coup d'essai. Abaaoud, this incident is
Comme l'a révélé Bernard

not his first attempt. As

Cazeneuve, ce personnage

revealed by Bernard

"semble impliqué dans quatre

Cazeneuve, this character

des six attentats évités ou

"seems involved in four of

déjoués par les services de

the six attacks avoided or

renseignement français depuis

foiled by the French

le printemps 2015."

intelligence services since
spring 2015".

18

S card or "Fiche S" is a card used by police, border patrols and customs, to list people who are considered a threat
to the nation (Laurent, 2015)

60

Table 7. (Continued)
Guerre

Nous entrons dans une

We are entering a new era,

War

nouvelle ère, notre président

our president has said; here

l'a dit ; nous voilà en guerre.

we are at war. The words

Les mots sont lourds de sens,

are heavy with meaning

les conséquences aussi.

and consequences.

Xenophobie

Ils veulent plus de répression

"They want more

Xenophobia

sur le mode : s'il y a trop

repression on the mode: if

d'étrangers, on ne peut pas

there are too many

laisser passer tout le monde,

foreigners, we cannot let

on est infiltrés. Pour illustrer

everyone pass, we are

son propos, l'élu raconte une

infiltrated". To illustrate

anecdote. Avant même les

his point, the elected

attentats, ce maire qui penche

representative tells an

"plutôt à droite" avait voulu

anecdote. Even before the

accueillir des réfugiés dans sa

attacks, this mayor who

commune de 70 habitants. "On

leans "rather on the right"

m'a répondu OK si ce sont des

had wanted to welcome

chrétiens, j'ai laissé tomber",

refugees in his town of 70

soupire-t-il.

inhabitants."I was told OK
if they are Christians, [so] I
gave up" he sighs.
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Table 7. (Continued)
Radicalisation

Née dans les Hauts-de-Seine et Born in Hauts-de-Seine

Radicalization

âgée de 26 ans, La jeune

and aged 26, the young

femme s'était rapidement

woman had quickly

radicalisée. "Jver biento aller

radicalized. "I’m soon to

en syrie inchallah biento

go to Syria, inchallah soon

depart pour la turkie" (sic),

to leave for Turkey" (sic),

écrivait-elle dans un message

she wrote in a message

publié sur Facebook le 11 juin

posted on Facebook on 11

dernier.

June.

Une fêtarde "un peu fofolle"

A "slightly crazy" party

La folie
madness

girl

Appel Musulman

Nous, musulmans de France,

We, Muslims of France,

Call from Muslims

sommes des citoyens français

are full French citizens,

à part entière, faisant partie

forming an integral part of

intégrante de la Nation, et

the Nation, and united with

solidaires de l'ensemble de la

the whole of the national

communauté nationale.

community.
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Table 7. (Continued)
Description État d’urgence

Les premières sont limitées au

The former are limited to

Details State of emergency

temps que durera l'état

the duration of the state of

d'urgence. En l'occurrence

emergency. In this case

trois mois. Elles sont plus

three months. They are

rigoureuses que n'importe quel more rigorous than any
contrôle judiciaire classique.

traditional judicial review.

Ne serait-ce que parce que

If only because the

l'obligation de motivation

obligation to motivate

reste très légère.

remains very light.

Consensus état d’urgence

État d'urgence : quasi-

State of emergency: quasi-

State of emergency consensus

unanimité à l'Assemblée;

unanimity in the Assembly;

Les députés ont voté la

The deputies voted to

prolongation jusqu'en février

extend this exceptional

2016 de ce dispositif

device until February 2016,

exceptionnel, pour faire face

to cope with the attacks.

aux attentats.
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Table 7. (Continued)
Laicité

PAS DE "MENU DE

NO "SUBSTITUTION

Secularism

SUBSTITUTION" dans les

MENU" in school canteens

cantines scolaires ni crèches

or Christmas cribs in town

de Noël dans les mairies :

halls: the Association of

l'Association des maires de

Mayors of France (AMF)

France (AMF) a défendu

on Wednesday defended a

mercredi une application très

very strict application of

stricte du principe de laïcité

the principle of secularism

dans son guide de « bonne

in its guide to "good

conduite laïque ».

secular conduct".

Armement de la police

HORS SERVICE et quand

OUT OF SERVICE and

Arming the police

même en service. Depuis ce

still in service. Since

jeudi, les policiers qui le

Thursday, police officers

souhaitent peuvent rester

who wish can remain

armés en permanence. Telle

armed at all times. This is

est la décision prise par la

the decision taken by the

Direction générale de la police General Directorate of the
nationale qui vient de publier

National Police which has

une circulaire dans ce sens.

just published a circular to
this effect.
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Table 7. (Continued)
Bombardement armée

La France a bombardé le

France bombed the French

Army bombardment

camp d'entraînement des

and francophone Islamic

Français et francophone de

State (IS) training camp in

l'Etat islamique (EI) à Rakka,

Rakka, Syria, on the night

en Syrie, dans la nuit du 8

of October 8.

octobre.
Assaut contre agresseur

Au lendemain de l'assaut mené

The day after the assault

Assault against Bataclan

par le RAID à l'angle de la rue

led by the RAID at the

agressors

de la République et de la rue

corner of rue de la

du Corbillon à Saint-Denis

République and rue du

(Seine-Saint-Denis) mercredi

Corbillon in Saint-Denis

18 novembre, au cours duquel

(Seine-Saint-Denis) on

les policiers ont tiré près de 5

Wednesday 18 November,

000 munitions, les enquêteurs

during which the police

attendaient avec impatience

fired nearly 5,000 rounds

les conclusions des

of ammunition,

constatations sur place et

investigators impatiently

l'issue du travail

awaited the conclusions of

d'identification des corps des

the findings on the spot and

personnes tuées.

the outcome of the work to
identify the bodies of those
killed.
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Table 7. (Continued)
Ressenti national

"Au bar du village, on ne parle "At the village bar, we only

National resentment

que de ça "

talk about that"

Témoignage

En fait, se souvient Louis, "

In fact, Louis remembers,

Testimony

mon cerveau essayait de se

"my brain was trying to

connecter, de comprendre

connect, to understand why

pourquoi on m'avait tiré

I was shot." He did not

dessus." Il n'a pas pensé

immediately think of a

d'emblée à un acte terroriste,

terrorist act, but rather of a

mais plutôt à un fou.

madman. "
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Table 8. Preliminary codes used to label passages from articles published 19 June 2016 in The
New York Times and The Washington Post

Open coding – label
Watch lists

Example
Rival measures from Republicans and Democrats to be taken
up on Monday seek to address the so-called "terror gap"
allowing people on terrorist watch lists to buy firearms, and
to expand background checks for purchases at gun shows
and online.

Legal precedents

In 2004, Congress allowed the 10-year ban to expire amid
lobbying by the NRA and gun-rights advocates in Congress.
John Kerry, the Democratic nominee for president that year,
accused President George W. Bush of failing to do enough to
win passage of an extension.

Portrait of candidate

Contrary to what many of his followers insist on believing,
he is not a self-made man. Over the course of his career, Mr.
Trump appears to have been more of a grifter than a
businessman, as recent investigations by The Times and
U.S.A. Today have shown, racking up four corporate
bankruptcies while continually enriching himself at the
expense of stockholders, contractors, employees, and
customers.
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Table 8. (Continued)
Other failed attacks

Belgium Says It Blocked Attack on Soccer Viewers

Aggressor childhood

Omar Mateen was that chunky kid with glasses, remembered
more for his scrapes with other classmates than for his
academic performance. Early on, the same schoolboy who
could wear a broad smile and a Power Rangers T-shirt in his
school portrait could also engage in ''much talk about
violence & sex,'' according to a school assessment.

Aggressor work history

Denied the right to wear one uniform, Mr. Mateen soon
dressed in another -- that of a security guard. He completed a
training course, passed a background check, and began
working for a security firm called G4S. At one point,
perhaps as part of a G4S contract, he was working as an
intake officer at a Florida juvenile assessment center. At
another point, he was providing security after the BP oil spill
in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, during which an
undercover documentarian recorded a few of his cynical
observations.

Aggressor religious beliefs

The mosque's imam, Syed Shafeeq Rahman, insisted that Mr.
Mateen had never heard teachings at the mosque that would
have radicalized him. ''There is nothing that he is hearing
from me to do killing, to do bloodshed, to do anything,
because we never talk like that,'' the imam said.
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Table 8. (Continued)
Aggressor history with FBI

Though far-fetched and even contradictory -- he claimed
connections to Al Qaeda, the Sunni extremist group, and ties
to its near opposite, the Shiite Hezbollah -- his comments
were troubling enough for the county sheriff's office to notify
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The bureau's subsequent inquiry was inconclusive.

Aggressor intimate

He had connected online with a young woman named Sitora

relationships

Yusufiy, an immigrant from Uzbekistan, who initially found
him to be a nice, funny man who treated his family well and
had aspirations of becoming a police officer.

Domestic violence

Soon after their marriage in April 2009, Ms. Yusufiy said, he
began beating her and isolating her in their Florida home.
With the help of her parents in New Jersey, she fled within
the year.

International relations

The confusion and division are emblematic of NATO's
inability so far to deal comprehensively with threats washing
up on its southern tier: terrorism, radical Islam, anarchy in
North Africa and uncontrolled migration.

Public policy agenda

By proposing to bar people from certain regions rather than
religions, Mr. Trump had avoided the sticky issue of testing
someone's faith.
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Table 8. (Continued)
Post-9/11 policies

For a time after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks,
people from predominantly Muslim countries arriving in the
United States were fingerprinted and questioned for a special
registration, and immigrants from those countries already
living here had to register as well.

The preliminary codes were used to label passages in the entire corpus of data for each
national newspaper articles. Because of the large numbers of articles to analyze, the coding
method of what is colloquially called “lumping” was used because it is a more expedient way to
analyze data and it still allows for more detailed subcodes later in the process (Saldaña, 2013, p.
20). Tables 9 and 10 show the axial coding used for the entire data set. Axial coding refers to the
links I drew between different codes and the associated data (Allen, 2017). These codes were
generated based on the preliminary codes. A codebook and a detailed list defining these codes
were generated based on my understanding of these frameworks (see Appendix C and D). Data
were color-coded and collated according to potential themes. For example, passages from data
that are addressing potential motivations for the Bataclan attacks and the Pulse shooting, were
coded under the umbrella term “perpetrator.” After coding the entire data set, the following
thematic groupings were created: (1) references and comparisons to other “terrorist” events; (2)
militaristic intervention abroad and international relations on terrorism; (3) politics of national
identity; (4) criminological identification of radicalism; (5) psychological figure of terrorism; (6)
religious identities and the Muslim experience.
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Table 9. Example of codes used to analyze articles published in Le Monde and Le Figaro 13 to
20 November 2015

Axial coding – label

Open coding – label

Example

(french/english)
Définisseurs principaux

Politiques autres pays

Depuis quelques jours, la

Primary definers :

Policies other nations

Turquie se montre

Que sont-ils ?

particulièrement active dans sa
traque anti-Daech.
Expertise securité

Ces efforts s'accompagnent

Security expertise

d'une prise de conscience, au
sein des renseignements turcs,
du risque sécuritaire posé par
les combattants étrangers qui
vont et viennent entre la Syrie et
l'Europe via la Turquie.
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Table 9. (Continued)
Responsabilités institutionnelles

Ces mois de préparatifs ; ces

Institutional responsibilities

multiples allées et venues, de la
zone grise de Molenbeek (dans
ce qu'on appelait voici dix ans
déjà le "Bruxellistan") à nos
propres ghettos suburbains ; ces
véhicules chargés d'armes et
d'explosifs ; ces appartements
conspiratifs ; l'agitation
d'individus dix fois fichés,
repérés, parfois condamnés...
sans que nul ne s'en avise
vraiment dans le renseignement
intérieur français ?

Autres

Autres bombes suicidaires

Samedi soir, un kamikaze s'est

Others

Other suicide attacks

fait exploser lors d'un assaut des
forces antiterroristes contre un
appartement de Gaziantep, ville
proche de la Syrie
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Table 9. (Continued)
Charlie

Un exemple : les Kouachi rôdant
et repérés autour de Charlie
Hebdo ; les Kouachi
entreprenant de se procurer des
fusils d'assaut et des cagoules ;
les Kouachi volant un véhicule
et le chargeant de tout un mortel
outillage ; ces mêmes Kouachi,
dix fois fichés et signalés,
cheminant, fortement armés,
vers leur cible. Cela peut, doit,
se détecter. La police a essayé et
échoué. Mais Coulibaly, déjà
connu, y compris comme
artificier d'une cellule terroriste
: comment a-t-il pu totalement
échapper à la vigilance des
services ?
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Table 9. (Continued)
Agresseurs

Agresseurs Bataclan

On s'interroge sur les raisons

Perpetrators

Bataclan attackers

qui ont, de nouveau, permis à
des délinquants faisant l'objet
d'une fiche S, de pouvoir
préparer et conduire des
opérations terroristes en pleine
capitale.

Présenté comme ayant "joué
d'évidence un rôle déterminant,"
dans les attaques de vendredi,
Abaaoud n'en est pas à son coup
d'essai. Comme l'a révélé
Bernard Cazeneuve, ce
personnage "semble impliqué
dans quatre des six attentats
évités ou déjoués par les
services de renseignement
français depuis le printemps
2015"
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Table 9. (Continued)
Radicalisation

Née dans les Hauts-de-Seine et

Radicalization

âgée de 26 ans, La jeune femme
s'était rapidement radicalisée.
"Jver biento aller en syrie
inchallah biento depart pour la
turkie" (sic), écrivait-elle dans
un message publié sur Facebook
le 11 juin dernier.

La folie

Une fêtarde "un peu fofolle"

madness
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Table 9. (Continued)
Rationalisation Bataclan

Élément humain : toujours ou

Rationalization Bataclan

presque il s'agit de criminels
fanatisés basculant dans la rage
homicide. Élément collectif : de
Merah en Kouachi et en
Abdeslam, on constate une
prédominance de fratries dans
lesquelles s'instaure ce que la
psychiatrie nomme un "délire à
plusieurs." Élément
topographique : toujours en
cause, comme lieu de naissance
ou de vie, comme bases de
prédations et de repli, les
territoires de la "politique de la
ville," trop souvent devenus des
pépinières à fanatiques.
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Table 9. (Continued)
Militaire

Affrontements

Le même jour, quatre personnes

Military

Confrontation

identifiées comme des militants
de l'organisation EI ont
également été tuées par l'armée
turque, à l'approche d'un poste
militaire frontalier avec la Syrie.

Occupation militaire

Lancée par la force "Barkhane"

Military occupation

le 26 octobre, l'opération
"Vignemale" prendra fin ce
dimanche. Menée simultanément
au Niger et au Mali, elle se
singularise à la fois par sa durée
- un mois - et son volume - un
millier d'hommes. La force
"Barkhane," présente dans cinq
pays du Sahel, cherche ainsi à
juguler les flux interfrontaliers
des groupes terroristes et, au
Mali, à empêcher les katibas
djihadistes qui avaient occupé le
nord du pays pendant près d'un
an d'y reprendre pied.
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Table 9. (Continued)
Guerre

Nous entrons dans une nouvelle

War

ère, notre président l'a dit ; nous
voilà en guerre. Les mots sont
lourds de sens, les conséquences
aussi.

Armement de la police

HORS SERVICE et quand même

Arming the police

en service. Depuis ce jeudi, les
policiers qui le souhaitent
peuvent rester armés en
permanence. Telle est la
décision prise par la Direction
générale de la police nationale
qui vient de publier une
circulaire dans ce sens.

Bombardement armée

La France a bombardé le camp

Army bombardment

d'entraînement des Français et
francophone de l'Etat islamique
(EI) à Rakka, en Syrie, dans la
nuit du 8 octobre.
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Table 9. (Continued)
Nationalité

Xenophobie

Ils veulent plus de répression sur

Nationality

Xenophobia

le mode : "s'il y a trop
d'étrangers, on ne peut pas
laisser passer tout le monde, on
est infiltrés." Pour illustrer son
propos, l'élu raconte une
anecdote. Avant même les
attentats, ce maire qui penche
"plutôt à droite " avait voulu
accueillir des réfugiés dans sa
commune de 70 habitants.
"On m'a répondu OK si ce sont
des chrétiens, j'ai laissé
tomber," soupire-t-il.

Ressenti national

"Au bar du village, on ne parle

National resentment

que de ça"
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Table 9. (Continued)
Urgence

Description État d’urgence

Les premières sont limitées au

Emergency

Details State of emergency

temps que durera l'état
d'urgence. En l'occurrence trois
mois. Elles sont plus rigoureuses
que n'importe quel contrôle
judiciaire classique. Ne serait-ce
que parce que l'obligation de
motivation reste très légère.

Consensus état d’urgence

État d'urgence : quasi-unanimité

State of emergency consensus

à l'Assemblée;
Les députés ont voté la
prolongation jusqu'en février
2016 de ce dispositif
exceptionnel, pour faire face aux
attentats.
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Table 9. (Continued)
Religion

Laicité

PAS DE "MENU DE

Secularism

SUBSTITUTION" dans les
cantines scolaires ni crèches de
Noël dans les mairies :
l'Association des maires de
France (AMF) a défendu
mercredi une application très
stricte du principe de laïcité
dans son guide de "bonne
conduite laïque."

Appel Musulman

Nous, musulmans de France,

Call from Muslims

sommes des citoyens français à
part entière, faisant partie
intégrante de la Nation, et
solidaires de l'ensemble de la
communauté nationale.
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Table 9. (Continued)
Bataclan

Assaut contre agresseur

Au lendemain de l'assaut mené

Assault against Bataclan

par le RAID à l'angle de la rue

agressors

de la République et de la rue du
Corbillon à Saint-Denis (SeineSaint-Denis) mercredi 18
novembre, au cours duquel les
policiers ont tiré près de 5 000
munitions, les enquêteurs
attendaient avec impatience les
conclusions des constatations
sur place et l'issue du travail
d'identification des corps des
personnes tuées.

Témoignage

En fait, se souvient Louis, "mon

Testimony

cerveau essayait de se
connecter, de comprendre
pourquoi on m'avait tiré
dessus." Il n'a pas pensé
d'emblée à un acte terroriste,
mais plutôt à un fou.
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Table 10. Example of codes used to analyze articles published in The New York Times and The
Washington Post 12 to 19 June 2016

Axial coding

Open coding – label

Example

Laws

Watch lists

Rival measures from
Republicans and Democrats to
be taken up on Monday seek to
address the so-called "terror
gap" allowing people on terrorist
watch lists to buy firearms, and
to expand background checks for
purchases at gun shows and
online.
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Table 10. (Continued)
Legal precedents

In 2004, Congress allowed the
10-year ban to expire amid
lobbying by the N.R.A. 19and
gun-rights advocates in
Congress. John Kerry, the
Democratic nominee for
president that year, accused
President George W. Bush of
failing to do enough to win
passage of an extension.

International relations

The confusion and division are
emblematic of NATO's inability
so far to deal comprehensively
with threats washing up on its
southern tier: terrorism, radical
Islam, anarchy in North Africa
and uncontrolled migration.

19

In reference to the National Rifle Association, number one lobbyist and benefactor organization through which
donations and contributions to the war on terrorism do not need to be public knowledge to imagine that N.R.A.
"jubilates" in times of terror like the ones that took place at Pulse that night, and also in France the year prior. More
on that later.
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Table 10. (Continued)
Candidate

Portrait of candidate

Contrary to what many of his
followers insist on believing, he
is not a self-made man. Over the
course of his career, Mr. Trump
appears to have been more of a
grifter than a businessman, as
recent investigations by The
Times and U.S.A. Today have
shown, racking up four
corporate bankruptcies while
continually enriching himself at
the expense of stockholders,
contractors, employees and
customers.
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Table 10. (Continued)
Public policy agenda

But they said that putting it in
place would take an ambitious
bureaucratic effort not likely to
move nearly as quickly as the
candidate envisions. And it
would make sweeping use of
executive authority to enact the
sharpest restrictions on
immigration since 1965, when
the United States abandoned
longstanding quotas designed to
exclude people from much of
Asia and from southern and
Eastern Europe.
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Table 10. (Continued)
Perpetrator

Aggressor childhood

Omar Mateen was that chunky
kid with glasses, remembered
more for his scrapes with other
classmates than for his academic
performance. Early on, the same
schoolboy who could wear a
broad smile and a Power
Rangers T-shirt in his school
portrait could also engage in
''much talk about violence &
(sic) sex,'' according to a school
assessment.
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Table 10. (Continued)
Aggressor work history

Denied the right to wear one
uniform, Mr. Mateen soon
dressed in another -- that of a
security guard. He completed a
training course, passed a
background check, and began
working for a security firm
called G4S. At one point,
perhaps as part of a G4S
contract, he was working as an
intake officer at a Florida
juvenile assessment center. At
another point, he was providing
security after the BP oil spill in
the Gulf of Mexico in April
2010, during which an
undercover documentarian
recorded a few of his cynical
observations.
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Table 10. (Continued)
Aggressor religious beliefs

The mosque's imam, Syed
Shafeeq Rahman, insisted that
Mr. Mateen had never heard
teachings at the mosque that
would have radicalized him.
''There is nothing that he is
hearing from me to do killing, to
do bloodshed, to do anything,
because we never talk like that,''
the imam said.

Aggressor history with FBI

Though far-fetched and even
contradictory -- he claimed
connections to Al Qaeda, the
Sunni extremist group, and ties
to its near opposite, the Shiite
Hezbollah -- his comments were
troubling enough for the county
sheriff's office to notify the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The bureau's subsequent inquiry
was inconclusive.
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Table 10. (Continued)
Aggressor intimate

He had connected online with a

relationships

young woman named Sitora
Yusufiy, an immigrant from
Uzbekistan, who initially found
him to be a nice, funny man who
treated his family well and had
aspirations of becoming a police
officer.

Domestic violence

Soon after their marriage in
April 2009, Ms. Yusufiy said, he
began beating her and isolating
her in their Florida home. With
the help of her parents in New
Jersey, she fled within the year.

Comparisons

Other failed attacks

Belgium Says It Blocked Attack
on Soccer Viewers
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Table 10. (Continued)
Post-9/11 policies

For a time after the Sept. 11,
2001, terrorist attacks, people
from predominantly Muslim
countries arriving in the United
States were fingerprinted and
questioned for a special
registration, and immigrants
from those countries already
living here had to register as
well.

To refine and define these codes, I collated passages with corresponding thematic
categories that I now explain in more detail before sharing an overview of the chapter.
To begin, codes were systematically generated by breaking down information from
newspaper articles and by evaluating the ways articles, or passages from articles, overlapped.
Coding allowed to process the selected quotes and fragments of text in an effort to saturate the
thematic categories, explained next. Saturation occurs, according to Testerman (2015), “when a
theme is developed and then all articles are resorted with consideration of that theme” (p. 45),
which is achievable through the iterative process in comparative thematic analysis. For this
research, I interrogated the entirety of the data and constantly edited the interpretation of coded
dataset within the conceptual orientations and methodological toolkits guiding this study.
Saturation occurs at the point where no new themes were found in subsequent articles. In other
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words, after I assigned a category for all the newspaper articles, saturation was achieved. Data
were coded by drawing from the sequences of moral panic to bring into focus the themes
elevated in the study of newspaper representation of terrorism and to deconstruct the
reinforcement of Orientalism discourse following the Bataclan and Pulse attacks.
Once the axial codes were selected by grouping open codes, the final themes were
elevated by collating axial codes and by gathering relevant data for each theme (see phases of
thematic analysis in Table 6). Themes were then refined through analysis and revisions after
being discussed with my advisors. For instance, the first theme brings together the categories:
perpetrators and Bataclan following the analysis of articles published in Le Figaro and Le Monde
and the categories: perpetrator and comparisons following the study of articles published in The
New York Times and The Washington Post. I will now preview the themes elevated for this study
before going over the results in the following chapters.
The first theme shows how newspaper representations of terrorism were complicit in the
construction of the identity of the perpetrator as folk devils. Following the Bataclan and the Pulse
attacks, the national press came across as a vehicle to fuel a certain hostility towards the
perpetrators, and towards people who emerged as a result of an amplification of the “threatpotential” in society (Hall, p. 223). This theme interprets the textual attitudes of newspaper
accounts that call back what was explained earlier, the strategies of newspapers that provide
simplified complex explanation (Alsultany, 2012) in stories told about the perpetrator. From the
perspective of signification spirals in a moral panic, this theme shows how newspaper
representation of terrorism simplified, “acts which pose[d] a challenge to the fundamental basis
of the social order itself” and “signified as constituting a threat to the future existence of the
whole state itself” (Hall et al., p. 225). From the sequences in the concept of moral panic, it is
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possible to understand how newspaper representation of terrorism reinforced Orientalism in the
amplification of an escalating threat (Hall et al., p. 222). In other words, this theme brings into
perspective how these major political events and the ensuing pursuit for the identification of a
threat were represented in newspaper representation as a reinforcement of Orientalism. The
codes used in newspaper instantiated significant breaches as acts of “radical Islamic terrorism,”
and amplified the prophecies that had predicted these “scenarios” and other vindictive expertise
that resonated within a state-controlled assessment of threat posed by a specific type of terrorism.
With this first theme, it is possible to understand how newspaper representation of
terrorism following the 13 November 2015 attacks and the 12 June 2016 shooting, reinforced
Orientalism with specific discursive arrangements of identity and the contrast with the
identification strategies that, recalling Silva (2016), “form a system of consensus surrounding
identity that naturalizes the system of racialized hierarchies” with “popular tropes of identity”
(Silva, p. 51). As a trope of identity at the center of newspaper representation of terrorism
following the attacks studied in this dissertation, is the stereotype of folk devils, to borrow the
expression from studies in moral panic. The stereotype of mad and barbaric “folk devils,” natives
of France and of the U.S.A., travelling across borders, and who appeared to be have become
“bad” Muslim (Alsultany, 2012, p. 110). A trope that cut across newspaper representation the
moment when, in a moral panic sequence, interests converged to use similar labels in the
identification of other threats posed by terrorism post-Bataclan and post-Pulse, and of the ways
to assess this threat.
The second theme analyzes the articulation of warlike security discourse that was
elevated as central in the study of newspaper representation of terrorism that reinforced
Orientalism discourse following the 13 November 2015 attacks and 12 June 2016 shooting.

93

Warlike refers here to the metaphors, similes, anthropomorphisms, that upholstered newspaper
representation of terrorism sets of discourses that articulated the weaponized arms of nationstates, built on settler colonialism and imperialism, and the dominant responses of a secular
security complex falls prey to terrorism. This theme becomes an opportunity to bring into
perspective the newspaper representation of presidential performances in the war on terrorism
within the logic of amplification illustrated in the previous theme. This second theme pays
specific attention to the newspapers discursive formations that transformed policing practices
and that illustrated how terrorism was regulated in France and the U.S.A. at the time.
Variations of the theme also interrogate the reinforcement of Orientalism discourse and
what cut across newspaper representation of terrorism as a biopolitical frame of surveillance and
securitization (Puar, p. xii). The facet of Orientalism discourse of politics and cultural power
relations that appeared to have been reinforced in newspaper representation of terrorism when,
Simon Browne explained, “enactments of surveillance reify boundaries, borders, and bodies
along racial lines, and where the outcome is often discriminatory treatment of those who are
negatively racialized by such surveillance” (p. 16). That is one of the reasons why this research
can be useful for those who wish to understand the apparent differences and undeniable
similarities in processes of racialization between France and the U.S.A. This theme interrogates
how newspaper representation signified a “racializing surveillance” and amplified the reification
of borders in a paradoxical secular security context.
Finally, the third and final theme deals with how newspaper representation of terrorism
reinforced Orientalism in its signification of the paradoxes that the national press and public
politicians appeared to be facing at the time of the events. In this theme, I dissect newspaper
representations of terrorism that self-contradicted or that conflicted utopian democratic ideals of
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tolerance, inclusion, and peoplehood within the weaponized secular security context of France
and the U.S.A. The paradoxes signified in newspaper representation of terrorism following the
Bataclan and Pulse attacks, reinforced Orientalism discourse in the moral panic sense that these
innumerable paradoxes provided a sense of ideological closure. Moments in the moral panic
when nationalism logics were strongly signified in the appeals to “tradition, national or religious
identity, patriotism,” an attitude that Said had already questioned about the U.S.A. and Libya in
the nineties war on terrorism (Said, p. 327). This is a moment when the “phalanx of guardians”
who simplified and protected “one or another creed, essence, primordial faith,” and when “one
fundamentalism invidiously attacks the others in the name of sanity, freedom, and goodness”
(Said, 1993, p. 327). Said added that “A curious paradox is that religious fervor seems almost
always to obscure notions of the sacred or divine, as if those could not survive in the overheated,
largely secular atmosphere of fundamentalist combat” (p. 327). The next chapter illustrates how
this paradox cuts across newspaper representation of terrorism following the 13 November 2015
attacks in the secular context of France post-Charlie. It questions the simplification of the
complexity of the 13 November 2015 attacks that, once instantiated in news as terrorism,
concomitantly vilified Muslims and depicted non-Muslim Western identity in position of
authority to deny the responsibility to cure the root causes of terrorism, political violence.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
THE ENDURANCE OF A DISPROPORTION:
NEWS REPRESENTATION OF TERRORISM IN FRANCE AFTER THE BATACLAN

Introduction
This chapter contends that newspaper representation of terrorism reinforced Orientalism
discourse in the context surrounding the tragic 13 November 2015 series of attacks that took
place in between Saint-Denis and Paris, France. I begin with an analytical summary of the events
that unfolded that night of 13 November 2015 events. I continue to interrogate the vilification of
people who identify with Islam and the Islamic worldviews, geographies, and cultural traditions.
This chapter points out the postcolonial significance of time in the presidential addresses, media
accounts, and other releases from public officials about these acts marked as terrorism. These
presidential performances, and the subsequent ones performed for days after the events,
resonated in the newspaper as evidence to the thesis of this dissertation. Orientalism was surely
reinforced in the newspaper representation of the Bataclan. It was also the foundations, the maps
and fields of meaning made (in)visible communicative practices of colonial legacies and
contemporary interest convergence in the subject of terrorism, within the toxicity of White
Supremacist discourses of the War on terrorism. The study starts by following the 13 November
2015 attacks and their representation as terrorism in a qualitative/interpretive approach to the
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selected newspaper articles. This chapter contends that Orientalism discourse was at the
inceptions of these tragic events, and of the unfolding newspaper representation of terrorism.

Newspaper Representation of the 13 November 2015 Series of Attacks
On the evening of Friday, 13 November 2015, three suicide-bombs exploded
intermittently near the Stade de France in Saint-Denis, France, where Germany and France were
playing a friendly international soccer game. A few minutes after the first bombing, a series of
shooting started a few kilometers south of Saint-Denis, in downtown Paris, France. A group of
shooters opened fire on people sitting outside bars and restaurants located in the 10th and 11th
arrondissements, or city boroughs, of the capital before another group of shooters killed and took
others hostage inside the Bataclan, a concert hall where Eagles of Death Metal was performing
that night. It was confirmed, days later, that 129 people died that night, and 354 others were
injured as a result of this series of attacks (Extract # 176).
Immediately after the attacks, for about a day or two, newspapers reported how the events
unfolded. Even though the emergency services were still struggling to provide first aid and
“sauver les rescapés dans un indescriptible bain de sang,” – the English translation of this
passage is as follows, “to save the survivors in an indescribable bloodbath” (Extract # 8) – ,
newspaper reporters and editors were already qualifying "these attacks" as “’complexes’ au
regard du modus operandi […], plusieurs assaillants [qui] se déplaçaient pour semer la terreur”
(Extract #20), which translates in English as, “’complex’ with regard to the modus operandi […],
several attackers [who] were moving to sow terror.” The partial descriptions of these multiple
and complex attacks remind the readership, at least in this last cited article, of the unprecedented
nature of the attacks, “inspirées d’une forme de violence ayant cours depuis plusieurs années
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dans des zones de conflit telles que l’Afghanistan, l’Irak ou la Syrie, où règne une forme de
violence dont la France se croyait jusqu’alors protégée,” or, “inspired by a form of violence that
has been going on for several years in conflict zones such as Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria, where a
form of violence reigns from which France believed to be protected.” In this news account,
Orientalism had already sedimented the discourses that consisted in making of nations, the
victims of a form of violence “dont la France se croyait jusqu’alors protégée,” or, “from which
France believed to be protected” (Extract #20).
The three themes developed in this chapter then allow us to understand the depth of the
anchor that is Orientalism in newspaper representation of terrorism. We begin with the theme
that challenges the stereotypes and tropes of Orientalism that reinscribe a fixed understanding of
religion and the simplification of anything that has to do with Islam, the tropes of the folk devils
that are communicated in news made by comments like the one cited above, reinscribing into the
imaginary of media consumers the sentiment of a threat still at risk, of a foreign-born threat
circulating feely among “us” citizens. The role played by news in the escalation of fear and the
enduring sentiment that the threat perdured for some time after the attacks at the Bataclan,
translates how deep the scope of Orientalism has been anchored in newspaper representation.
One of the textual attitudes of Orientalism that undercut newspaper representation of
terrorism was, as you will notice in this chapter, the way the nation-state of France came across
as “immunized” against the threat, reinscribing into the consciousness of media consumers the
language that communicates the need for “medicalization” in a nation still at prey with the threat
posed by terrorism. The deconstruction of the questions of identity made central to the news
challenged the stereotypes of a “homegrown” folk devils “on the loose” that came across
newspaper representation in the sets of word images of pools of blood, scattered body parts, and
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teared human flesh and souls. Throughout this entire chapter, we keep in mind the conscious
labor of interpreting data to understand how Orientalism served as anchor to newspaper
representation of terrorism at the time of the events. We will then turn to the warlike discourse
and the depiction of acts weaving into the fabric of society a sentiment of inertia that results out
of the traditional canvas made of violence signified in newspaper representation of terrorism.

Theme 1: The Construction of the Identity of the Perpetrators as Folk Devils
Following the Bataclan attacks, newspaper representation of terrorism invited the readers
to accuse the “djihadistes,” or, “islamistes” - read as, fundamentalist Islamists - who are already
and always posing a threat to the European democracies. A simple search for terms like “Islam”
in the word document that holds the compilation of the 210 articles, shows that the term and
others with the same roots - like “islamistes” or “islamique” or “islamisme”, - appeared 312
times. What comes in stark contrast with the fixation on Islamism, is the ways newspaper
reverberated strongly what it meant to be French, or français following the attacks. In
comparison, the term français was printed at least 286 times in articles collected for this
research. The limited juxtapositions of Islam as a monolithic entity with terrorism contrasts
greatly with the juxtaposition of French-ness as this ideal experience, represented in the news as
the epitome of democratization processes. One should not have to be Muslim to realize this
disproportional attention limits what may be the experience of being Muslim. In other terms,
there is a unidimensional representation of Muslims and Islam that does not admit variations.
Soon after the 13 November 2015 attacks, readers of Le Monde and Le Figaro learned
more from detailed accounts about the events. A series of articles give specific details about the
perpetrators of the tragic acts. For example, the article redacted by an editorial team at Le Monde
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and published on 15 November 2015 that gave an account of a survivor who faced the aggressors
said: “J’ai vu deux fous, arriver en riant : “Ce que vous faites à la Syrie, on va vous le faire” “,
témoignera un peu plus tard une femme, blessée.” This passage translates as, “I saw two
madmen, arriving laughing: ‘What you are doing to Syria, we are going to do it,’ a wounded
woman would testify later, hurt." First, this passage gives an example that shows how discourses
of madness were reinforced in newspaper representation of terrorism post-Bataclan. Second, this
passage demonstrates how Orientalism discourse was reinforced in the testimonies of survivors
who are repeatedly used to frame madness.
One example of survivor testimonies resonated with this madness theory, in the article
“Louis Samka, 26 ans: ‘J’étais en mode survie’” published in the international section of Le
Monde. Another evidence of a use of a survivor testimony that invited readers to immerse in the
narrative of madness and to become a framing hypothesis used to label the crimes committed by
the perpetrators. The article notes: “En fait, se souvient Louis, " mon cerveau essayait de se
connecter, de comprendre pourquoi on m'avait tiré dessus ". Il n'a pas pensé d'emblée à un acte
terroriste, mais plutôt à un fou, "which translates as, “In fact, Louis remembers, ‘my brain was
trying to connect, to understand why I was shot.’ He did not immediately think of a terrorist act,
but rather of a madperson.” Madness becomes the frame used by the journalist to frame the
introduction of the article. What comes after is a series of paragraphs in which the journalist
must have asked the survivor to give an account of the events. An account by a survivor who
seemingly consented to give detailed memories about “facing death” after finding oneself in the
middle of “scenes of war”. Next, the journalist must have received consent from the mother who
then was quoted as feeling resentment or, in other words, was experiencing “incomprehension in
the face of barbarism” (Extract # 209).
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These examples are important for understanding how newspaper narratives depicted
perpetrators through survivor testimonies. By survivor testimonies, I refer to the stories told by
people who encountered the perpetrators, who bore witness to these acts of extreme violence,
and who are quoted in the news. In that sense, it could be interpreted that, consumers attentive to
news might have a window open into what Mbembe names best, a representation of terrorism
within already existing "death-worlds" (Mbembe, 2003, p. 40). In fact, the abovementioned
passages, quoted from the data, only shows a glimpse at how survivor testimonies are to evoke
madness in the newspaper representation of terrorism post-Bataclan. I use the term diagnostical
to remind the reader of this project, of the politics of resentment traditionally expressed in the
dominant response to acts of violence legally marked as violent and the way vehicle of news in
the scheme of justification for sovereign legitimacy over the nonlegal use of violence (Mbembe,
2019). One cannot omit the exertion of power in the discourse of madness as a quintessential
framework for the logic of Orientalism to prevail. This trend of emitting the madness hypotheses
is ultimately at the core of Orientalism discourse but here, through testimonies coming from
people who witnessed and suffered from the trauma of a brutal act of violence. The critique is to
question the role played by newspapers in framing these accounts as part of the justificatory
schemes that make of state use of political violence non legal yet justifiable.
Since Orientalism relied, principally, on a logic of essentialization and objectification that
buttressed imperial regimes, it is important to understand the role of survivor testimonies in the
representation of terrorism following the 13 November 2015 attacks. I turned to Baroni (2018)
who taught us that the narrative framework of newspaper articles might neutralize “l’immersion
et la mise en intrigue […] au profit d’une représentation objectivante et généralisante, visant à
rendre compréhensible un événement ayant introduit une forte discordance dans le flux de
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l’actualité” (p. 119) - a passage that translates as follows, “the immersion and intrigue [...] in
favor of an objectifying and generalizing representation, aiming to make comprehensible an
event having introduced a strong discordance in the flow of the news”. According to Baroni, this
journalistic trend can be found in the first days following the attacks of 13 November 2015,
when numerous articles narrated the “protagonists” and more particularly the “aggressors” and
which more often relate to their functions (“suicide bombers” or “Commandos” for example)
than their unique identities. This representation invites readers to perceive a threat made palpable
through media narratives (see the category of perpetrators, Table 9). I contend that these
passages reinforce Orientalism discourse for how journalists and editors reify the assumptions
that Islam should be perceived as a “looming threat and destabilizing power” (Elgamri, 2008, p.
49). This way of narrating the events of the Bataclan works in tandem with the way the media
have focused on the identity of the scapegoats. This association also corresponds to the second
characteristic of moral panic, that is, the hostile reaction towards the community considered
responsible for the acts. The definition of the threat sketched out by the condemnation of a global
enemy, amplified in the national press, made visible Muslims and those who identify with Islam,
often called by the national press and politicians to condemn the acts committed by “djihadistes”
or, “jihadists” (Extract #17).
It is possible to notice differences and similarities in the ways national print press
reverberated and amplified the call to unity in the backdrop of the warlike climate resented in the
wake of these tragic attacks. Beyond the usual qualifications (of “commandos” and “assailants”),
we can see a tendency of the right-wing press to infantilize certain aggressors (described as
“petits voyous et d’illuminés,” “petits délinquants,” “malfrats français” terms which translate as
follows, “little thugs and crackpots,” “petty delinquents,” “French thugs”) and to affix a foreign
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origin (“Syrian migrant”) to others (Extract # 65). This trend is found as the central theme of an
article published in Le Figaro on 16 November 2015 by Mevel, who was the expert for the
newspaper on issues related to Eastern Europe. Mevel wrote:
Le scenario de tueurs se mêlant au flot incontrôlable des quelque 800 000 hommes,
femmes et enfants débarqués cette année de Turquie en Grèce donne, depuis longtemps,
des sueurs froides aux polices du Vieux Continent. Une confirmation [que le passeport
appartient à l’un des assaillants] accréditerait aussi une planification de longue haleine
des attentats par l’État islamique, à l’opposé des « loups solitaires » incriminés lors de
l’attaque du Musée juif à Bruxelles et de l’attentat déjoué contre le TGV Bruxelles-Paris.
(Extract # 31)
This passage is translated in English by the author in the following block quote,
The scenario of murderers mingling with the uncontrollable flow of some 800,000 men,
women and children who landed this year from Turkey in Greece had been giving police
in the Old Continent, cold sweats. Confirmation that [the passport belongs to one of the
attackers] would also accredit a long-term planning of the attacks by the Islamic State, a
the opposite of “lone wolves” incriminated during the attack on the Jewish Museum in
Brussels and of the foiled attack on the Brussels-Paris TGV.
This passage illustrates a tendency of the dominant responses post-Bataclan in the use of the
metaphor of an "uncontrollable flow" to describe an "immigration crisis" as a causal link with the
terrorist threat. A practice that reinforces the hypothesis of "the figure of the migrant [that] has
come to be seen as a potential terrorist in the West," part of the world where migrants and
refugees are already continually characterized as taking place in "a destructive and even
militarized war against Western civilization” (Nail, 2016, p. 160). With this passage, the reader
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is invited to stand in "cold sweats" alongside police of the "old Continent" and other institutions
in charge of tracking down the "homegrown," "radical Islamic terrorists," some of whom were
still on the loose in the days that followed the attacks.
Media consumers found themselves immersed in birds eye views of journalistic accounts
that followed the tracks of institutions invested in the arrest of the perpetrator, in charge of
"hunting down the radical Islamic terrorists" still running loose. An alarmist report published on
Le Figaro by Cornevin on the 19 November 2021 invited the readers to make sense of, "la
traque hors norme menée pour neutraliser les complices des sept kamikazes qui ont frappé le
coeur de la région parisienne" (Extract # 145). In English, this passage translated as follows,
"the extraordinary hunt carried out to neutralize the accomplices of the seven suicide bombers
who struck at the heart of the Parisian region." Readers were then suddenly compelled to fear
that the Double, as the author claims, "un extravagant nid de terroristes, l'un des plus venimeux
que la France n'ait jamais abrité en son sein, qui a été mis au jour en plein quartier historique
de Saint-Denis, à deux pas de la Basilique des rois et à moins d'un kilomètre du Stade de France
visé par trois opérations suicides." A passage that, once translated, illustrates how the Double
was constructed following the 13 November 2015 attacks, subject of the next subsection and
discussion of the second theme of this chapter. The passage reads in English, " an extravagant
terrorist nest, one of the most poisonous that France has ever housed within it, which has been
unearthed in the historic district of Saint-Denis, a stone's throw from the Basilica of the Kings
and at least one kilometer away from the Stade de France targeted by three suicide operations."
The front cover of Le Figaro published that; investigators counted approximately 5000
ammunitions on the scene of this hunt while the in-depth coverage of the police assault played
the immersive role of describing veritable "scenes of war" (see the category of war in Table 7).
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The reader is left with the imaginations of orders shouted, sounds of gunfire, explosives, sirens,
and other sonic manifestations of war that surely terrorized at least part of the population living
in the neighborhood.
The immersive journalistic accounts of the police raid published in Le Figaro gave the
impression of closure and return to security for people in France when news confirmed by the
perpetrators were killed during the assault.20 Readers of Le Monde were not that deeply
immersed in the police raid and were instead invited to understand how police forces obtained
intelligence information about the whereabouts of Abaaoud and one other accomplice of the 13
November 2015. Only the investigation of the assault and the publication months later of an
internal report showed that the assault did not happen the way Bernard Cazeneuve, and the
people in charge of the raid, said happened (for details, see Martinet et al., 2016). It was
discovered that there were not 5000 ammunitions, but three times less, mostly coming from the
weapons of officers. It was reported that the terrorists could only fire approximately fifteen
bullets and could not possibly have fired a Kalashnikov, as reported by primary definers in the
media. It was also reported that police officers were crossing fire with each other and that some
had been shot as a result of fratricidal fires. The canine unit in charge of snooping around the
debris was also shot dead by the police. It was finally discovered that the police officers on duty
during the assault were reported firing weapons long after one the perpetrators self-detonated an
explosive device, killing everyone inside the apartments instantly. I contend that the construction
of the figure of the Double coupled with the exaggeration of facts (read, lies) by the Minister of
the Interior about the assault against the perpetrators, reverberated in media in a sense that
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Indeed, the articles reported the deployment of 110 officers for that specific raid of the police, and a total of
approximately 800 investigators employed since the 13 November 2015 attacks.
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provided very little explanation or in-depth understanding of the violence at the core of the 13
November 2015 and the responses to it.
Despite efforts from public officials to make the identity of the perpetrators central to
media representation terrorism following these acts, the readers were left with no solutions to
understand the perpetrators or what prompted the perpetrators to resort to violence in the first
place (see categories of rationalization Bataclan, madness, radicalization, and Bataclan attackers
in Table 9). I contend that media representation played a role in steering the attention of the
readers away from the deeper societal concerns related to violence underlying the 13 November
2015. According to Mbembe, "the problem is neither the migrants nor the refugees nor the
asylum seekers" - onto whom the burden of terrorism has been reflected in France and in Europe
modes of governance post-Bataclan - but borders more specifically "borderization" (p. 99).
Borderization, Mbembe questioned if that does not stand for the complex processes "by which
world powers permanently transform certain spaces into impassable places for certain classes of
populations;" "the conscious multiplication of spaces of loss and mourning, where the lives of a
multitude of people judged to be undesirable come to be shattered;" "a way of waging war
against enemies whose means of existence and survival we have previously destroyed;" "a
plethora of bombs, absurd demonstrations of untold destructive power - in short, ecocide" (pp.
99-100). It is with the intellectual consciousness of Mbembe that I turn to the second theme of
this chapter. Mbembe leaves us with a better understanding of the immersive experience that
positioned the readers of news as witnesses to the role played by media in offering simple
explanations about the acts and also about the dominant responses to the acts. The interpretation
of the language of war and the security imperative communicated by elected public officials are
discussed in the next subsection.
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Theme 2: The Articulation of Warlike Security Discourse
To understand this second theme central to the newspaper representation of terrorism
post-Bataclan, necessitates tracking back to the moment when the perpetrators triggered the
explosive mechanisms of the bombs near the Stade de France, in Saint-Denis, France, and when
the president was "extirpated" from the stadium, instants after the first detonation (Extract #9).
Before first responders could even confirm the number of deaths, and before the police
concluded an assault that would end the hostage situation at the Bataclan, then-president of the
U.S.A. Obama was the first to react to the acts. He stated that,
Once again we've seen an outrageous attempt to terrorize innocent civilians. This is an
attack not just on Paris, it's an attack not just on the people of France, but this is an attack
on all of humanity and the universal values that we share (Obama, as cited in Garunay,
2015).
Ready to “traduire les terroristes en justice" (Extract #16; see also category of
rationalization Bataclan in Table 7), or in English, “translate the terrorists in justice,” the appeal
to universality and assumed shared understanding of the human experience claimed by Obama,
appeared to align with the subsequent comments made by then-president Hollande in reactions to
the acts.
In two successive addresses to the nation one 13 and 14 November 2015, Hollande’s call
for unity came in tandem with declarations of war not unlike Bush’s post-9/11 rhetoric (Van
Reybrouck, 2015). Demanding the necessity to be at war with the people responsible for
committing such violent acts, Hollande (Isos, 2015) stated on 14 November 2015 that,
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Ce qui s’est produit hier, à Paris et à Saint-Denis près du Stade de France, c’est un acte
de guerre. Et, face à la guerre, le pays doit prendre des décisions appropriées. C’est un
acte de guerre qui a été commis par une armée terroriste, Daech,21 une armée
djihadiste, contre la France. Contre les valeurs que nous défendons partout dans le
monde. Contre ce que nous sommes. Un pays libre qui parle à l’ensemble de la planète.
Un acte de guerre qui a été préparé, organisé, planifié, de l’extérieur et avec des
complicités intérieures que l’enquête permettra d’établir. Un acte d’une barbarie
absolue.
This passage is translated in English by the author in the following block quote,
What happened yesterday, in Paris and in Saint-Denis near the Stade de France, is an act
of war. And, in the face of war, the country must make appropriate decisions. It is an act
of war that was committed by a terrorist army, Daesh, a jihadist army, against France.
Against the values that we defend everywhere in the world. Against what we are. A free
country that speaks to the whole planet. An act of war that has been prepared, organized,
planned, from the outside and with internal complicity that the investigation will
establish. An act of absolute barbarism.
The speeches by Obama and specifically the ones by Hollande, were amplified in both national
public broadcast television and also in Le Monde and Le Figaro. The article, “Attaques
terroristes sans précédents en plein Paris,” which translates as "unprecedented terrorist attacks
in the middle of Paris," made the headlines of Le Figaro. An article published the day after the
attacks recalls that, “onze mois après la tuerie de Charlie Hebdo, la France replonge dans
l’horreur,” “eleven months after the Charlie Hebdo massacre, France is plunging back into
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Daech is the term preferred by the French government to refer to what the United Nations calls the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant.
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horror" which was caused by “l’équipée sanglante [de] terroristes […], la pire tragédie jamais
endurée par le pays depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale,” a passage that translates as, “the
bloody team [of] terrorists […], the worst tragedy the country has endured since World War II”
(Extract #8).
In days following the attacks that ended at the Bataclan, newspapers seized the language
of war, and other war-like metaphors used in public addresses. A total of 247 utterances of the
term guerre, or war, appeared in the articles selected for this analysis (see the category of war in
Table 9). Although some uses were meant to describe the war waged against the Assad régime in
Syria at the time, the imagery of war was also prominent to show how some experts qualify the
state of siege imposed by the Bataclan attacks. In an article published in Le Figaro by Cornevin
and Leclerc, we read about the “dark scenario” feared by many experts in counterterrorism,
“celui d'un attentat multiple frappant le coeur de Paris ainsi qu'un site hautement symbolique,
est devenu réalité vendredi soir” (Extract # 8, see also category of war in Table 9). A passage
that read in English as follows, “that of a series of attacks hitting the heart of Paris as well as a
highly symbolic site, became reality on Friday evening.” The reality of this dark scenario
mentioned here wasn’t fully comprehended – or, “attended” if we were to continue with the
metaphor of a macabre theater – that it was already compared by the authors to “la pire tragédie
jamais endurée par le pays depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale,” or in English “The worst
tragedy ever the country ever endured since the World War II.” Even though the superlative
tracing back to WWII may not have been used much, other analogies signified to the reader the
horror of made possible by the 1939-1945 war. For example, the term kamikaze was mentioned
130 times by newspapers selected for analysis.22 This comparison was further supported by
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In French much like in English, the etymology of the term kamikaze traces back to the use of airplanes by
Japanese aircraft soldiers who would deliberately crash into a target. Both the Centre National de Ressources
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other journalists, including an article published a day later by the press agency at Le Monde
which read, “les rues de Paris se sont vidées comme si la France connaissait vraiment la guerre
et ses couvre-feu” (Extract #25), or in English, “the streets of Paris emptied as if France really
knew about war and its curfews.” For many people cited in the news, or for journalists
themselves, the perpetrators of the series of attacks committed brought Paris in a state of siege.
The threat then materialized into reality when the coordinated attacks of 13 November
2015 by young people from France and Belgium – a series of bombing targeting people
attending a symbolic (celebration of an armistice) international friendly soccer game between
France and Germany at the Stade de France, shootings of people sitting at the patio of selected
bars and restaurants in different arrondissements of Paris, and the shooting and hostage situation
at the Bataclan concert hall – brought into the imagination of people who consumed media at the
time, an image of war that was, arguably before the Charlie events of January 2015, perceived as
impossible to take place on French soil. The description of the acts and the rhetoric of war
embraced by the president, prime minister, and other political leaders as a response to these acts,
invite readers of the news to perceive the threat, and draw the portrait of the perpetrators as
terrorist who invite a war from over there, here, in the nation of human rights. War, then,
appeared to have been used in ways that went beyond the metaphorical.
As mentioned previously, the prolongation of the state of emergency, deployed by
Francois Hollande the night of the Bataclan attacks just minutes before the police intervention to
rescue hostages inside the concert hall, was voted unanimously a few days later. Even though the
vote took place on 20 November 2015, only Le Figaro reported on the voting process that locked

Textuelles et Lexicales and The Oxford English Dictionary traced the roots of the term back to the late 1800s,
meaning a powerful wind, said to be gift from the gods; gales that destroyed the fleet of the invading Mongols in
1274 and 1281.
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in the state of emergency. There were not many articles in Le Monde at that time, that
commented on the prolongation of this measure. Thus, it is possible to understand how
newspaper representations of terrorism post-Bataclan were marking security measures
permanently into the fabric of French society. Considering the political orientation of the
editorial line at Le Figaro, it is not surprising, then, to read that it published three (3) articles on
20 November 2015, dedicated to explaining what is the state of emergency (see the category of
state of emergency in Table 7), and what are the organizations (e.g., the police) that gravitate
around and who claim a stake in its application (Extract #193).
Very few articles published during the week after the attacks and selected for analysis
appear to question this exceptional measure, and most of the articles only appeared to describe
what the state of emergency entails (see category of emergency in Table 9). Criticisms of the
measure were only perceived through the representation of members of the Nouveau Parti
Anticapitaliste (NPA), a far-left coined “radical” political party in the article by Chabrout
(Extract #77) published in Le Figaro, but as a side note under a rubric with, as title, a quote from
Le Pen’s reactions to the measure, titled “bonnes inflexions,” or good inflections (see also
category of emergency in Table 9). An article by Gonzalès (Extract #114) titled, “Les magistrats
mettent en garde à propos des limites de l'état d'urgence” offered a glimpse at the issues with the
provisions embedded in the measure. The title is best translated in English as follows,
“Magistrates warn about the limits of the state of emergency.” However, the ways the article was
framed, through the lens of people working in the legal field dedicated to the war on terror in
France, only serve as a platform for the toughening of measures in ways that the recent
intelligence law (see Vétois, 2015) did not address. In fact, the article suggest that the state of
emergency is welcome by people in the magistracy. The impingement on human rights and civil
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liberties do not appear to pose a problem, despite what human right activists and scholars might
say (Vauchez, 2018). Originally drafted in 1955 as a temporary response by then-imperialist
French colonial state at a time when people in Algeria struggled for independence, the state of
emergency provided the rights for administrators to benefit from the same authoritative rights
than that of the judiciary branch, notably in investigating people and in limiting freedoms. The
meaning of the law today has not changed much since its inception; so far as it is an extension of
the judiciary branch that allows public administration officers at the regional level (préfets in
French, prefects in English) to command the police to conduct house searches and arrests, among
other processes, under the purview of the law.23
Readers of Le Figaro might have felt compelled to celebrate this security measure that
relies on assessment of risks related to terrorism and the increase of surveillance practices on
populations that have always and already been the targets of such policies. The following
example highlights how people in positions of power use the legal articulation of the state of
emergency to assert authority:
Le texte est assez flou et succinct pour permettre aux préfets - et non plus aux magistrats
- d'« ordonner des perquisitions à domicile de jour comme de nuit ». Dans les
départements les plus concernés par le trafic d'armes et le radicalisme religieux, entre
trois et cinq perquisitions se déroulent tous (sic) les nuits actuellement. (Extract #190)
This passage translates into English as follows,
The text is rather vague and succinct to allow prefects - and no longer magistrates - to
"order searches at home day and night." In the departments most concerned with arms
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See the actual text of the law, Loi n° 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence.
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000695350. Since January 11th, 2018,
prefects are also given the right to “prohibit the movement of people or vehicles in places and times fixed by the
decree.”
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trafficking and religious radicalism, between three and five searches are taking place
every night now.”
As the passage above demonstrates, the “vague-ness” of the text “allows” people in positions of
power to conduct house arrests and searches based on assumptions - not actual evidence – that
people being searched and arrested pose a threat to the public. The numbers illustrate this
demonstration of power. In the lead of the same article, the author lists that a total of “414
perquisitions, 64 interpellations dont 60 gardes à vue” - in English, “414 searches, 64 arrests, 60
of which in custody” - have been conducted between Saturday 14 November and Wednesday 18
November 2015. Arrests, as the previous example showed, that were conducted at any time of
day and night. These numbers become an issue when one considers what it means for the 350
house searches that have not led to any arrests. From a more quantitative perspective, only
15.46% of house searches resulted in arrests, which illustrates the paradoxical responses to terror
“by the force of the law” praised by Hollande, topic of the next subsection.

Theme 3: The Paradoxes that the National Press and Public Politicians Appeared to be
Facing24
The third and final theme central to this analysis should help in understanding that
Orientalism discourse was an anchor of newspaper representation of terrorism since way before
the Bataclan and, in a chronologically logical sense, before Pulse, too (see the following
chapter). So far, this project has been investigating the role of the newspaper in amplifying a
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According to CRNTL, paradox could be defined as followed, "Affirmation surprenante en son fond et/ou en sa
forme, qui contredit les idées reçues, l'opinion courante, les préjugés." The Oxford English Dictionary lists the
following as the definition of the logic of paradox: An argument, based on (apparently) acceptable premises and
using (apparently) valid reasoning, which leads to a conclusion that is against sense, logically unacceptable, or selfcontradictory; the conclusion of such an argument. Frequently with a descriptive or eponymous name. See also:
Putnam et al. (2016).

113

state-sponsored definition of the threat. By state-sponsored, I refer to how newspaper represented
the need for the amplification of the definition of the threat posed by a suicidal approach to Self
(in body, flesh, soul, spirit, and political consciousness) and the ways newspaper representation
instantiated the events that breached different expectations about violence in society. In this
section, I contend that the role played by news representation of terrorism post-Bataclan was like
that of a conduit that buttressed a self-generating warfare logic scheme orchestrated (consciously
or unconsciously) between the perpetrators and principally, the primary definers like elected
officials, with relative control over whose life is grieve-able.
The processes of racialization that manifested in the newspaper representational
tendencies, attitudes, of reverberating the depoliticization of naming the events as "radical
Islamic terrorism," "barbarism," and anything in-between. The reaction by Hollande was but an
example of how first definers turned the events of 2015, including the Bataclan, as an inevitable
series of attacks that newspapers instantiated as terrorism. The word images fixated, over time,
on the villainy of acts and the identification of the threat posed by terrorism. One could possibly
argue that consumers of representation of terrorism were hailed in with a signification of a
racialized threat. The paradox, in France, reached a turning point when ideal of “vivre ensemble”
were threatened by an understanding of terrorism that had already been anchored in the
imaginary of French society, or at least the readers of the news selected here. The ideals of
democracy that were chanted after the mass murders at Charlie, the hostage situation at a Kosher
supermarket in January of that same year. The perpetrators of the Bataclan, or more specifically
what is made of their identity in newspapers that one week, reverberates sets of discourses that
were already fueled by fantasies of Orientalism. What scholars have already described as a
security secular turn in contemporary France manifested on the streets very differently, and
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relegated concerns about the state complicity in terrorism (remember, state terrorism is but a
facet of the incommensurable puzzle that solidifies the matrices of domination orchestrating
White Supremacy in late modernity).
The paradox is to consider the responses, in the context of the Bataclan, that contributed
to an understanding of how nation-states assessed the threat differently, and that agitated debate
in the European Union and that contributed to discussion about the responsibilities of member
states in the endorsements of the use of war as political response to the acts. For example, the
article titled, "La France n’est pas seule, l’UE est à ses côtés,” or, "France is not alone, the EU is
on its side" by Ducourtieux published in Le Monde, 19 November 2015, transcribed an interview
with Pierre Moscovici, then European Commissioner for the Economy, who reassured the
readers that security was a priority and the France could count on the mobilization of other
member states in the European Union to increase security measures at the borders (Extract
#173). The paradox is, from a perspective that only Said could really understand, explain, and
challenge, in the irreconcilability of conditions of secularism as an already existing paradox in
French society. Here, the securitized arm of secularism showed how, surely, the cyclical
constructions of a threat and the fabrications of an essentialism that shoves under one stroke
Islam, and eventually any possibility to interpret Islam, in the backdrop of a nation state
implication in state terrorism.
An article published in Le Figaro on 16 November 2015, G. Tabard (Extract # 44)
explains that,
Avec le recul, sont apparues les limites, les illusions voire les tromperies du fameux «
esprit du 11 janvier ». La belle communion nationale d'un jour avait parfois servi de
paravent pour ne pas regarder en face les causes profondes de la radicalisation
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fondamentaliste, au sein même de la société française. L'impératif d'unité avait parfois
servi d'alibi pour refuser d'affronter certains tabous. L'exécutif avait pris des mesures
fortes ayant quand même permis de déjouer certains projets sinistres. Mais la nécessité
de dénoncer le terreau du terrorisme avait vite cédé la place à l'éloge d'un « vivre
ensemble » idéalisé au nom du refus de toute « stigmatisation » et de tout « amalgame ».
Imposer un nouveau « Je suis Charlie » n'était plus possible.
The English translation of this passage is as follows,
In hindsight, the limits, illusions and even deceptions of the famous “spirit of January 11”
appeared. The beautiful national communion of a day had sometimes served as a screen
so as not to face the root causes of fundamentalist radicalization, even within French
society. The imperative of unity had sometimes served as an alibi to refuse to face certain
taboos. The executive had taken strong measures which nevertheless made it possible to
foil certain sinister projects. But the need to denounce the breeding ground of terrorism
had quickly given way to the praise of an idealized “living together” in the name of the
refusal of any “stigmatization” and any “amalgamation”. Imposing a new "Je suis
Charlie" was no longer possible.
This rather lengthy paragraph illustrates the sentiment of indignation following the
Bataclan. In this article, it appears that the spirit of a 01/11 spirit haunts a society at prey with
and, paradoxically, fertile ground for terrorism (see also categories of institutional
responsibilities and Charlie in Table 9). What is perhaps troubling with these statements is the
way Tabard continues to highlight the paradoxes of the dominant discourse post-Charlie – the
call for laicité as a tool to reinforce values of the French Republic – to justify the stigmatization
of a community already stigmatized since before Charlie, people who identify as Muslims in
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France. The last sentence of this passage then reads like a euphemism; denouncing terrorists
becomes an imperative, beyond a call for unity, in which the refusal to make amalgams is not
possible anymore. This passage implies that desire to stigmatize Muslims or people who identify
as such becomes an undeniable possibility in the face of terror.

Conclusion
Attentive to and interactive with these theories and the news collected as a dataset, this
chapter deconstructed how national newspapers in France deployed the notion of terrorism the
week following the 13 November 2015 series of attacks in Saint-Denis and Paris, France, and the
ways that Orientalism discourse was reinforced following these tragic events. More specifically,
this chapter shows how the newspapers, Le Monde and Le Figaro, represented terrorism in ways
that reinforced Orientalism for days after Saint-Denis and Paris were made the centerstage of a
tragic series of attacks that combined suicide-bombings, mass murders, hostage situations, and
police standoffs. The spotlights of newspapers made of the post-Bataclan moment a dramatic
event marked as terrorism, that reinforced Orientalism discourse in many ways.
First, the questions about issues related to identity at the center of newspaper
representation of terrorism following the Bataclan were interpreted through the sequences of a
moral panic. This can be seen in the tendency for newspaper to amplify dominant responses in
the public sphere and the confusion about naming the acts. From a critical standpoint of
Orientalism discourse, the apparent institutional preoccupation only served to reinforce control
over the use of sovereign power. This chapter, I hope, showed how newspaper depiction of the
perpetrators might reinforce assumptions about the escalation of a “Brown threat” posed by a
deterministic, objectivizing, and generalist worldview on terrorism and its contemporary folk
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devils (Silva, 2016). The Islamophobic blankets of Orientalism discourse hold a key to
reinforcing assumptions that the fear of terrorism passes through the media narratives of folk
devils, a work of simplification in the tradition of media narratives that simplify the reasons why
the perpetrators committed suicide using explosives and others used weapons of mass murders
freely. What is simplified (read as, uncontested or unchallenged as problematic) in these
situations, at least through representational modes and media narratives about the perpetrators
studied here, is the logic that underlies the response to these acts of extreme violence. What is
simplified is the broader notion of violence and the attention given to societal concerns related to
its breach in society (political, symbolic, divine).
This dissertation thus must continue to interrogate the ways in which Le Monde and Le
Figaro immersed the audience in a logic that consisted in displaying a demonstration of force, of
all the means (military, police, politicians) necessary to "hunt down" the perpetrators. It is
common knowledge, at least in the critique of state response to acts of such violence, that the
state is implicated in perpetuating the use of political violence and in justifying its use (Butler,
2016). Newspapers, in reverberating governmental identification of the perpetrators within this
frame of terror, played a role in focusing the readership attention away from the actual concerns
about violence and towards justification narratives in state use of violence as a response to the
acts of already extreme violence. As if the only response is violence. The dominant responses to
the 13 November 2015 attacks, although somewhat necessary to apprehend the perpetrators and
bring them to justice for committing such horrific acts, illustrated what Agamben (2005) calls a
state of exception, which is "not a special kind of law (like the law of war); rather, insofar as it is
a suspension of the juridical order itself, it defines law's threshold or limit concept" (p. 4). A kind
of violence that is non legal because it operates outside of the legal regime that is considered
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violence - "radical Islamic terrorism” - a sovereign right to reinforce racialized ordering. One
could argue that the representation of terrorism following the 13 November 2015 attacks
obfuscated responses to the acts that could legitimately fall under the purview of what is takenfor-granted and that often goes unchallenged: state terrorism (Alsultany, 2012).
In addition, the news attention or sensitivity towards the life of the perpetrators, refers to
the media role played in contemporary landscape of capitalism that consists in building
marketable news value. One could hypothesize that media profit off terrorism when assuming the
role: to force-feed terrorism over and over again (at least for a week), by inviting punctual or
daily subscribers to regurgitate scenes of symbolic political violence – of deaths, war, chaos,
suffering –, scripted words – spoken, recorded, written, published – and staged performances that
might procure – in images, imageries, and imaginaries - the impression of hearing the sound of
bloody living bodies, dying corpses, and burned souls. We have seen the recurrent tropes that
normalizes scapegoating, or the identification of and publication of media narratives that suggest
that a “djihadiste,” a “radical Islamic terrorism” threat, persisted in the aftermath the events.
From the perspective of studies in moral panic, there are reasons to believe that newspaper
representation of terrorism reinforced an escalating threat disproportional to the actual threat
posed by terrorism (Kumar, 2017).
Following this breach in the thresholds of violence of French society, the impression of
an endurance in the escalation of threat came across newspapers when connecting other events
and the responses to face the threat. The prolongation of the state of emergency is one example
of the ascendency to the sovereign ideals of the recourse to political violence. By analyzing the
post-Bataclan moment through the sequences of a moral panic, this chapter shows how these
selected stories giving the impression of folk devils, reinforced Orientalism discourse in the
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warlike security discourse. A strategic turn that, from a critical perspective, fuels the terrorismreligion nexus that animates dichotomies in Orientalism discourse and the making of modern
homegrown terrorist, object of knowledge established in newspaper representation as a
“dominated discourse about the Orient;” an “established […] body of texts that brought about a
discursive identity of the Orient making it unequal to the West” (Elgamri, 2008, p. 24). The
dichotomous control of an essentialism that reduced people identifying with Islam and the
Middle East, to exoticism and barbarism, and the concomitant universalism that elevated people
identifying with what is not Islam and the Middle East, to ideals of progressiveness and
democratic liberalism.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
PLATFORM OF HOSTILITY AND VOLATILE PANIC:
NEWSPAPER REPRESENTATION OF TERRORISM IN THE U.S.A. AFTER PULSE

Introduction
Early on Sunday 12 June 2016, Omar Mateen entered Pulse, a popular gay nightclub
located downtown Orlando, Florida, shortly after 2 am. Opening fire on the dancing crowd
celebrating Latin night inside the club, Mateen murdered dozens of patrons before holding
dozens of others hostage, trapped inside the nightclub for close to three hours. Some clubgoers
who managed to escape, searched city streets for help. A few hours after the first gunshots were
fired, at approximately 5 a.m., police officers broke the wall and breached inside the club early
Sunday morning, killing Mateen and freeing hostages from the hands of the perpetrator. Fifty
people died, including Mateen, while 58 were wounded that night in Florida. One clear
observation is that Pulse, which was marked profusely as terrorism, consumed and ended the life
of Queer Black and Brown bodies living in the moment, at a dance club.
In this chapter, we begin with an analytical summary of the events that unfolded in
newspaper representation of terrorism following that night of 12 June 2016. We continue to
interrogate the vilification of people who identify with Islam and the Islamic worldviews,
geographies, and cultural traditions. This chapter shows how the identification of the perpetrator
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as a terrorist threat, someone who self-identified to public authorities the night of the event,
began years prior to the attacks at Pulse. We continue by showing how presidential performances
saturated media during the days that followed the mass murder of forty-nine people inside Pulse.
Combined with the understanding that the appearances of consensus about the threat posed by
terrorism post-Pulse, this chapter also brings into question the volatility of a moral panic. The
sensation of a panic subsided and vanished with only traces of a legal challenges that failed to
instantiate the moment. The impression left in newspaper representation of terrorism post-Pulse
was that the fabric of society in France and the U.S.A. remained unchanged despite an escalating
hostility generated in the identification of the threat.
Before exploring these themes, the reinforcement of Orientalism discourse could be
traced back to the hours that preceded the tragic mass murders of people who were targeted by
Mateen that night of 12 June 2016, at Pulse. I take advantage of the method to include in this
thematic analysis, articles published certainly hours before Mateen entered Pulse. I interpreted
the eight articles from dataset that were published in The New York Times and The Washington
Post and the significance of the representation of terrorism in the context of the U.S.A. in 2016. I
chose to interpret the articles published the day of the event because they offer insights about the
context in which the events at Pulse occurred. It provides the lens through which to understand
the ways in which newspapers zoom in and out of different national contexts. Contrary to the
previous chapter, I focused on these articles from the main dataset because they also offer a lens
into the moment in between the attacks that ended at the Bataclan and leading to Pulse.
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Newspaper Representation of Terrorism Following the 12 June 2016 Shooting
In The New York Times (Times, from now on) articles published on 12 June 2016, readers
were invited to consider terrorism as a threat from abroad. That day, an article reported about the
threat posed on civil liberties in Bangladesh, where over 3000 people were arrested for their role
in fueling “a climate of terror,” suspected of killing “, bloggers, freethinkers, religious minorities,
foreigners, gay activists, followers of more liberal strains of Islam” (Extract #213; see also
category of international relations in Table 8). The Times also reported on the strikes organized
by labor unions and other activists demanding rights and privileges for people who work in
garbage disposal management systems in France, in the midst of what the author coined, “the
city’s mean season of terrorist attacks” (Extract #214). Of interest for the greater purpose of this
dissertation is the way this article seemed to be relegating the actual societal concerns of
violence underlying terrorism to conversations about other uses of political violence that
emanated from a strike because of the context of the acts marked as terrorism in France that year.
This is an important connection to draw because The Washington Post (Post from now on) draws
perhaps even more problematic ones on that day. That is an interpretation for Chapter Four,
however.
What cut across articles published in the Post is the resonance with the articles by the
Times and what is made of as a travelling, loose, border-crossing, phenomenon of violence. For
instance, the Post published an article about the difficulty of certain nation-states at prey with the
threat of terrorism. That, in critical perspective, becomes a textual attitude in newspaper
representation that conversely depicted the convergence of interests in the definition of the threat
posed by terrorism and the sets of discourses that appeared to have maintained control over
discourse of the war on terrorism. What these articles signified, at least to the consumers of both
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outlets, is a symbolic ascendency to violence. An escalation of violence, to be more precise, in
the response to the acts marked as terrorism by influential moral entrepreneurs of modern times
(presidents, magistrates, journalists, editors, politicians, military officials, police officers, to
name a few) who come to consensus in the use of a violence as a response mechanism to the
Pulse attacks.
Notably, there appeared to be a deep investment in what was coded as the Manbij
offensive, or what were the hands of the U.S. military in a civil war in Syria. Here is a brief
passage,
Envoy Brett McGurk said the operation to surround the city of Manbij, astride the only
remaining access road to Turkey, has been "one of the most complex military maneuvers
we've seen in some time."
Once the city itself is taken, he said, "it will entirely cut off [the Islamic State's] ability to
move from Raqqa and threaten us." He noted that planning and personnel for the recent
terrorist bombings in Brussels and Paris had come from Raqqa, through Manbij.
The attitude of this specific passage - published right after the lead paragraphs - reinforced
Orientalism discourse in the following way. The dots drawn here by “Envoy Brett McGurk” as a
point on a map where military forces are deployed, not counting the “forces have been
additionally aided by 300 U.S. Special Operations forces, who, among other assistance, have
trained the rebels to call in airstrikes, using coordinates and visuals displayed on tablets that they
then communicate to the Americans.” This was an unsurmountable obstacle, namely, to try to
control an area under the threat of a “terrorist cell.” This assumption and action pointed to the
Western rationality of primary definers of situations in that they are who here appeared to have
drawn connections between the “recent” attacks marked as terrorism in France and the U.S.A.
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The Post appeared to have been focused on the implications of the U.S.A. in the fight
against terrorism as a concern during the primaries that had just ended at the time of the attacks
at Pulse. Indeed, Clinton emerged as the official candidate for the Democratic party, running
against Trump who emerged as the incumbent for the Republican party. A Post article reveals, in
passing, that terrorism is the center of concerns for people in Iowa, U.S.A. (Extract #218; see
also category of candidate in Table 10). The Post also reported about counterterrorism warfare
taking place in Iraq. Detailing reports of a mission to secure areas in the city of Fallujah that
relied on “U.S.-led coalition for air cover”, the article invites the reader to map out how special
forces and “tribal fighters trained by the United States in bomb-disposal techniques” in different
areas of the city (Extract #220). Yet, in another article published by the Post, we learn that the
fight against terrorism is sanctioned by the U.S.A. The Post reported the story of Amin alBaroudi who was sentenced to two years in prison after pleading guilty “to conspiring to export
U.S.-origin goods to Syria in violation of federal sanctions” (Extract #221). In hindsight, the way
Western rationality was centered that day as a logic in the discursive formation of terror that led
to the Pulse moment, it is an entry point into how newspaper representation reinforced
“Orientalism fantasies” (Szpunar, 2018). A stepping board to understand the ways news framed
the identification of Mateen within traditional narratives and images of a threat (Szpunar, 2018)
foreshadowed by primary definers and other stakeholders in the public sphere at prey with
terrorism. So, when Mateen decided to execute at point blank and hold hostages dozens at Pulse,
the focus zoomed in on the threat posed by terrorism in the U.S.A. But, how was the events
perceived and represented by media?
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Theme 1: The Construction of the Identity of the Perpetrator as Folk Devils
As we learned, details about Mateen’s life, the perpetrator of the attacks in Orlando,
started being represented in the Times and the Post as early as the day following the events.
Often described by newspapers as “the gunman,” Mateen’s history of immigration, employment,
domestic violence, religiosity, sexuality, and potential ties to terrorism were the most salient of
representation in newspapers (see category of perpetrator in Table 10).
Scholarships that interrogated news representation of Pulse already showed how national
television broadcasted news services frames the perpetrator in various ways (DeFoster, 2017). In
the first two days following the attack, both newspapers referred to Mateen as the son of
immigrant from Afghanistan, often juxtaposing Mateen’s national identity and the allegiance to
ISIS pledged during the attack. For example, an article by Martin published by the Times
informed the readers that, “The suspected gunman, Omar Mateen, was an American who
declared allegiance to the Islamic State and was the son of an immigrant from Afghanistan”
(Extract #222) while an article published that same day by Tsukayama, Berman, and Markon of
the Post read, “The gunman was identified as Omar Mateen, a 29-year-old security guard who
was born in New York to Afghan parents.” (Extract #232; see also category of the perpetrator in
Table 10). These are two of many examples of how news coverage of the events at Pulse
solidified the nexus of terrorism and religion. While the former indicated how news covered the
revendication made by the perpetrator, the latter illustrated how news representation centered
towards revealing the perpetrator’s experience with employment in the U.S.A. The common
thread in these two passages extracted from data, is the ways news represented terrorism
following Pulse by associating Mateen’s national identity to a family experience with
immigration. This type of news representation was not as present towards the end of the week.
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Rather, it was Mateen’s employment history as a security guard for almost nine years that
shifted media attention, at least the one of newspapers selected for this research. In the first day
that followed the attacks, fleeting reports about the life of the perpetrator started to pour in about
G4S, which in 2013 was the world’s third largest private employer after Walmart and FoxConn
(Hammer, 2013). A company that was not aware that Mateen was under investigation while
under employment. It could be argued that politicians and media pundits alike may have omitted
the level of responsibility of G4S for not taking seriously the issues faced by Mateen during his
time as an employee. The employment history of Mateen was a central subtheme that immersed
the readers into the racialized experience of a perpetrator who nurtured ambiguous relationships
with colleagues, employers, and government agents employed by the FBI. For days after the
events, readers were left without the possibility to question the role played by these same
institutions in letting Mateen "slip through the cracks."
In media, the impression of a collision occurred between stories told through the lenses of
former colleagues, intimate partners, and relatives of the perpetrator (see category of perpetrator
in Table 10). A collision that symbolically emerged from news as a formation of consensus view
of the motives that led Mateen to commit these acts of extreme violence. Not unlike in the
representation of the acts at Pulse in televised news (DeFoster, 2017), newspapers representation
focused briefly on politicians' attention to homegrown terrorism and qualified Mateen, a lone
wolf, like in the article published in the Times on 15 June 2016 by Apuzzo and Lichtblau who
wrote, " the F.B.I. is investigating 1,000 potential ''homegrown violent extremists,'' the majority
of whom are most likely tied to or inspired by the Islamic State" (Extract # 277). A cumulation
of stories that buttressed the figure of a "lone wolf" and the myth of a perpetrator whose sexual
orientation and professional experience stood as the standard up against which every Muslims in
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the U.S.A., probably the world, were compared to at the time of the events. The mass murder,
hostage situation, police negotiation and standoff moment took place at a time when people were
at Pulse for Latin Night. The facts pile up to feed the white supremacist myth that the perpetrator
was a sexually frustrated perpetrator who acted alone as a non-hetero lone wolf who had gone so
deeply Muslim as to escape from the vigilance of security experts for years until that night.
In the media, the construction of the identity of the perpetrator illustrated the forms of
denial (cf. Chapter Two) that gives the impression of an impossibility for readers to question the
responsibilities of an employer (e.g., G4S) and the FBI, among other institutions. The reader is
simultaneously invited to reject the possibility that G4S - a global corporation specialized in
security services and responsible for training people in the manipulation of what I presume to be
an arsenal of weapons - and the FBI - a domestic intelligence and security agency - are
responsible for failing to act on signs that Mateen would turn "terrorist." For instance, an article
published in the Times opened with the headline, “Security Giant where Mateen worked said it
knew of 2013 FBI investigation” (Extract #259) The statement read, "we learned that Mateen
had been questioned by the FBI but that the inquiries were subsequently closed. We were not
made aware of any alleged connections between Mateen and terrorist activities and were
unaware of any further FBI investigations" (Extract #259). Further in the article, the author
revealed that G4S had removed any statement made public by Kenning and refused to
acknowledge responsibility in knowing about the fact that Mateen was subjected to state
surveillance.
The dominant representation of the perpetrator showed Mateen’s experience with the FBI
and the responsibilities of the agency of “letting go” of the perpetrator despite the years of
subjecting Mateen to surveillance. From a feminist praxiological standpoint, surveillance refers
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to the logic that focuses on maintaining a systematic attention to and measurement of certain
populations considered a threat to the state (Smith, 2015). The very first day after the attacks,
newspapers reported profusely about the life of Mateen (see category of perpetrator in Table 10).
In the article cited above by L. Alvarez et al. (2016), “Praising Isis, Gunman Attacks Gay
Nightclub, Leaving 50 Dead in Worst Shooting on U.S. soil”, it is reported that Mateen was
investigated in 2013 “when he made comments to co-workers suggesting he had terrorist ties”
and in 2014 “for possible connections to Moner Mohammad Abusalha, an American who
became a suicide bomber in Syria.” It is reported that the connection between Abusalha and
Mateen was suspected based on the fact the two perpetrators attended the same mosque. From a
critical perspective, this suspicion underlies deeper issues of surveillance practices in the U.S.A.
Although both perpetrators committed terrible acts of violence, their “possible” connections
might invite readers to assume that Muslims in Fort Pierce, FL, are somehow connected to
terrorism because both perpetrators resided there at some point in their life.25 A form of
generalization that categorizes and equates Muslims as culprits.
It is only after a few days following the Pulse shooting that, full reports started emerging,
written in the form of biographies with accounts from close relatives, friends, and people who
may have met the perpetrator at some point. Accounts that offer an in-depth understanding in the
making of a mass murderer that focused on Mateen’s religious background and offered an insight
into Mateen’s romantic relationship, subjects of the next subsections. What is perhaps more
compelling in the accounts given of Mateen’s life than this generalization is the ways
newspapers showed how the FBI let go of Mateen. As mentioned above, Mateen was able to
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The focus of this dissertation is on newspaper accounts of terrorism following the acts at Pulse and on the role of
newspaper to reverberate accounts given by primary definers. The connection between the two perpetrators with the
mosque may have been coincidental but legally an investigation of this possible connection was necessary.
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continue working as a security officer for G4S and buying weapons despite years being under
surveillance. A failure in the surveillance system that was approached by newspapers as a
problem only insofar as the agency was overwhelmed with the responsibility of assessing the
threat of terrorism. A week after the attacks, a questionable article, “The FBI was correct not to
arrest Omar Mateen” published by Greenwald, read as follows,
based on what we know, the FBI acted properly. Agents have the power they need, and
they were right to close the case on Mateen. Just because someone successfully carries
out a mass attack does not prove that police powers were inadequate or that existing
powers were misapplied.
This passage illustrates, in my opinion, the ways newspapers align with the ideological
framework set forth by the war on terror. In a sense, it shows how news reports may justify yet
another transfer of responsibility on behalf of the agency. To push the argument further, I would
argue that such a passage further erases the history of the FBI in processes of racialization. What
Alimahomed-Wilson (2019) describes as the processes that continue to exacerbate the lived
experiences of Muslims; a process of “racialization [that] informs media and political
conversations and provides a framework for comprehending or explaining everyday
engagements with topics that have become exclusively racialized” and “constituted through a
multi-faceted racial project that distorts Muslims as the potential enemy” (p. 876). By associating
Mateen with Abusalha, and by putting Mateen under the surveillant gaze for years, the FBI and
subsequently the news media, buttressed what Alimahomed-Wilson coined racialized state
surveillance, “to specifically hone in on the state’s explicit role in racializing Muslims as objects
of surveillance” and “to emphasize the state’s (in this case the FBI) policies and practices that
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manufacture ordinary Muslims as suspicious” (p. 877).26 An analysis of newspaper
representation about Pulse as terrorism may not be sufficient enough to fully understand how
Pulse became a means by which FBI and other agencies increased surveillance. However, it is
possible to contest how newspaper rally behind the FBI for letting the perpetrator of the attack
“slip” through the cracks (Bahney, 2018).
The lengthy articles “From Troubled Child to Aggrieved Killer” (Extract #379) published
in the Times, written by Barry et al., or the article “The Volatile Life of Omar Mateen” (Extract
#391) published in the Post and written by Sullivan and Wan, both illustrate how newspapers
worked diligently to show the motives of the perpetrator, from citizenship to religion, sexuality,
and a history of domestic violence. Before these articles, and as early as the day after the
shooting, 13 June 2016, newspapers explained how Mateen’s allegiance to ISIL was pledged
over the phone with first responders shortly after the beginning of the shooting. Although
newspapers aligned in their representation of Mateen’s claim, each approached the confusion
over the perpetrator’s religious background in different ways. For example, Dvorak reported in
the “METRO” section of the Post on 14 June 2016 that, “No, Mateen didn't kill people because
he was a Muslim. He killed people because he was an angry, unstable person who apparently
beat his former wife and was outraged when he saw two men kiss in Miami” (Extract # 260).
This passage may be just a snippet of the numerous way news represented the perpetrator, but it
also shows a tendency, for the majority of articles analyzed, to depoliticize the subject in terms
of religion. That is, an invitation is offered for readers to think about the tragedy at Pulse as
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It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine how the FBI used cases like the Pulse shooting and Mateen
to surveille larger groups of Muslims with little evidence of a specific threat. However, it would be possible to
critique the FBI for not doing more to prevent the shooting at Pulse and for using an attack by a specific individual
to justify greater surveillance of a whole group of people (without specific evidence of threat like that which existed
in Mateen’s case).
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means to create a barrier with religion. The barrier posed by newspaper representation of
Mateen’s pledge to ISIL was further confounded when reports emerged from Mateen’s first wife,
S. Yusifiy, in the lengthy article by Sullivan and Wan (Extract #370). In it, it is reported that,
“Yusifiy said Mateen was not a devout Muslim and preferred spending his free time working out
at the gym. She said she never saw signs that he held radical beliefs.”
Meanwhile, the Times focused on existing F.B.I. suspicions about the possible threat
posed by that same perpetrator, Mateen, for years before attacks. The story by Lichtblau and
Apuzzo published the same day explained how the F.B.I. “sought help from Saudi intelligence
officials to determine whether Mr. Mateen had contact with any known terrorist suspects during
his travels for the umrah in 2011 and 2012” (Extract #244). The authors go on to mention that
“F.B.I. agents in Florida used multiple investigative tools, including an undercover informant
who made contact with the suspect, wiretapping his conversations, and pulling personal and
financial records on him.” This specific article also listed a track of records filed by agencies that
gave detailed accounts of interviews with Mateen. For some, quoted passages might have read
like the summary of an episode of the wire. For others, it shows how agencies supposedly in
charge of vetting and assessing the meaning of threat at the national and international level, took
an exit strategy in the definition of responsibility for having let go of Mateen.27 And for people
like Trump, this passage detailing the surveillance practices used against Mateen had indicated
that certain agencies don’t do counterterrorism surveillance well. Arguably, this was a way to
appeal to audience ready to invest in fueling, even more, the infamous war on terror (Extract
#332).
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A few days after Pulse, newspapers revealed that the F.B.I. had been sitting on piles of documents that had been
archived and left unaccounted for. The article “Decades Later, Big Brother Comes Out of Hiding” published in The
New York Times by J. Goldstein explained that surveillance documents of the “anti-communist ‘Red Squad’” tracing
back from mid-1950s to early 1970s were recovered during a routine inventory (Extract #332).
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The newspaper reports were even more perplexed when reports about Mateen’s
orientation to sexuality started to emerge in newspapers, four days after the attacks,
Mr. Mateen had voiced hatred of gays, minorities and Jews, and had claimed links to
Islamist terrorist groups; during the siege at the nightclub, he declared allegiance to the
Islamic State. But investigators were also looking into reports that he might have been
gay himself. (Extract #284)
Mateen’s presumed hatred towards people who identify on the LGB spectrum, coupled
with the assumptions of same-sex desires, became the focus of investigators and newspapers
alike in the days following the event. Already casting the perpetrator as mentally ill, unfit for
labor, and erratic, newspapers’ attention to Mateen’s sexual orientation highlighted the
complexity of the situation. It could be argued that this type of representation limits complex
understanding of religion and sexuality. The challenge is to deconstruct the racializing processes
that unfold following Pulse when consider the deaths of people who were already surviving the
clear-cut normative assumptions about sexual orientation; people whose ontologies and
epistemologies might and could have inspired liberation, self-empowerment, and organically
oriented notions of community; people who might have challenged the dichotomous patriarchal
conventions of understanding gender fluidity; or, people who might have had to hold on to the
myth of the Christian-based faith-oriented American Dream as a means of survival for being in
the world; people whose lived experiences might have already been subjected to dominant
representation of sexuality following Pulse. It is important to remember the changes in laws and
reforms generated by the 12 June 2015, decision from Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) that made the
banning of same-sex marriage unconstitutional, the year prior to Mateen’s assault at Pulse. A
milestone in progress for human rights tarnished by the violence committed at Pulse and
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permeated by false, deceitful, depoliticized appeals to belongingness signified in dominant
responses.
In addition, Mateen’s marital relationships were scrutinized right after the attacks. At the
core of newspapers representation were the depiction of Mateen as a violent domestic partner.
The representation of violent outbreaks and abusive personality of Mateen at home disclosed by
Yusifiy, coupled with how news focused on Mateen’s hatred towards homosexuality, the lack of
gun reforms, the increase in security measures, illustrate what Haider (2016) coined the
dominant, albeit invisible, frame of toxic masculinity. The issue of domestic violence, it could be
argued, was sidelined and only served to portray the perpetrator as another “bad” and violent
Muslim man (see category of perpetrator in Table 10). By paying attention to homophobia and
the overwhelming account of the terrorism frames, as sharing an underlying toxic masculinity,
Hayder argues, that
Frames homophobia as the problem, asking all communities and populations to consider
this prejudice […] raises the question of patriarchy and patriarchal constructions of a
heteronormative masculinity that regards violence as both natural and integral [and]
opens up a discussion of the patriarchal underpinnings of securitocracy and the agencies
and industries of a capitalist order in which food and water shortages plague the world,
yet the manufacture and sales of firearms and other weapons offer ever more lucrative
il/legal routes to making “a killing.” (p. 557)
Such an in-depth understanding of how to comprehend the acts at Pulse – that is, through
the frame of homophobia – is important when we consider how politicians appropriated the acts
for political gain. It is even more necessary when we consider that the term homophobia was
used only twelve (12) times by newspapers in the week following the Pulse shooting even
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though the president of the U.S.A. recognized the dimension of hate crime of the acts committed
by Mateen. From the perspective of moral panic, it supports the claim that media and politicians
maintain strategic areas of silence. In the next subsection, I approach the ways in which this
absence in framing homophobia symbolizes deeper issues rooted in the socio-political fabric.

Theme 2: The Articulation of Warlike Security Discourse
It is undeniable that, when an event is marked as an act of terrorism, concerns emanating
in the public sphere reach astonishing proportions. The day that followed the attacks, both the
Times and the Post quoted security and terrorism experts, survivors of the tragedy, activists from
around the U.S., and responses from the president and other political candidates in ways that
showed the impossibility for people to anticipate such violent acts. The articles published by the
Times, “Trump Seizes on Massacre and Repeats Call for Ban on Muslim Migration” by Martin
(Extract #222; see also category of public policy agenda in Table 8) and “For Gays Across
America, A Massacre Punctuates Fitful Gains” by Stolberg et al., (Extract #223), indicated the
heightened tensions. The headline of the former article explains how Trump used the attacks to
repeat a call for a travel ban, seizing on violent acts to perpetuate anti-Muslim rhetoric and
political agenda. The latter article shows how such an attack impinges upon the progress made
by and for people who identify on the Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transsexual Queer Intersex Asexual
spectrum and who are continuously fighting for equal rights. Articles published in the Post that
same day represented concerns that coincided with this dynamic. The article “At D.C. pride
festival, tears and resolve” by McCoy et al. (Extract #231), quoted D.C. mayor Bowser who
called for unity and love. Governors from Virginia and Maryland were quoted for aligning with
the state of emergency enacted by then-governor of Florida Rick Scott. In another Post article,
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“50 killed at gay club in Fla.” by Tsukayama et al. (Extract #232; see also category of laws in
Table 10), the confusion and concern were further confounded by the description of the horrific
“hellish scene” encountered by first responders who intervened at Pulse. The intensity of the
responses represented in media, such as state of emergency, call for unity and love, and
presidential addresses, highlights the consensual essence of responses to acts of terror. “Like
other threats” Walsh (2017) explains, “terrorism may produce significant albeit fleeting, displays
of patriotism, unity, and loyalty” (p. 649). In the wake of Pulse, calls for unity and fleeting
displays of patriotism were, in a sense, reminiscent of 9/11, subject of our next sub-section.
One of the most salient ways in which newspapers covered the massacre at Pulse was by
associating the massacre with an exceptional act of terror that is reminiscent of 9/11. Of the
sixteen (16) newspaper articles published 13 June 2016 about terrorism, fourteen (14) dedicated
their content to report on the acts at Pulse by citing reactions from people across the U.S.A.,
including Trump, Clinton, Obama, and human rights activists from different states. Coining
repeatedly the Orlando shooting as what then-President of the U.S. Obama called “an act of
terror and an act of hate”, newspapers also participated in representing the events as a type of
terrorism reminiscent of 9/11. Many news reports referred to the attacks as “the worst shooting in
U.S.” and some frequently reported the attacks as “the worst act of terrorism on American soil
since Sept. 11, 2001” (Extract # 225; Extract #270; see also category of comparisons in Table
10). The international terror framework of post-9/11 was buttressed by then-presidential
candidate Clinton who rallied in Cleveland, OH the day following the attacks. Both the Times
and the Post reported on the presumptive democrat candidate’s call for national unity,
reminiscent of “the spirit of 9/12”, even praising then-President Bush for sending “’a message of
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unity and solidarity' to Muslims” a few days after the attacks on the World Trade Center (Extract
#248).
There are, in my opinions, two underlying consequences to representing the acts as the
worst shooting in U.S. soil and as the worst act of terror since 9/11. First, following the latter
would erase the genocidal history and other massacres that took place in the U.S.A. The article
“Orlando Attack Brings up History of U.S. Massacres” by Pérez-Peña (Extract # 366) published
in the Times interrogated the use of superlatives by news reporters and editors and explained that
coining the shooting at Pulse “the worst” in U.S. obfuscates the history of massacres. Yet,
experts were cited in this article to debunk the myth of comparisons and still, confusion remains:
Disputes over how to define mass shootings are serious enough that experts disagree
about whether they are on the rise. Some researchers exclude domestic attacks, but not
others. Some say that only the acts of lone gunmen can qualify; others say that a small
group of people can carry out a mass shooting if they prepare and act together.
What is relevant in this passage, is the ways experts seem to forget the implications of U.S.sanctioned acts of terror, or state terrorism, and the discursive formation of the U.S.A. that
terrorized native and indigenous peoples (Writer, 2002). As Writer (2002) explained from a
critical race theoretical perspective,
What has been forgotten or unrealized is the United States' historical formation, set
within the context of terrorism against this nation's Indigenous peoples. Forgotten or
ignored are the United States' colonization, deculturalization, and oppression of
Indigenous peoples through acts of terrorism. For over 500 years, terrorist acts have been
carried out yet erased from the consciousness of the non-Native United States population
and its forms of media. (p. 320)
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Addressing the dominant representation of the 9/11 attacks, Writer challenges the privileges of
defining terrorism in ways that erase first nations’ histories, which leads to my second point.
Second, the comparison made by newspapers to 9/11 brings about a sense of nostalgia
reminiscent of 9/11, with all of its patriotism, call for unity, and possible resentment towards
Arabs and Muslims. I mention possible here because of the way news portrayed and depicted
reactions from people who identify with Islam in somewhat positive ways. As I demonstrate
further in the second section of this chapter, narratives of Muslims in the U.S.A. who reacted to
Pulse highlight discursive strategies that might reify Orientalism. Before we analyze in more
depth how news used these narratives, it is important to go back to the level of concern inherent
in moral panic processes, and the ways Muslims in the U.S.A are made the target of oppression
following the attacks marked as “radical Islamic terrorism” by people in positions of power. A
recent study published by the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism at California State
University San Bernardino showed that hate crimes rose in 2016 and 2017, and that there is “a
sustained levels of anti-Muslim prejudice in the high thirty to mid forty percent range in the
United States, a level higher than after 9/11” (Levin & Grisham, 2017, p. 13). This report raises
concern for the well-being and rights of people who identify with Islam in the U.S.
As if the resurgence of anti-Muslim acts and the appeal to 9/11 used by people in
positions of authority to make sense of the acts at Pulse were not enough, newspapers informed
about ongoing repercussions of post-9/11 securitization, including the breach of human rights in
the imprisonment, torture, and indefinite detention of people considered enemy combatants at
Guantanamo. Four days after the attacks, in a Post article “Saudi Suspected of Wanting to Join
9/11 Hijackers Seeks to Leave Prison” by Goldman (Extract #290), readers learn that Obama
was still trying “to close the U.S. military prison and transfer out as many of the 80
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[Guantanamo] detainees remaining as possible” but that there exists long-lasting challenges to do
so. That day, Mohammed al-Qahtani sought to be released from Guantanamo and appeared in
front of a review board after being detained fourteen years for possible ties to the organization of
9/11. “But,” as Goldman explained in the article, “the Qahtani case is among the most complex
facing the administration because the military thinks he was linked to the 9/11 conspiracy, but
his ill-treatment and medical issues make a trial all but impossible.” If by “ill-treatment”
Goldman refers to the years of abuse and torture underlying the treatment of people accused of
association with terrorism, it is perhaps downplaying violence.28 A symbolic and political
violence that dehumanizes people with mental health issues for the sake of national security. At
the time these pages were written, al-Qahtani was still considered a significant threat to the
security of the U.S. by the interagency review board, despite medical expertise that diagnosed
the detainee with schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorders, and other physical trauma.
Newspaper representation of terrorism after Pulse reinforced what I want to call a
nostalgic securitization when, six days after the Orlando shooting, Mazzetti and Shane published
an article in the Times under the title, “A Saudi Imam, 2 Hijackers and Lingering 9/11 Mystery”
about the efforts by official agencies in the U.S.A. to reveal what the authors show, as “the Sept.
11 plot [that] officially remains an open case” for the FBI (Extract #330). The same day, the
Times also reported in the article "Advocates for release of 9/11 documents worry about potential
delay" by Hulse (Extract #335), asserting that more recent reports about 9/11 are still to be
declassified because they implicated Saudi Arabia. Still on 17 June 2016, the Times published an
article that appeals to 9/11 sentiments when Wilson reported, “Funeral at Last for Fire Chief Lost
to Twin Towers” (Extract #338). This is not even counting the ways newspaper showed
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Some Republicans (and most Democrats) acknowledged that these acts were torture (Cooper & Santora, 2007).
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Mateen’s whereabouts during 9/11. The ways for the Times and the Post to represent terrorism
after Pulse invited the readers to consider 9/11 as the point of reference, marking the acts as
another exceptional event that requires strong securitization measures. It also reminded the
audience of how people in positions of authority define responsibility to acts marked as
terrorism, the focus of the next sub-section.
The representation of terrorism by newspapers amplified hostility towards the perpetrator
of the acts. Following such acts, the platform offered by newspapers to politicians and security
experts fueled the dichotomous assumptions about good and evil (Walsh, 2017). The
exceptionality of the events represented in newspapers by the appeals to previous tragic events,
are confounded by what was happening in the U.S.A. then. At the time of the 12 June 2016
attacks, the presidential campaign in the U.S.A. was underway, turning political realm into a
dramatic theatre of more than a mere war on words with, at its center, the struggle for partisan
leaders to name the events at Pulse an act of “radical Islamic terrorism.” The platform offered by
both the Times and the Post for Trump’s anti-Muslim and anti-immigration rhetoric became one
of the most salient aspects of the newspaper representation of terrorism following the shooting in
Orlando. Yet, in both papers, Trump’s response to the attacks was the focus of newspapers.29
Most of the newspaper articles reported on and were critical of Trump for coining the attacks at
Pulse as radical Islamic terrorism.
For example, the article “Trump’s Broadside After Massacre Shakes Islamic Group”
published in the Post by Achenbach and Beachum (Extract #301; see category of candidate in
Table 10) accused the candidate of blaming people who identify with Islam of complicit
relationship with the perpetrator, and for collapsing religion and national identity with terrorism.

29

Trump’s name was referenced by newspapers a total of 678 times whereas Clinton’s was mentioned 273 and
Obama’s 377 times.
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Another article published in the same paper by DeYoung and DelReal (Extract #318), “Trump
Says His Insinuation About Obama and Terror was Right,” debunk the candidate’s claim that
Obama was inherently tied to terrorist organizations. The article “Trump’s speeches on Muslims
fire up his base, but may prove costly in election” published in the Times by Burns and Kaplan
(Extract #349) revealed the growing anxiety by possible voters, and shows that “strong
majorities of Republican voters supported Mr. Trump's suggested ban on Muslim immigrants.”
This strategy would prove to be profitable when Trump was appointed President months later
and signed an executive order as a president.
However, some reports indicated that the various call made by Trump aligned with
current concerns in the U.S.A about the threat of terrorism. The article “When a phrase takes on
new meaning: ‘Radical Islam’, explained” by Fisher (Extract #305; see also categories of law
and candidate in Table 10) published in the Times offered more legitimacy to the rhetoric used
by Trump. In it, Fisher shows how experts of the Islamic World like Shadi Hamid and Will
McCants criticized the demand to call the acts radical Islamic terrorism. Even though Fisher
forgot to draw from the primary definition of the term radical, that relates to the fundamental
nature of something, the roots of something, Fisher still debunks the use of the terms in the
context of Pulse. Still, as early as 14 June 2016, Fisher, an international columnist for the Times,
was also reporting on the diverging perspectives at the center of the dominant responses to the
attacks. In the article, “Gays, guns and jihad: Motives blur on closer scrutiny” Fisher (Extract #
238) remarks,
Mr. Trump, by citing "radical Islam," urges a narrative of clashing civilizations and war
on terror. Mr. Obama, meanwhile, has focused his outrage on what he sees as the laxity
of America's gun laws. And gay rights groups have placed the attack within a long
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history of homophobic violence […] The "radical Islam" narrative, of all those available,
offers perhaps the clearest appeal. It portrays attackers and potential attackers as a
monolith, identifiable by common features that are alien to America's non-Muslim
majority. And it frames terrorism within the familiar context of a war – something that
can be won. […] Mr. Obama's emphasis on access to deadly weapons, however, presents
terrorism as an extension of crime and therefore something that can only be managed.
Still, this approach offers its own villains – politicians and lobbyists who oppose tighter
gun regulations – as well as a simple way for thinking about the threat and how to curtail
it.
The passage above exemplifies how the use of the term “radical Islamic terrorism” dominated
newspaper representation the week after Orlando. Although Fisher demonstrated how the use of
the terms “radical Islamic terrorism” was outlined by Trump in a form of accusation, blaming
Obama for being politically correct, the article reads like a means to support the anti-Muslim
rhetoric set forth by Trump. Without explicitly supporting Trump’s assertion, the appeal to
specifically name this kind of new terrorism (Ditrych, 2014), this passage appeared to legitimize
the ways in which the Republican candidate turned president perpetuates the myth of a clash of
civilization. A tenet of Orientalism that I explain in more details in Part II.
This section showed how news representation focused primarily on defining the events
from within the realm of terrorism discourse, as an exceptional event, incomprehensible. We also
learned how newspapers may have become the necessary platform for presidential candidate like
Trump to fuel hostility towards Muslims. The following section analyses the third theme
elevated from thematic analysis of newspaper articles published by national press, by drawing
the portrait of the perpetrator of the acts. As people around the world rallied behind slogans like
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“We are Orlando” and “Pray for Orlando”, explanations about the motivations of Mateen
surfaced.

Theme 3: The Paradoxes that the National Press and Public Politicians Appeared to be Facing
A radical Islamic terrorist targeted the nightclub not only because he wanted to kill
Americans, but in order to execute gay and lesbian citizens because of their sexual orientation.
It is a strike at the heart and soul of who we are as a nation.
It is an assault on the ability of free people to live their lives, love who they want and
express their identity.
It is an attack on the right of every single American to live in peace and safety in their
own country.

Donald Trump, speech given at the Saint Anselm College New Hampshire Institute of
Politics, 13 June 2016 (as cited in “Transcript," 2016).

In this final theme, I discuss the paradox faced by media and politicians following Pulse,
between the call for unity and perceived hostility. Throughout this essay, I have shown how
Orientalism served as an anchor to newspaper representation of terrorism post-Pulse. The ways
the portrait of the perpetrator of the acts was drawn by news reporters the week following the
exceptional act of terror committed at Pulse, reinforce what Maira (2009, see also Mahmood,
2002) calls the “bad” Muslim narrative. The way people “are made into public exemplars of antiWestern enemies by state allegations of threats to national security and U.S. democracy;
hysterical media coverage […] and often distorted accounts of their activities and politics” (p.
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636). Although Mateen might have been a prey of bullying, Islamophobia, and lived with
invisible disability, that does not excuse the mass murder of patrons at Pulse. Accounts of
Mateen’s life as the bad Muslim only props up the accounts of “good Muslims” represented in
the news, the contrasting stories of Muslims published in the Post three days after the events
titled “Muslim students report bias amid terror wave” (Extract # 291) and another published by
the same newspaper four days after the massacre, and titled, “Seeing urgency, Muslims plan to
fight Trump with vote” (Extract #317), which invite the readers to consider performance of
Muslim Americans as “good citizenship” (Maira, 2009, p. 634). Accounts reported in the news
that read like a support to the theory of madness (as the understanding that madness underlies
contemporary civilizational discursive practices), like a cursor that worked in tandem with other
appeals in the news. Newspapers appeared to have dressed the portrait of a terrorist threat by
representing Mateen’s “failed” masculinity (with the representation of the personal life of the
perpetrator by drawing irrational behavior, violent, homophobic, and inclined to misplaced
patriotism because of immigration). A representational nod which, in hindsight, might bury
deeper the anchor of Orientalism.
As stated previously, leaders of different nation-states shared concerns, griefs, and
outrage shortly after the attacks at Pulse, by situating the events within the realm of terrorism.
For instance, the Post reported comments from Pakistan's prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, who
called the Pulse shooting “a "gruesome act of terrorism" and an "inexcusable act of inhumanity".
Other leaders’ responses were also reported, like the Prime minister of India Narendra Modi use
of Tweeter to share condolences. In France, people like Le Pen, leader of the far-right then-Front
National, wrote on Facebook that, "terrorism has killed. This time, those targeted were targeted
because they were homosexuals, and we know to what extent homosexuality is attacked in the
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countries that live under the Islamic yoke. We must fight with all our strength this dark
barbarism" (Extract #258; see also category of international relations in Table 8). Ironically, this
quote comes from the leader of the far-right in France who opposed same-sex marriage and
continued to exacerbate the lives of Muslims in France during the 2017 presidential election.
This passage by Le Pen is important for the purpose of this dissertation about French and
U.S. news discourse. It illustrates how newspapers relied on the use of social media by people in
positions of authority who, conversely, benefitted from the platform offered by media. This
represents an overlap in the representation of interests related to terrorism, a stage for the
injunction to resort to violence against non-Christian nations. Such an authoritative response
misses the fact about the tragic acts in Orlando that were conducted by a single person on U.S.
American soil. A slippery slope is present that invites the readers to imagine all non-Christian
nations as barbaric, devoid of cultural richness, and in need of intervention, as if the genesis of
such violent acts couldn’t implicate the state in producing and staging so-called “barbaric” terror.
As mentioned in the previous chapter about news representation of the 13 November 2015
attacks that ended with a hostage situation and a mass shooting at the Bataclan concert hall, the
use of the term barbaric has become normalized for most of far-right politicians and a major part
of people across the political spectrum, including the population, in France. A derivative of the
term was also used by Clinton during the 13 June 2016 campaign speech in Cleveland, OH,
when then-Democratic presumptive nominee and former Secretary of State declared that,
“[w]hatever we learn about this killer, his motives in the days ahead, we know already the
barbarity that we face from radical jihadists is profound” (“Hillary,” 2016). This short passage
from the speech represented the supposedly moderate response like the one launched by Clinton,
could be interpreted from a critical perspective as a more latent way to emulate Orientalism than
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the manifest ways in which Le Pen, for instance, or Trump are given a platform to do so after the
Bataclan and Pulse. That is, by casually fueling the myth of a clash of civilization.
Inspired by Lewis and made popular by Huntington towards the end of the cold war, the
thesis of a clash of civilization supports that “the conflicts of the future will occur along the
cultural fault lines separating civilizations” (Huntington, 1993, p. 25). To summarize,
Huntington’s assertions was reinforced by various assumptions about what might be the cause of
this conflict, including: differences in histories, language, and religion among others as the
genesis of long and violent conflicts, increased interactions between people, the weakening of
national identity due to modernized economics and social change, the threat posed to and from
within the West by indigenous epistemologies, the danger of fluid, dynamic, and
multidimensional identities, and the development of economic relations between non-Western
states (Huntington, 1993).This represents a set of questionable assumptions that made of
differences in value and belief systems a means to cast Islam at odds with the West, which was
normalized and revived before 9/11. The platform offered Trump, as explained in this chapter,
thus legitimized the perpetuation of civilizational discourse. An example of how this myth was
fueled by people in positions of authority following the Pulse shooting was the support given to
Trump and the accusations made to Obama for refusing to do so, ultimately leading
conservatives to demand the resignation of the president. Once again, readers are confronted
with the paradoxes faced by politicians, between the rallying call of unity to a nation about to
elect a president and the anti-Muslim rhetoric communicated by candidates like Trump,
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have analyzed how newspapers represented the acts at Pulse as an
exceptional act of terrorism and deconstructed the ways news dressed the portrait of the
perpetrator. I explained how the marking of the acts as terrorism were reminiscent of a 9/11
nostalgic securitization. I also showed how newspaper represented the perpetrator in ways that
aligned with racialized state surveillance. The thematic analysis of newspaper articles indicated
that the moral panic processes were triggered in the wake of the shooting at Pulse to a certain
extent. Considering the socio-political context, however, the responses to the tragic 12 June 2016
mass murder coincided with an already existing frame of reference deeply rooted in the
construction of terrorism since before 9/11. This is where, with the identification of the
perpetrator and the association of Muslims with terror through the good and bad Muslim
narrative, newspapers reify Orientalism. I have pointed out how responses by people in positions
of power employed linguistic devices to tie the genesis of the acts to barbarism, depicting Islam
as non-civilized, and backward. People in positions of authority who, by coining the acts a dark
barbarism, constructs the Brown body as primitive and perpetuates the assumption that nations
like France and the U.S. are, “sexually exceptional: less homophobic and more tolerant of
homosexuality […] than the repressed, modest, nudity-shy Middle-East” (Puar, 2007, as cited in
Calafell, 2017). An exceptionality that was taken up by Trump in the speech given the day after
the event, as shown in the passage above.
It is now irrefutable to claim that Trump used the attacks as a political platform to bring
people who identified on the LGBTQIA+ spectrum into the fold of the nation. A nation in which,
in the four years after the attacks and the subsequent election of Trump to presidency, efforts
have been made to deny rights to and discriminate against people who identify as LGBTQIA+
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(“The Discrimination,” 2017). This is in addition to the actual travel ban enacted in early 2017,
and to the numerous rules on immigration and detention put in place by the administration. I
recognize that this chapter may not have taken into account and deconstructed the erasure of
people who were the targets of the attacks at Pulse. At the center of concerns is the violence
committed against people whose tragic deaths reflect lived experiences that taught others,
including myself, a lot about the fluid, multidimensional, and complex understanding of identity.
People who, arguably predominantly, have lived through the racialized experience in the U.S.
(including, the shooter). In conclusion, I am left wondering about the topic of violence, what
Bhabha (2004) wondered about colonization, violence, and the formation of the modern nation in
the foreword of Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, “how do the oppressed discover the
enduring strength to found a free and just society, a national consciousness, if they are
continuously aware of their own anxiety and fragility?” (p. xxxi). It is possible to contend that
Pulse represented, in all of its symbolism, this possibility for people in the community who were
used to attend the nightclub as a space to discover such an enduring strength.
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CHAPTER SIX:
ORIENTALISM REINFORCED:
DIFFERENTIAL TEXTUAL ATTITUDES IN THE PANIC AFTER THE BATACLAN IN
FRANCE AND PULSE IN THE U.S.A.

"Nous, musulmans de France, réaffirmons notre rejet catégorique et sans ambiguïté de toute forme de
violence ou de terrorisme qui sont la négation même des valeurs de paix et de fraternité que porte l'islam.
Nous, musulmans de France, sommes des citoyens français à part entière, faisant partie intégrante de la
Nation, et solidaires de l'ensemble de la communauté nationale. Nous, musulmans de France, proclamons
notre attachement indéfectible au pacte républicain qui nous unit tous. Nous, musulmans de France,
proclamons notre adhésion totale aux valeurs de la République. Les musulmans de France élèvent leurs
prières vers Dieu, le Très Clément et le Très Miséricordieux, pour qu'Il préserve et qu'Il bénisse la France !
Les musulmans de France formulent tous leurs voeux de paix, de sécurité et de prospérité pour leur patrie,
la France."
Extract # 187 (published in Le Figaro, 20 November 2015)

English and French are world languages, and the logics of border and warring essences are totalizing, so
we should begin by acknowledging that the map of the world has no divinely or dogmatically sanctioned
space, and of humanly constructed and interdependent histories that are fundamentally knowable, although
not through grand theory or systemic totalization.
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Said, 1978, p. 312
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to deconstruct newspaper representation of terrorism by
examining the tradition, in both French and English news writing, that perpetuates the “logics of
border” evoked in the epigraph, especially following the 13 November 2015 and 12 June 2016
attacks. In Chapter Two, I explained how this border logic unfolded in France and in the
European Union, and came across in newspaper representation of terrorism, as totalizing ways of
divinely and dogmatically sanctioned space. In simpler terms, this chapter traces the depths of
Orientalism discourse. For this chapter, I ground the lived experiences shared with readers of Le
Figaro in the epigraph, as a way to unearth the “somewhat elusive oppositional mood, and its
emerging strategies, as an internationalist counter-articulation” (Said, 1978, p. 311). The
message from Said prompted me to open with lessons learned from the quote published by
Guénois under the title, "L'"appel solennel" qui sera lu dans 2 400 mosquées." The selected
passage in the epigraph came across as one of the only sources that challenges Orientalism
discourse, in the face of the readers. Translated in English, the epigraph reads,
We, Muslims of France, reaffirm our categorical and unambiguous rejection of any form
of violence or terrorism which is the very negation of the values of peace and
brotherhood that Islam carries. We, Muslims of France, are full French citizens, forming
an integral part of the Nation, and united with the whole of the national community. We,
Muslims of France, proclaim our unwavering attachment to the republican pact which
unites us all. We, Muslims of France, proclaim our total adherence to the values of the
Republic. Muslims of France raise their prayers to God, the Most Merciful and the Most
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Merciful, that He preserve and bless France! Muslims of France express their wishes for
peace, security and prosperity for their homeland, France.
Although I do not know what it is like to grow up Muslim in France, I found the turn to religion
at the end of the passage an inspiring intellectual response that challenged directly the nationalist
paradigm deployed since the attacks that vilified Muslims in France and in the U.S.A. through
the prophetic claims of nationalism, in the traditional canvas of this "new" yet not-so-new
terrorism (Ditrych, 2014; Wilson, 2017).
People who contributed to the publication of this "appel solennel" wrote in plain English
and French to illustrate how Orientalism discourse is recycled, or reinforced. This public
announcement, as opposed to newspaper representation of terrorism, came across as one of the
few liberating expressions of solidarity made visible in the news, one that publicly challenged
the message from public officials and other media pundits who continued to attribute to Muslims
in France and from around the world, the burden of terrorism. For instance, in the U.S.A., Trump
attributed this burden in explicit ways whereas Clinton, among others, have done so latently. In
France, a similar division was observed between politicians (see category of nationality in Table
9 for explicit manifestation of Orientalism). The witty response quoted in the epigraph reminded
me of "Talking Back," as per the title of a seminal literature in Black Feminist thinking
published by hooks (1989). Talking back, or the movement from silence to speech that is "for
the oppressed, the colonized, the exploited" - I would add, the vilified - "and those who stand and
struggle side by side a gesture of defiance that heals, that makes new life and new growth
possible," an "act of speech, of 'talking back,' that is no mere gesture of empty words, that is the
expression of our movement from object to subject- the liberated voice" (p. 9).
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This dissertation brought into comparison themes analyzed in newspaper representations
of terrorism to understand how Orientalism functioned like an anchor in narrativizing what led
the perpetrators to commit these acts and how it was reinforced in the different scripts that
contributed to the making of the radical Islamic terrorists and the veiling of state use of political
violence -- state terrorism. In that effort, Chávez (2010) offers support to this line of reasoning,
stating,
This particular historical moment, constituted by neoliberalism and post-9/11 insecurity,
has re-emphasized the importance of secure borders - moral and national ones. Migrants
and queers emerge as the prototypical threats to those borders, in part because they are
figured within the national social imaginary as strangers. (p. 138)
With that understanding of the context of belonging and citizenship in mind, newspaper
representation of terrorism contextualized in this project illustrated how societies in France and
the U.S.A. expatiated the mythical need for the securitization of moral and national borders.
Readers of the news were left to instantiate the events with these distorted myths of Arabs,
Muslims, migrants, queer, and everyone who identifies from near and far in-between and at these
intersections of identity and whose existence were made "prototypical threats."
In this chapter, I conclude with a synthesis of the two thematic analyses interpreted in the
two previous chapters. The differences and similarities in the sequences of a panic that have
made reactions in the public sphere a focal point in newspaper representation of terrorism, are
discussed as elements in the ascendency of Orientalism in between 2015 and 2016, in France and
the U.S.A. In the second section of this chapter, I circle back with an interpretation of the
dogmas of Orientalism that have been reinforced in the newspaper representation of terrorism in
the West.
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Endurance of Disproportionality in France and the Volatility of a Panic in the U.S.A.
This first part questions the elements of panic by returning to the warlike security
discourse that saturated the national press in France and in the U.S.A. I examine the similarities
and differences contributing to heightened concerns about the terrorist threat as well as the
supposed expectations of the population in terms of public policies that make panic volatile.
First, it is important to clarify that one of the main differences, between the dominant discourses
in response to the Bataclan attacks and those in response to the Pulse attack, is the volatile effect
of panic. Indeed, post-Bataclan rhetoric seem to be anchored in the long term and the media
convey justifications for the enactment and prolongation of the state of emergency. In the
U.S.A., the effects of panic wear off much faster over time.
In this second case, the attempt and failure to pass a law to prevent the purchase of
firearms from people on the "watch lists" comes to end the sequence (Corso, 2017). A difference
which shows the specificities of the moral panic specific to the French and U.S. socio-political
contexts. Although the manner of transcribing the Pulse attacks is similar to those often used to
frame terrorism in the aftermath of the Bataclan attacks, the security responses in the media are
not as salient as those observed post-Bataclan. For example, the dominant responses to the 13
November 2015 attacks illustrated the threat posed by terrorism and the need for politicians to
face it at home and abroad (see categories of military and emergency in Table 9) whereas, in the
U.S.A. following the 12 June 2016 shooting, the responses came across as confined (see category
of law in Table 10). Debates in the post-Pulse national press cover a fundamental aspect of U.S.
society, the Second Amendment to the Constitution, which guarantees the right to carry guns, but
also exposes some of the limits of moral panic. Indeed, there is a consensus in the public sphere
that agrees to condemn the atrocity of the Pulse attacks, to strive not to stigmatize Islam and to
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debate how to counter (or not) the easy access to weapons of war. The comparison between postPulse and post-Bataclan war speeches shows a difference in the war on terror as a means of
control. Indeed, in the U.S.A., the state of emergency is deployed by the mayor of Orlando, and
it is broadened by the governor of Florida to allow an increase in security measures for
LGBTQIA + nightclubs in the region.
In contrast, the deployment of the state of emergency was a central theme of postBataclan media representations. The way in which the media transcribed the promulgation of a
state of emergency in France and its extension at the end of the period studied here, highlights
the dynamics of a growing fear of terrorism, and the needs to address this fear. This also
highlights the volatile effect of moral panic. Briefly, this measure extends to prefects’ powers
previously reserved for magistrates, such as ordering home searches at any time. The declaration
of a state of emergency illustrates a "legislative fever" (Chalkiadavi, 2015, cited in Boutin &
Paulussen, 2015, p. 235), a "contagion" (Hamilton & Berlusconi, 2018) contracted by a
presidential figure. A president who now appears as a "hawk" - an image used several times by
the national press in France to question the role of warlord assumed by the president - and which
reinforces the hypothesis that the institutional responses to the terrorism (state of emergency,
military interventions) fuel the escalation of panic over time (Walsh, 2017). Sporting and
"cultural" events were canceled, gatherings banned, and public places (e.g., churches, mosques,
schools) guarded by soldiers. It is possible to interpret the promulgation of the state of
emergency as a characteristic element of moral panic, the passage of a law which testifies to an
ambient fear generated by these attacks and amplified in the media through the invocation of a
"Charlie effect".
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While it is important to remember that these attacks were very different -- they took place
in different cities and nation-states; one was a coordinated series of attacks while the other was
perpetrated by a single shooter in a unique site -- these differences remain a few among many.
Comparing the way the media focuses on war rhetoric, we find that the moral panic "bubble" is
dissipating in the U.S.A. as a result of the refusal to legislate on access to semi-automatic
weapons. A volatile effect, paradoxical in a way, but which contrasts sharply with the dominant
post-Bataclan responses, represented in the French national press, and which advocate a largescale response and a state of emergency capable of extending into time. There is then the
enduring effect of a moral panic that sets in over time with the lasting installation of a state of
emergency.
In hindsight, this research dissected the different elements of the sequential model of
moral panic in the analysis of questions of identity and of the war discourses that have fueled
concerns in France and the U.S.A. In this last part, we explain the differences and similarities in
the paradox that the media organizations and the political authorities are confronted with, which
makes it possible to highlight the limits in newspaper representation of terrorism, assenting to the
escalation of violence in the public as a sequence in a moral panic that reinforced Orientalism
Many articles in the French national press rekindled the collective trauma of Charlie
Hebdo. However, the comparisons between the expected post-Bataclan responses and those
mentioned after Charlie are regularly formulated in such a way as to shed light on the logic of
preventing terrorism and exploiting anxiety in the face of future attacks. Many political figures
such as Nicolas Sarkozy or Alain Juppé, or even experts, such as Gille Keppel, all interviewed
by Le Figaro in the aftermath of the 13 November 2015 attacks, recall the justified and
justifiable needs for security decisions facing the threat of terrorism.
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A feeling of indignation gripped moral entrepreneurial figures, politicians and journalists
after the Bataclan. This seems to show that the post-Charlie spirit haunts a society plagued by
terrorism. What is perhaps troubling about these statements is how Tabard, in his writings (see
Chapter 3), exemplifies the paradoxes of the dominant post-Charlie discourse. These writings
take place in the recurring discourse on the place of religion in France - an implicit or explicit
call to secularism as a tool for strengthening the values of the French Republic but also as a
means of justifying the stigmatization of people, already stigmatized long before Charlie, who
identify as Muslim in France. The last sentence of this passage then reads like a euphemism;
denouncing terrorists becomes an imperative, beyond a call for unity, in which the refusal to mix
it up is no longer possible. This passage implies that the desire to stigmatize (here, Muslims or
people who identify as such) becomes an undeniable possibility in the face of terror.
The press in the U.S.A., for its part, focuses more fully on the fear of the victims of the
Pulse attack, often attached, but little recognized, to the intersectional experience, and more
generally, to the real and lived fear of the people who identify with the victims of these tragic
events (Vaccaro & Koob, 2019). This unique, multidimensional experience was taken into
account by many journalists the day after Pulse. The speeches of leading political figures
converge to integrate into the core of national identity people who are subjected, even
marginalized, by the normative processes linked to sexual orientation and gender. Puar evokes,
in order to deconstruct homo-nationalist discourse in the post-9/11 U.S.A. (2017), the system of
assimilation which would allow a category of the population, until now marginalized by
heteronormative discourse, to be rehabilitated as a citizen within a nation invested in a modern
multiculturalism against the backdrop of the war against terrorism. Obama's response, cited as an
example at the beginning of this article, would approach post-Pulse homonationalism in a
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repeated call for core values that signify belonging to a unique US experience. But it is mostly
Trump's words that evoke homonationalism post-Pulse. It should be remembered that almost a
year ago, "the Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage, gay, lesbian, bisexual and
transgender Americans, and those working to advance their rights". The press does not hesitate
to show how the presidential candidates recognized, in 2015 following the Pulse attack, the need
to highlight the problems experienced by marginalized people, mostly racialized, in the
intersection of sexual orientation, gender, and religion. This was a short-lived recognition since
Trump, then president, questions and bars access to care for transgender people, to cite just one
example, even though he declared the day after Pulse, "I will fight for you”.
We also see how the media appeal to people who identify or are identified as Muslims to
testify on the presidential candidacy, for example. From a critical point of view of Orientalism,
this way of narrating the lived experience of Muslims in the U.S.A. supports the dualistic
hypothesis characteristic of discourses according to which there is a "good" and a “bad” Muslim
(Maira, 2009; Mamdani, 2002). Take, for example, an article in the Post published on 15 June
2016 titled “Sensing urgency, Muslims plan to fight Trump with vote” (Extract #317). In this
example, students from metropolitan Washington, DC, urged the readership to categorize
Muslims as "good" citizens when they take on the civic role and bear witness to the blessings of
the American multicultural experience. This contrasts with the example of the “bad” “Muslim”
citizen in the person of Mateen, who is often identified as such, while it is very often reported
that the perpetrator of the Pulse attacks was not religious. Comparatively, this dichotomy could
also be perceived in the context of France post-Bataclan; the statement in the epigraph aligns
with the Orientalist discourse of the "good" Muslims in France.
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Responses from experts, authority figures, and other figures considered legitimate to
describe the attacks carried out on 13 November 2015 and the killing sponsored by Mateen on 12
June 2016, would be expected, if not desired, by the perpetrators of the killings. According to
Walsh's work, the "provocative" role of the attackers is therefore to exploit "modern societies"
defining properties to unsettle political order and sociality" (p. 652). Here, the case of insurgents
in the modus operandi makes the prevention of political violence all the more difficult as these
scapegoats would have already been subjected to surveillance practices (in the case of Mateen, in
particular). In the light of the work of Crone (2016) on radicalization, this recourse to violence
demonstrates "intellectual transformation" on the part of those responsible, a passage to the
terrorist act which implies "an embodied know-how, an enacted or practical kind of knowledge
about how to act […] that enables the perpetration of violence” (pp. 600-601). In other words,
the authors would bring an epistemology of "terrorist" violence, a violence that would transform
not only those responsible for these acts into actors of moral provocation but also of the moral
fabric of societies. In addition, it can be assumed that abusers are aware of the amplifying role of
the media (Leśniczak, 2017; Murray, 2017; O’Loughlin, 2016). With this in mind, shouldn't we
distance ourselves from the reductive hypothesis, often assumed by presidents, experts, or even
the media, according to which religion and extremism are always and already entangled?
Although it is difficult to be able to demonstrate the volatile effect of moral panic, I
believe that the analysis of the political orientations represented in the selected national press
regarding terrorism makes it possible to differentiate between an escalation of panic in France
and its evaporation in the U.S.A. In both cases, on the other hand, the injunctions made to
Muslims, would be based in my opinion on Orientalizing discursive processes which would fuel
hostile reactions.
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Dogmas
The interest of this entire dissertation project was to provide a comparative perspective
and procedural interpretation that placed the complexities of media representations in the sociopolitical contexts of French and American societies. In France, the almost unanimous decision to
extend the state of emergency, the surveillance practices that this exceptional measure induces,
and their media representations, demonstrate how the definition of a problem has come to be
based on growing anxieties linked to the attacks of 13 November 2015 and fed by the press. In
the U.S.A., the interest shown by the national press to represent the efforts, and consequently, the
failure of a legislation supposed to regulate, even to bar, the access to certain weapons to the
people listed on "no-fly" and/or other watchlists, paradoxically demonstrate how the panic
subsided.
This section of the dissertation now seeks to answer the last of the three research
questions that asked, in what ways do national newspapers in France and the U.S.A. reinforce
Orientalism? In this section, I begin the climb back from the immersive experience of a
comparative thematic analysis of national newspaper articles, up the interpretive ladder and
towards the critique of Orientalism and its reinforcement. Orientalism was very much alive at the
inception of the events and for centuries that preceded the events and representation as terrorism,
studied here. What this section discusses is the widening scope of Orientalism discourse and the
underlying logic that media plays a role (conscious or unconscious) in its reinforcement. In
France, for instance, I opine that Orientalism discourse materialized in news representation of
terrorisme with the perpetuation of the myths that function like a logic always and already
attributing people who identify as Muslims or are identified as such, the burden of terrorism.
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As is explained in this open-ended discussion, this study simply attempted to show how
newspaper representation perpetuated this myth through what Alsultany had called simplified
complex explanation (cf. Chapter One). To illustrate how simplified complex explanation
buttressed Orientalism in news representation of terrorism following the Bataclan and Pulse, I
use the image of the spotlight which I think helps to navigate data interpretation. The
repercussion of the acts at Pulse and the failure of media to authenticate with their spotlight,
testify against, serve as watchdogs for the struggle against hate crime illustrates the depth of
Orientalism discourse. The erasure of a possibility for news readers to engage with the hate
crime dimension of the attacks at Pulse manifested as evidence of deeper issues in the U.S.A.
(Hancock & Haldeman, 2017). For instance, Meyer (2020) exposed the tendency of
counternarratives published on popular lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer websites to
reinforce stereotypes of Latinx communities and the intertwined ideologies of family and faith
that recentered whiteness following the Pulse attack (pp. 262-263). The following block quote by
Hancock and Haldelman (2017) adds a psycho-social understanding to complement the
discussion started in the first theme about the vilification of a perpetrator - the possibility that
Mateen might have been struggling to identify both Muslim and on the LGB spectrum, as the son
of a family from Pakistan living in the U.S.A. - and the politics of denial to discharge the FBI
from any responsibilities for letting the "radical Islamic terrorist" on the loose:
There were individuals who claimed to have had romantic relationships with Mateen
(e.g., CBS/AP, 2016). Mainstream media, though, did not pursue this information or
ignored it entirely— perhaps because it was difficult to prove or substantiate or because
of the influences described above. However, the picture that this information would have
provided is more complicated and nuanced, would very likely have taken a bit more time
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and care to investigate, and may have been considered by reporters to be too much for the
inquiring public to digest. The inclusion of the hate crime aspect of this tragedy (i.e.,
Mateen’s homophobic remarks juxtaposed with multiple visits to the Pulse and his use of
gay websites) again would have painted an intersectional picture—a picture in which
profound conflicts emerge among multiple identities. This would have resulted in a
deeper inquiry regarding his having selected Latino night for this shooting. (p. 156)
It is hard not to disagree with an understanding that connects to Alsultany's concept of
simplified complex explanations, although, a critique of Orientalism might fear that, by insisting
for media representation to focus on the sexual orientation of a perpetrator like Mateen, one
might reinforce this idea that hate crime and terrorism dimensions of these acts of violence, can
only be tried by drawing all sorts of hypothesis on a person who is dead.
The fear is that dogmas of Orientalism might be reinforced if we focus intellectual
attention and commitment towards the critique of Orientalism discourse following this postulate
by Hancock and Haldelman (2017). Orientalism, as overtly and covertly manifested as it was in
the wake of both events studied here, resuscitated what Said listed as follows:
[O]ne is the absolute and systematic difference between the West, which is rational,
developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, underdeveloped, inferior.
Another dogma is that abstractions about the Orient, particularly those based on texts
representing a "classical" Oriental civilization, are always preferable to direct evidence
from modern Oriental realities. A third dogma is that the Orient is eternal, uniform, and
incapable of defining itself; therefore it is assumed that a highly generalized and
systematic vocabulary for describing the Orient from a Western standpoint is inevitable
and even scientifically "objective." A fourth dogma is that the Orient is at bottom
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something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown
dominions) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright
occupation whenever possible). (Said, p. 301)
Focusing the intellectual energy to counter Orientalism discourse by insisting to know
more about the sexual orientation in the cases of Mateen might get dangerously close to that third
dogma. This is to say that while Orientalism is evidenced in newspaper data for this project, the
conclusions and realizations that I have arrived at can be extrapolated to the ways in which
power and Orientalism is understood from a distance and functioning in our immediate, every
day, intellectual and political life. Finally, this entire dissertation project challenged the takenfor-granted use of the term, "terrorism" and its representation in newspapers as a key term that
also indicated, through a critical compassionate lens, the complexity of emotions in
communication.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
DISCUSSION

In this discussion chapter, I begin by addressing how this study (a) contributed to critical
studies on terrorism, moral panic, and Orientalism. I continue with a (b) reflexive section
attentive to the limitations of this project. I follow these sections with the (c) theoretical and
practical implications, and then (d) present my conclusion.

Contributions
Theoretically, my dissertation contributes to critical studies on terrorism, moral panic,
and Orientalism. I specifically attended to the calls for "the necessity of racialized rhetorical
criticism to include and understand anti-Muslim racism" (Yousuf & Calafell, 2018, p. 315). I
expanded on that call by deconstructing terrorism in the news through the sequences of moral
panic and the theoretical lens of Orientalism that transcends U.S. and French borders. By
conducting a comparative thematic analysis of U.S. and French newspaper accounts of two
different acts of terrorism, this dissertation expands upon a topology of discursive
representations and circuits of power across the globe, an unusual but promising feature of this
communication scholarship for critical cultural studies anchored in qualitative methodology.
Beginning with studies on terrorism, this project examined in-depth, within a constrained period
of time, newspaper reports about terrorism following acts of extreme violence and demonstrated
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how journalistic practices often simplified the story told about these events by honing in on
victims'/perpetrators' narratives (Walter et al., 2017). In my study, terrorism is conceptualized as
co-constituted communicative acts of political violence implicating state, insurgent actors, and
media (Stohl, 2008).
I contend that the journalistic practices simplify the complexity of the events studied in
this project in particular, and terrorism in general, without questioning the broader societal,
political, economic, and cultural factors that contributed to make these acts a tragic reality. There
has been increased scholarly interests in the acts at the Bataclan and Pulse from different corners
of communication, in France and the U.S.A. For instance, Alexander and Weems (2017)
dedicated a special issue of Qualitative Inquiry to poetic responses to the 12 June 2016 shooting
at Pulse. My research contributed to the understanding put forth by the editors in the introduction
of this special issue who stated that, "terrorism, as the defense against terrorist, conflates
identities as collective culprits that restrict borders/border crossing/border identities as a method
of containing controls is a terror invoking act itself, bearing arms against difference" (p. 485).
While the authors addressed state terrorism, or counterterrorism, following the acts at Pulse, this
definition also resonates with the dominant responses to the 13 November 2015 attacks in
France. My research thus was to keep up, even so remotely, with the "hearts, bodies, and critical
minds on the pulse" of a research agenda set against homophobia, sexism, racism, and
islamophobia (p. 486).
In my francophone research, scholars have also mobilized to interrogate discourses postattacks and the resonance of acts marked as terrorism in society. In the introduction to a special
issue published in Mots. Les langages du politique, Truc et al. (2018) stated that
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[L]es attentats sus-citent une production symbolique extrêmement riche et diverse qui, si
elle ne suffit évidemment pas à effacer la violence (ni même à la faire cesser), remplit des
fonctions anthropologiques fondamentales. Il est clair notamment que ces discours
précipitent la formation d’une communauté émotionnelle en réaction à l’attaque et
activent des sentiments de commune appartenance, à commen-cer par le sentiment
national, sur lequel le discours politico-médiatique domi- nant met prioritairement
l’accent. (p. 14)
This passage is best translated in English as follows,
[T]he attacks trigger an extremely rich and diverse symbolic production which, while it is
obviously not sufficient to erase violence (or even to put an end to it), fulfills
fundamental anthropological functions. It is particularly clear that these speeches
precipitate the formation of an emotional community in reaction to the attack and activate
feelings of common belonging, starting with national feeling, on which the dominant
politico-media discourse places the priority accent.
Thus, my research contributed to this understanding of what Truc et al. (2018) referred to as, an
orchestra without conductor, or communication about attacks in media that framed and produced
dominant responses best suited in these moments of crisis, in the days that followed these acts of
extreme violence marked as terrorism.
Second, the diverse and interdisciplinary aspects of my research interrogated the use of
terrorism in francophone and anglophone media and contributed to the sequences of moral
panics useful to understand the reinforcement of Orientalism. By drawing from Orientalism, I
sought to understand its relevance today and to challenge the ways in which Islam was
represented as a monolith in the wake of these attacks. Orientalism thus exposed the ways
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Whiteness prevails as a set of discursive practices that continue to hierarchize people through
citizenship and belonging today. Now, more than five year after these tragedies, the
manifestation of Orientalism discourse underlie this onto-epistemological moment in which the
confluences of discourses and materialities helps us to build knowledge through being and
understanding the world. As evidenced in the previous chapter, I combined Orientalism with
moral panic, a framework that can be defined as the sequential process of identifying a threat in
the wake of an event that breached societal expectations about the use of violence; the ensuing
vilification that project onto a group of people who are blamed for these acts; the consensus to
identify the threat as felt and real; the disproportional reactions from moral entrepreneurs; and
the volatility of the panic through its atrophy or its endurance. Examples presented in this
dissertation include the distinction between the volatile effect of the panic, even though it is not
sufficient to understand its effects in depth.
This study revealed similarities and differences in journalistic trends that pose concerns
for the study of identity, communication, and culture, specifically the similar ways media
amplified the threat and villified people who identify as Muslims in France and the U.S.A., or
people who are identified as such, folk devils. The ways journalists and editors instantiated these
acts of extreme violence illustrated how deeper societal concerns are often relegated to the
background of the politico-media agenda. Following Walsh (2017), it is possible to question
whether these acts do not benefit the perpetrators as much as it benefits "spectacle hungry media
outlets" and other moral entrepreneurs (such as politicians, public/private security organizations,
surveillance and policing agencies) from the moral panic paradigm. From this paradigmatic
approach to moral panic, the state of exception that emerged in France specifically following the
13 November 2015 attacks, afforded politicians and media the social, political, and cultural
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currencies to legitimize increased security measures. This connection between legitimacy and
security (Smith et al., 2019) validates claims made by the perpetrators, or folk devils, who in turn
questioned and provoked the legitimacy of the nation-states like France and the U.S.A. Indeed,
as Walsh (2017) opined, "fearful, retributive, and vengeful reactions to terrorism undermine the
very conditions - security and democracy - they are purported to protect and preserve" (p. 658).
It is possible to question the acts and the dominant responses by politicians and media pundits as
an auto-generating mechanism that contributed to the making of terrorism as taken-for-granted
phenomenon. In that sense, it is possible to challenge the role played by media as working
parallel to the doing of nation-states.
The prolongation of the state of emergency in France speaks to the endurance of the
disproportional responses to the 13 November 2015 attacks in France and, conversely, the failure
to implement laws banning access to guns following the 12 June 2016 demonstrates the volatility
of a panic. As this study has shown, "there is legitimate tension between the actors, despite
overlapping interests in perpetuating the conflict or exacerbating public fears. U.S. politicians
and defence [sic] industry affiliates do not support" organizations like ISIL or their "objectives
and seem to sincerely hope to bring about their destruction (and vice-versa), despite both groups
benefiting from the existence of the other" (Smith et al., 2019, p. 164).
Third, I contribute to critical studies on Orientalism. The tensions and overlapping
interests mentioned in the section above, specifically between security and legitimacy, stressed
varying degrees of intensity in the dominant responses to these acts. I contend that these
variations reinforced the three tenets of Orientalism discourse discussed in Chapter One. These
three tenets are: (1) a distinction between various forms of knowledge and the politics of
knowledge production in/about the study of terrorism, (2) the methodological devices used by
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newspapers to dehumanize the Oriental Other, and (3) the personal dimension of journalists and
politicians perpetuating processes of identification that are permeating the everyday lived
experiences of people in France and in the U.S.A. Orientalism is not new but how it is manifest
today in the discourses and materialities of terrorism and nation-states’ responses to
contemporary acts of terrorism is different. As Orientalism perpetuates the unequal power
relations between the rationality of Western nations and the barbaric backwardness of Arabs and
Muslims, it does so in the construction of the identity of perpetrators as folk devils. By
combining moral panic and Orientalism, this study has also shown the varying degrees in which
Orientalism is reinforced in different national contexts.
Specifically, this research contributed to understanding the distinctions between the
various forms of knowledge produced in and about terrorism by media. Through immersive
narratives, detailed description of perpetrators already subjugated to surveillance and policing,
and accounts of hypothetical links with other perpetrators (the terrorist cell hypothesis),
newspaper reports contributed to fuel "old myths" about terrorism (Stohl, 2008), including the
myths of a clash of civilizations.
In sum and understandably, this interdisciplinary research necessitated more than just a
study of newspaper uses of terrorism with regard to the actors and also the underlying political
dynamics not only in terms of nation-state. Before addressing limitations and implications, it is
important to understand how the consistency of this research contributed to answer questions
about issues at the intersections of racialized identity, including and not limited to gender,
national identity, religion, and sexuality. The 14 July 2016 truck attack in Nice, France, and the
22 May 2017 bombing in Manchester perpetuated the on-going religion-terrorism nexus; the 23
April 2018 Toronto van attack and, to a certain extent, the 6 January 2021 storming of the U.S.
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Capitol illustrated how this nexus is reinforced with rampant toxic masculinity at the inception of
acts of extreme violence (Haider, 2016). In the following sub-sections, I draw back from what
motivated this research to begin with, offering critical insight into the significance of this study
in the ongoing struggles against racism.

Limitations
It is worth noting a few important limitations to this project. The first limitation is the
amount of data and timeframe for this study. While this interdisciplinary research sought to
challenge dominant Western assumptions about terrorism that are reinforced in the news in
France and the U.S.A., the data collected for this dissertation did not necessarily allow me to
understand fully the confluence of terrorism, moral panic, and Orientalism.
Although I could delve into the ways in which, for instance, national newspapers
published in France reinforced Orientalism following the Pulse attacks and, conversely, the ways
national newspapers published in the U.S.A. reinforced this logic following the series of attacks
that ended at the Bataclan, I could not go in depth nor could I have access to the people--as
journalists, terrorism victims, politicians, and other stakeholders—at the heart of the journalistic
accounts. As such, it is possible to consider this dissertation project to be the starting point for a
more comprehensive interpretation of the role of national newspapers to rely on simplified
complex explanations (Alsultany, 2012) on the inevitably globalized stage of news production
about acts of extreme violence marked as terrorism.
Another limitation is the newspaper outlets selected for this research. This project could
not claim to encompass the broader discourse of Orientalism that might underlie representation
of these events as terrorism in other national news outlets, alternative news, regional news, cable
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news networks, and social media accounts as well as memorials built in commemoration of the
victims of the attacks (Niemeyer, 2018). For instance, a more thorough account could offer a
deeper understanding of the scope of Orientalism discourse following these attacks and the
outreach of various outlets that target a broader audience.
Finally, I have not placed these acts of violence fully with the ongoing and current acts
marked as terrorism that took place in these specific nations and around the globe. Since the
2015 attacks in France and the 2016 shooting in the U.S.A., many other acts have taken place.

Theoretical and Practical Implications
As mentioned previously, this research drew from and contributed to critical studies in
terrorism, moral panic, and Orientalism. Since Orientalism was developed and expanded as a
theoretical framework, the hope was that a dualistic East/West divide would not necessarily exist
anymore or, at least, not in the way Orientalism was originally theorized. Globalization has
brought an expanded set of antagonistic relations that still are delineated by race, ethnicity,
nationality, and other differences but also are increasingly politicized by class in the United
States, France, and other parts of the world. People in positions of power who frame acts as
terrorism have a vested interests in labelling such acts in these ways to keep their positions of
status and privilege. These interests and their relationships to power and control dynamics
become visible when evidenced in the analysis of newspaper representations of terrorism through
the lens of moral panic. Although it is difficult to be able to demonstrate the volatile effect of
moral panic, the analysis of the political orientations represented in the selected national press
regarding terrorism made it possible to differentiate between an escalation of panic in France and
its volatility in the U.S.A. In addition, further research should take into consideration the
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processes and effects of such volatility in critiques and especially in a classed critique of how
profitable the wars on terrorism are for particular groups in nations and throughout the world.
While I could not study this in-greater depth, it is important to note that one of the
strategies used by newspaper like Le Figaro to vilify Muslims as barbaric Others was by blaming
the immigration policy of Belgium and, in doing so, use a fictionalized name of a city that
connects Molenbeek, Belgium, to any non-Western nations ending with the suffix, "-stan." For
instance, the article written by Mével and published in Le Figaro reveals the depth of
Orientalism. The title of this article reads, "Au coeur du Molenbeekistan" (Extract #112; see also
category of institutional responsibilities in Table 7) -- a title best translated in English as follows,
"At the heart of Molenbeekistan" -- was the only example in the data to show evidence of
strategies used by newspapers of simplified complex representations (Alsultany, 2012). While
Alsultany (2012) conceptualized the following: "fictionalizing the Middle Eastern or Muslim
country" as a representational strategy used in television shows like The West Wing or 24, here
the journalists invite the reader to blur the distinct lines between reality and fiction (pp. 25-26).
This news article reveals the depth of Orientalism, once more, in its use of an actual
neighborhood of Brussels, Molenbeek, in Belgium and associating with it the suffix necessary to
essentialize nations like, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and others. This manifestation of
latent Orientalism opens with a detailed description of a reality that brought antiterrorist police
forces back into a neighborhood to target and arrest Salah Abdeslam, suspect of the 13
November 2015 attacks still on the run at the time. A failed police intervention that did not deter
the journalist from drawing a link between, for instance, perpetrators of the 2004 attacks in
Madrid and the 2015 attempted attack on Brussels-Paris train. A series of hypothetical
connections made about folk devils and a vilified community of people facing economic
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deprivation, surveillance, and policing practices. Limiting the representation of this
neighborhood of "Europe's capital," Molenbeek is marked as the fertile ground of
"radicalization" from which the "carnage" of the 13 November 2015 took root. This fictionalized
reality holds serious pragmatic, and to a certain extent, theoretical implications for journalists
that I address later.
The discussion of radicalization -- that could not possibly be a part of this dissertation -holds serious implications because it is closely tied to the third theme about the paradoxes faced
by politicians and journalists discussed in this project. While it is reported that the governments
of Western nations like France and the U.S.A. take deradicalization as a serious project, the
failures to finance efforts by non-profit organization contradict these projects. In France, for
instance, an article published in Le Figaro exposed how the government failed to finance, as
promised, a non-profit organization dedicated to the processes of deradicalization; the
organization, originally operating under the authority of the prefecture of police, was reported to
have closed (Extract #188; see also category of radicalization in Table 7).30 Worse, the issue of
radicalization often came across as a problem that comes from outside of the borders of the
nation-states under scrutiny, France and the U.S.A. For instance, when former Prime Minister
from 1995 to 1997 Juppé responded to a question by Le Figaro journalists Garat et al. that asked,
"Après ces attentats, qu'attendez-vous de la communauté musulmane de France?" (Extract #122)
- a passage that is best translated in English as follows, "after these attacks, what do you expect
from the Muslim community in France?", Juppé answered,
Je les appelle à une prise de parole forte. Pour expliquer que ces actes odieux n'ont rien
à voir avec leur religion, pour condamner les terroristes, combattre la radicalisation et
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The founder and president of the non-profit was later tried and condemned to four-month suspended prison
sentence for embezzlement (Mouly & Vincent, 2017).
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défendre les valeurs républicaines dans lesquelles ils se reconnaissent. Il faut que les
autorités religieuses se prononcent, fortement. Elles sont les plus crédibles à le faire. Ce
n'est pas les stigmatiser que de le dire.
This response can be translated in English as follows,
I call on them to speak out loudly. To explain that these heinous acts have nothing to do
with their religion, to condemn terrorists, fight radicalization and defend the republican
values in which they identify with. The religious authorities must speak out, strongly.
They are the most credible to do so. It's not stigmatizing them to say it.
This passage refers to significant theoretical implications upon which I expand in this chapter
since the quote demonstrates that radicalization as a problem is deferred back and projected onto
a Muslim-only problem and that, from a critical race perspective, Whiteness prevails.
Specifically, postcolonial and whiteness studies scholarships have recently interrogated
Whiteness as a "cultural hegemon" and complicated Whiteness as a problem that is "both
aesthetically desirable and pragmatically necessary," "a product of the so-called civilizing
mission of colonialism" (Lopez, 2005, pp. 17-18). In the example cited above, Juppé illustrates
how colonial traces of whiteness linger in contemporary French society through the demands of a
cultural assimilation to Republican values.
Based on these findings, I contend that my research has pragmatic implications for
students in communication and mass communication as well as for students of political science
and people who hold positions of power in various institutions invested in (counter)terrorism.
Methodologically, this dissertation sought to contribute to the interpretive/qualitative turn called
for by scholars in comparative research (Downey, 2020; Wagener, 2017). The use of
comparative thematic analysis as a method to analyze newspaper articles and the theoretical
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lenses of critical studies in terrorism, moral panic, and Orientalism serve as a solid foundation to
complicate the dominant understanding of representation in different national contexts through
seminars and workshops.
Following the calls for an ethics of multiculturalism (Meer & Modood, 2011), my
research also urges media to play a role in the transformative possibilities that the representation
of violence should not limit Islam to a monolith (Elgamri, 2008; Richardson, 2004). The
responsibilities of journalists to do the work of multiculturalism are especially important
considering the ways in which discourse of security unfolding in the wake of such events as the
one studied here have often become synonymous with the national paradigm of secularism,
citizenship, and immigration. And even though people in the public sphere like decision makers,
media pundits, and politicians, appear to claim that we live in an era of multiculturalism, scholars
should continue to question the role of newspaper in reinforcing a Western-centric
multiculturalism that is exclusionary of people who identify with Islam. By drawing from
elements of a moral panic to study news representation, future research can continue to challenge
the climate of fear and outrage that shape the everyday life of people in Western societies.
From a pragmatic standpoint, one could argue that journalistic accounts and narratives
about acts of extreme violence do not necessarily engage with the root causes of such acts. Once
again, I do not condone such use of violence, but if politicians and media took a moment to listen
to grievances of the perpetrators, such acts might be prevented in the future. Very few articles
published after the 13 November 2015 and after the 12 June 2016 attacks consider these
grievances. Additionally, a recent article published by the Public Health Institute commented on
a study conducted by the Berkeley Media Studies Group (Bakal et al., 2018) and stated that,
"shrinking newsroom budgets and tight deadlines in today's always-on media environment make
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it increasingly challenging for journalists to tell broader stories about violence that include social
factors such as poverty, disinvestment, or trauma" ("Improving," 2018). In the case of the events
in France and in the U.S.A., one might question the ways in which newspaper might consciously,
or not, overlook deeper societal issues such as suicide, Islamophobia, xenophobia, and
homophobia. From a critical standpoint, one could argue that the role of news media
organization to be(come) watchdogs by interrogating the role of politicians in addressing (or not)
these concerns.
In hindsight and with regard to addressing theoretical implications and drawing out
practical applications, I am left wondering about the possibility to expand on the study of acts
marked as terrorism and the ways media reinforced Orientalism discourse by conducting a
critical ethnographic project that would gather together semi-structured interviews with actors in
"counter-terrorism" effort such as employees of governmental agencies invested in addressing
issues related to terrorism (e.g., radicalization, imprisonment) and with politicians temporarily
assigned to public policy surrounding terrorism. If media play the role of gatekeeper and not the
one of watchdogs, what is the role of researcher in asking the questions to politicians, media
pundits, and other stakeholders on the War on Terror? Finally, I also think that it would be
important to conduct a comparative thematic analysis of peer-reviewed articles published using
the term terrorism since 2015, if not before.

Conclusion
I began this project with the desire to study terrorism through the lens of Orientalism
based on the thoughtfulness of mentors, professors, and of a respondent to a panel on
Islamophobia at the National Communication Association convention in Philadelphia,
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Pennsylvania, U.S.A., in 2016. At the time, the Charlie Hebdo attacks of January 2015 and the
responses by politicians and media pundits raised a lot of concerns about what it meant to be
French (Raymond, 2018). My interests in the socio-political repercussions of such events were
sparked when the 13 November 2015 and 12 June 2016 took place. This is both a personal and
professional project that has transformed the way I perceive the world today. Yet, it is impossible
not to feel a sense of urgency after such a project.
Recent statistics showed that reports of Islamophobic acts have increased in between
2014 and 2016 in the U.S.A. (Kishi, 2017). In France, the year 2015 marks a turning point in the
sense that, according to the Collectif Contre l'Islamophobie en France, islamophobia mutated
from within the security dimension made possible by such policing practices as house arrests
provided by the state of emergency. The examples of the security context in France continue to
legitimize violence against and surveillance of people who identify as Muslims or are perceived
as such, since the veil law of 2005, which has made Islamophobia a predominantly gendered act
of racism (Bogain, 2017; "Rapport CCIF," 2017). These statistics both in France and the U.S.A.
are without counting the acts that are unreported, including ones committed by people working
in public and private organizations, in colleges and universities, and so on.
Having kept these deeper issues that mark the everyday life of people who identify as
Muslims, it is my hope that my project encourages future and current scholars to pursue this type
of research that consisted in doing comparative research with applied communication practices
and more contextualized methodologies. My main hope is that this dissertation offers some
advocacy and invites people to consider feasible solutions towards reducing Orientalist
orientations and promotion of moral panic in journalistic reports. On a more reflexive note, I
paraphrase Said who challenged readers to consider that one does not have to identify as Arab
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Palestinian to challenge Orientalism discourse in media. Today, in my opinion, this lesson still
resonates at a time when nation-states like France and the U.S.A. continuously deny humanness
to people from Palestine.
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Appendix A: References of Analyzed Articles From Dataset by Extract #
Table A1. Le Monde and Le Figaro Between 13 November 2015 and 20 November 2015
#

Date

Newspaper Outlet

Byline / Author.s

Section

Title

(Last, First Name)
1

11/13

Le Figaro

Oberlé, Thierry

International

Zoom; Beyrouth: plus de 37 morts dans un attentat

2

11/13

Le Figaro

Barthe, Benjamin &

International

Sérieux différends avant la conférence de Vienne

France

COP21 : le ministère de l'intérieur affiche un dispositif sécuritaire

Sallon, Hélène
3

11/13

Le Monde

Borredon, Laurent

renforcé
4

11/13

Le Monde

Ducourtieux, Cécile &

International

Israël dénonce l'étiquetage par l'UE de produits de ses colonies

Politique

Le scénario noir tant redouté par les forces de l'ordre et les services de

Smolar, Piotr
5

11/14

Le Figaro

Cornevin, Christophe

renseignement
6

11/14

Le Figaro

Minoui, Delphine

International

Le dossier syrien s'impose à la table des discussions du G20 en Turquie

7

11/14

Le Figaro

Rizk, Sibylle

International

Le Liban reste l’otage du conflit voisin

8

11/14

Le Figaro

Cornevin, Christophe,

Politique

Attaques terroristes sans précédent en plein Paris

Gonzales, Paule, &
Leclerc, Jean-Marc
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9

11/14

Le Figaro

Du Limbert, Paul-

Politique

François Hollande décrète l'état d'urgence

Politique

François Hollande décrète l'état d'urgence: Le président de la

Henri
10

11/14

Le Figaro

Rovan, Anne

République a convoqué un Conseil des ministres extraordinaire dans la
nuit
11

11/14

Le Figaro

Jaulmes, Adrien

Politique

1500 soldats en renfort en Ile-de-France

12

11/14

Le Figaro

Barthe, Benjamin

International

En difficulté, l’EI frappe le Hezbollah a Beyrouth

13

11/14

Le Monde

Borredon, Laurent

France

Délinquance : l'enquête qui contredit le gouvernement

14

11/14

Le Monde

Bougnon, François &

Planete

" Nous voulons éviter une rivalité stratégique avec la Chine "

Bourcier, Nicolas
15

11/14

Le Monde

S., So

France

Bernard Cazeneuve contourne le secret-défense

16

11/15

Le Monde

Unknown

France

Six attaques simultanées au cœur de Paris

17

11/15

Le Monde

Unknown

France

Réactions

18

11/15

Le Monde

Zilbertin, Olivier & de

France

L’état d’urgence instauré sur l’ensemble de la métropole

Montvalon, JeanBaptiste
19

11/15

Le Monde

Bissuel, Bertrand

France

Ecoles et musées fermés, rencontres sportives annulées

20

11/15

Le Monde

Follorou, Jacques

France

Un attentat « complexe » inédit sur le sol français
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21

11/15

Le Monde

Vincent, Elise

France

Depuis « Charlie », une série d’attaques ratées ou déjouées

22

11/15

Le Monde

Borredon, Laurent

France

Renforcés, les services de renseignement restent débordés

23

11/15

Le Monde

La redaction du

France

Soudain, une detonation retentit

“Monde”
24

11/15

Le Monde

Bonnefous, Bastien

France

Des voix dissonantes chez les politiques

25

11/15

Le Monde

Unknown

France

François Hollande : " C'est une épreuve terrible qui, une nouvelle fois,
nous assaille "

26

11/15

Le Monde

Service International

France

Obama : « Une attaque contre toute l’humanité »

27

11/16

Le Figaro

Garat, Jean-Baptiste

Politique

Bruno Le Maire : « Notre combat contre l'islamisme radical doit aller
plus loin »

28

11/16

Le Figaro

Leclerc, Jean-Marc &

Société

Des budgets qui ne traduisent pas encore un effort de « guerre »

Gonzalès, Paule
29

11/16

Le Figaro

Gonzalès, Paule

Société

Une justice toujours déficiente

30

11/16

Le Figaro

Guénois, Jean-Marie

Société

L'islam de France démuni face à la puissance des réseaux sociaux

31

11/16

Le Figaro

Mével, Jean-Jacques

International

En Europe, la crise des réfugiés s'exacerbe; L'hypothèse qu'un terroriste
soit venu dans le flot de réfugiés syriens renforce les opposants à leur
accueil.
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32

11/16

Le Figaro

Kovacs, Stéphane &

Société

De l'île de Léros au Stade de France, l'étonnant itinéraire d'un passeport

Kefalas, Alexia

trouvé près de l'un des kamikazes

33

11/16

Le Figaro

Unknown

Une

Jours de France : La culture ne doit pas s’incliner devant leurs balles

34

11/16

Le Figaro

Cornevin, Christophe

Société

La traque se concentre sur un réseau franco-belge, La banlieue de
Bruxelles a servi de base arrière aux terroristes, dont au moins trois
Français. Un membre présumé des commandos est toujours recherché

35

11/16

Le Figaro

Mével, Jean-Jacques

Société

Molenbeek, foyer des réseaux djihadistes bruxellois

36

11/16

Le Figaro

Négroni, Angélique

Société

Ismaël, petit délinquant radicalisé devenu l'un des tueurs du Bataclan

37

11/16

Le Figaro

Renault, Enguérand

Télévision

Les chaînes d'info ont retenu les leçons de « Charlie »; L'extrême
prudence et les appels à la solidarité ont été les fils directeurs des
éditions spéciales de BFMTV, i-Télé et LCI.

38

11/16

Le Figaro

De Santis, Sophie

Société

L'Est parisien, épicentre de la vie nocturne visé par l'EI

39

11/16

Le Figaro

Ferran, Benjamin

Société

Les réseaux sociaux, relais instantanés de la terreur et de l'espoir

40

11/16

Le Figaro

Ronfaut, Lucie

Société

L'hommage aux innocents assassinés le 13 novembre; La plupart des
personnes tuées vendredi soir ont désormais été identifiées.

41

11/16

Le Figaro

Galiero, Emmanuel

Politique

À l'Élysée, Marine Le Pen établit un lien entre les attentats et les
migrants
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42

11/16

Le Figaro

Jaigu, Charles

Politique

Sarkozy durcit le ton contre le chef de l'État;Le président des
Républicains pointe les failles de la politique de Hollande.

43

11/16

Le Figaro

Huet, Sophie

Politique

Bartolone et Villepin, deux visions du combat contre Daech

44

11/16

Le Figaro

Tabard, Guillaume

Politique

CONTRE-POINT ; La droite tire les leçons des désillusions du 11
janvier

45

11/16

Le Figaro

Leclerc, Jean-Marc

Société

Manuel Valls face au défi de la riposte pénale et juridique; Le premier
ministre laisse entendre qu'il pourrait examiner les solutions de la droite,
notamment en matière de rétention de sûreté ou de déchéance de
nationalité

46

11/16

Le Figaro

De Coustin, Paul

Société

À l'école, une minute de silence sous tension; Le ministère de
l'Éducation, qui veut éviter de nouveaux dérapages, a écrit à tous les
enseignants.

47

11/16

Le Figaro

Jaulmes, Adrien

International

Comment faire la guerre a l’État Islamique

48

11/16

Le Figaro

Malbrunot, Georges

International

La nouvelle stratégie internationale de Daech; Pour porter la terreur hors
du califat, l'EI renforce les liens entre sa direction centrale et ses
succursales étrangères.
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49

11/16

Le Figaro

Minoui, Delphine

International

Un début de dégel entre Poutine et Obama; Au G20 d'Antalya, les ÉtatsUnis et la Russie ont apporté leur soutien à un cessez-le-feu et une
transition politique en Syrie.

50

11/16

Le Figaro

Barotte, Nicolas

International

La politique d’ouverture de Merkel encore plus critique

51

11/16

Le Figaro

De Mallevoüe,

Société

L'énigme du Stade de France; Selon l'hypothèse la plus probable, les

Delphine

trois kamikazes avaient bien prévu d'entrer dans l'enceinte sportive.
Pourquoi n'ont-ils pas attendu d'être dans la foule pour se faire exploser
?

52

11/16

Le Figaro

Garat, Jean-Baptiste &

Politique

Le président consulte, l'opposition s'organise, les Français se recueillent

Bourmaud, François-

: récit d'un dimanche de deuil national

Xavier
53

11/16

Le Figaro

De Royer, Solenn

Politique

François Hollande veut prouver sa détermination; Le chef de l'État, qui
souhaite prolonger l'état d'urgence de trois mois, annoncera lundi aprèsmidi des mesures de riposte, devant le Parlement réuni en Congrès à
Versailles.

54

11/16

Le Figaro

Huet, Sophie

Politique

Au Congrès, un discours présidentiel suivi d'un débat

55

11/16

Le Figaro

Alexandre, Amandine

Société

Londres a renforcé son arsenal depuis 2005
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56

11/17

Le Figaro

Unknown

Société

À Lunel, « certains ont peur de voir leur gamin à la TV après une
attaque »

57

11/17

Le Figaro

Pech, Marie-Estelle

Société

Dans les écoles, des élèves stressés; Les minutes de silence se sont
globalement déroulées dans une atmosphère recueillie. Les enseignants
ont pu échanger avec les enfants, dont beaucoup ont passé le week-end
devant les écrans.

58

11/17

Le Figaro

De Santis, Sophie

Société

Dans l'Est parisien, « la psychose est bien là »

59

11/17

Le Figaro

Mascret, Damien

Sciences

Des blessures psychiques possible dans tout le pays

60

11/17

Le Figaro

Roy, Soline

Sciences

Identification des morts : l'insoutenable attente; La reconnaissance d'une
victime de catastrophe doit répondre à une procédure rigoureuse et très
codifiée.

61

11/17

Le Figaro

Woitier, Chloé

Médias

La presse passe en édition spéciale; La mobilisation a débuté dès
samedi.

62

11/17

Le Figaro

Frat, Muriel

Télévision

François Jost : « Les chaînes d'info ont évité le piège des rumeurs »;
INTERVIEW Ce fin observateur de la télévision salue la prudence des
médias dans la couverture des récents attentats. Malgré quelques
dérapages.
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63

11/17

Le Figaro

Galiero, Emmanuel

Politique

Valérie Pécresse (LR) : « Il faut construire un véritable bouclier de
sécurité »

64

11/17

Le Figaro

Leclerc, Jean-Marc

Société

Conversion tardive sur le retrait de la nationalité

65

11/17

Le Figaro

Cornevin, Christophe

Société

Une attaque décidée en Syrie et organisée en Belgique; Alors que Salah
Abdeslam, rescapé présumé des kamikazes, est recherché, les policiers
auraient retrouvé l'appartement conspiratif des commandos, à Bobigny.

66

11/17

Le Figaro

Négroni, Angélique,

Société

Trois des quatre kamikazes français identifiés ont été formés par Daech

International

L'enquête révèle des ratés judiciaires et policiers; L'un des kamikazes

de Mallevoüe,
Delphine, Kovacs,
Stéphane, & Leclair,
Agnès
67

11/17

Le Figaro

Gonzalès, Paule

avait rompu son contrôle judiciaire. Un autre avait été signalé par
Ankara aux services français.
68

11/17

Le Figaro

Malbrunnot, Georges

International

La montée en puissance des cadres francophones a la direction de Daech

69

11/17

Le Figaro

Lemenestrel, Christian

International

Salah Abdeslam échappe a la police belge

70

11/17

Le Figaro

Mandeville, Laure

International

Lutte antiterroriste: les espions français et américains resserrent leur
coopération
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71

11/17

Le Figaro

Berthemet, Tanguy

International

Paris va intensifier ses raids en Syrie; Des chasseurs français ont conduit
dimanche ses raids les plus massifs contre le fief de Daech à Raqqa.

72

11/17

Le Figaro

Lemenestrel, Christian

International

Avec l'article 42.7, un appel à la solidarité européenne

73

11/17

Le Figaro

Lasserre, Isabelle

International

Hollande appelle à une grande coalition contre Daech; Le président
français doit rencontrer dans les prochains jours Barack Obama et
Vladimir Poutine, pour « unir nos forces ».

74

11/17

Le Figaro

Collomp, Florentin

International

Le Royaume-Uni augmente les effectifs de ses services de
renseignement et tient les SAS en alerte

75

11/17

Le Figaro

Barotte, Nicolas

International

Face à la « guerre » contre les djihadistes, l'Allemagne hésite

76

11/17

Le Figaro

Minoui, Delphine

International

À Antalya, les membres du G20 font bloc contre le terrorisme

77

11/17

Le Figaro

Chabrout, Julien

Politique

Le PS et ses allies approuvent le discours, la gauche radicale prend ses
distances

78

11/17

Le Figaro

Huet, Sophie

Politique

La droite veut de l’action, mais pas une réforme de la Constitution

79

11/17

Le Figaro

Tabard, Guillaume

Politique

CONTRE-POINT; Les enjeux politiques d’un tournant sécuritaire

80

11/17

Le Figaro

De Royer, Solenn

Politique

Hollande assure que « la République détruira le terrorisme »; En chef de
guerre, le président a prononcé un discours martial et annoncé une
batterie de mesures sécuritaires devant le Congrès réuni à Versailles.
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81

11/17

Le Figaro

Pluyette, Cyrille &

Politique

Hollande s’affranchit des 3% du pacte de stabilité

Société

Justice : des peines « significativement alourdies » pour les actes

Visot, Marie
82

11/17

Le Figaro

Gonzalès, Paule

terroristes
83

11/17

Le Figaro

Jaigu, Charles

Société

Hollande veut redéfinir l'état d'urgence; Le président souhaite faire
évoluer la Constitution en réécrivant l'article 36 qui ne porte que sur
l'état de siège.

84

11/17

Le Figaro

Cornevin, Christophe

Société

Un lance-roquettes découvert lors d’une perquisition

85

11/17

Le Monde

Borredon, Laurent,

France

Un commanditaire belge parti en Syrie

France

La Belgique au coeur des réseaux djihadistes

France

Molenbeek, plaque tournante du terrorisme islamiste

Follorou, Jacques, Piel
Simon, Seelow, Soren,
& Stroobants, JeanPierre
86

11/17

Le Monde

Follorou, Jacques &
Stroobants, Jean-Pierre

87

11/17

Le Monde

Stroobants, Jean-Pierre
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88

11/17

Le Monde

Vincent, Elise,

France

Ismaël Omar Mostefaï, l'un des kamikazes français du Bataclan

France

Vers une “revision” de la loi sur l’état d’urgence

Borredon, Laurent, &
Piel, Simon
89

11/17

Le Monde

Bekmezian, Hélène,
Chambraud, Cécile

90

11/17

Le Monde

Guibert, Nathalie

France

Les missions intérieures de l’armée restent a définir

91

11/17

Le Monde

Guibert, Nathalie &

France

Des raids francais menés en urgence en Syrie

Paris, Gille
92

11/17

Le Monde

Service France

France

La " drôle de campagne " des régionales

93

11/17

Le Monde

Chambraud, Cécile

France

Les musulmans espèrent échapper aux amalgames

94

11/17

Le Monde

Battaglia, Mattea &

France

A l'école, les enseignants se sont préparés aux questions des élèves

Collas, Aurélie
95

11/17

Le Monde

Gurrey, Béatrice

France

Place de la République, une grande prière laïque

96

11/17

Le Monde

Béguin, François &

France

Les hôpitaux parisiens face à des " faits de guerre "

International

Dix mois de “France Charlie”

International

Les Russes affichent leur compassion envers la France

Benkimoun, Paul
97

11/17

Le Monde

Chemin, Ariane &
Robert-Diard, Pascale

98

11/17

Le Monde

Mandraud, Isabelle
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99

11/17

Le Monde

Unknown

International

" Pour les Libanais, on ne crée pas de bouton sur Facebook "

100

11/17

Le Monde

Kaval, Allan & Barthe,

International

Assailli sur ses terres, l’EI frappe tous azimuts

Benjamin
101

11/17

Le Monde

Baumard, Maryline

International

Craintes sur l’arrivée de terroristes avec les migrants

102

11/17

Le Monde

Chastand, Jean-

International

Un kamikaze du Stade de France a emprunté la route des Balkans

Baptiste & Druelle,
Julia
103

11/17

Le Monde

Service France

France

Plus de cinquante perquisitions en France

104

11/17

Le Monde

Bonnefou, Bastien &

France

Etat de guerre: Jusqu’ou peut aller Hollande

Revault D’Allonnes,
David
105

11/17

Le Monde

Bekmezian, Hélène

France

Un Congrès à Versailles organisé en trois jours

106

11/17

Le Monde

Unknown

International

Ce qu’il faut savoir

107

11/17

Le Monde

Sallon, Hélène

International

A Vienne, un accord de façade sur la transition en Syrie

108

11/17

Le Monde

Ducourtieux, Cécile &

International

Durcissement du débat européen sur les réfugiés

International

En Allemagne, les anti-Merkel estiment que " Paris change tout "

Stroobants, Jean-Pierre
109

11/17

Le Monde

Lemaître, Frédéric
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110

11/18

Le Figaro

Périnel, Quentin

Société

Rester, partir ? Dans le XIe arrondissement, certains habitants
s'interrogent; Si la plupart restent attachés à leur quartier, certains n'ont
plus envie de vivre là où s'est déroulé une telle tragédie.

111

11/18

Le Figaro

Leclair, Agnès

Société

Apprivoiser l'angoisse, le nouveau défi des Français

112

11/18

Le Figaro

Mével, Jean-Jacques

Reportage

Au Coeur du Molenbeekistan

113

11/18

Le Figaro

Leclerc, Jean-Marc

Société

Un juge antiterroriste aux affaires familiales : qui peut sauver le soldat
Trévidic ?

114

11/18

Le Figaro

Gonzalès, Paule

Société

Les magistrats mettent en garde à propos des limites de l'état d'urgence

115

11/18

Le Figaro

Malbrunnot, Georges

Société

Les « jeunes mariés », les kamikazes chair à canon de Daech

116

11/18

Le Figaro

Cornevin, Christophe

Société

Un neuvième membre du commando est recherché; Il faisait partie de
l'équipe qui a ensanglanté les terrasses des cafés de l'est parisien avec
Salah Abdeslam, visé par un mandat d'arrêt international et son frère
Brahim mort en kamikaze.

117

11/18

Le Figaro

Négroni, Angélique

Société

Attaquer une salle de concert, la mission d'un islamiste radical arrêté en
août

118

11/18

Le Figaro

Avril, Pierre

International

L’aviation russe intensifies ses frappes contre le califat

119

11/18

Le Figaro

Bourmaud, Francois-

Politique

Le gouvernement veut créer un « régime civil d'état de crise »

Xavier & Rovan, Anne
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120

11/18

Le Figaro

Zennou, Albert

Politique

Les Français prêts à moins de libertés pour plus de sécurité; Selon un
sondage Ifop pour « Le Figaro » et RTL, 84 % des Français
accepteraient davantage de contrôles. 50 % font confiance à l'exécutif
pour vaincre le terrorisme.

121

11/18

Le Figaro

Huet, Sophie

Politique

Révision constitutionnelle: embarrass à droite

122

11/18

Le Figaro

Garat, Jean-Baptiste,

Politique

Alain Juppé : « La France a besoin d'unité »; L'ex-premier ministre met

Jaigu, Charles,

en garde droite et gauche contre « la surenchère d'imagination juridique

Goulliaud, Philippe, &

» dans la lutte contre le terrorisme.

du Limbert, PaulHenri
123

11/18

Le Figaro

De Royer, Solenn

Politique

Comment le président s'est mué en « chef de guerre »

124

11/18

Le Figaro

De Royer, Solenn

Politique

François Hollande en première ligne; Sous pression, le chef de l'État
revêt tour à tour son costume de commandant en chef et de père de la
nation.

125

11/18

Le Figaro

Leclerc, Jean-Marc

Société

DÉCRYPTAGE; Virage à droite sur la déchéance de nationalité
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126

11/18

Le Figaro

Leclerc, Jean-Marc

Société

Ce que les experts pensent du plan Hollande; Ils soulignent qu'il faudra
attendre deux années pour obtenir la totalité des moyens
supplémentaires promis par le chef de l'État et que l'état d'urgence n'aura
qu'un temps. À leurs yeux, judiciarisation des affaires et redéploiement
des effectifs s'imposent.

127

11/18

Le Figaro

Ronfaut, Lucie

Société

L’application Telegram, casse-tête du Renseignement

128

11/18

Le Figaro

Darmamin, Jules

Société

Vidéo de djihadistes belges : Facebook pointé du doigt

129

11/18

Le Figaro

Service international

International

Bombardements français et russes contre Rakka

130

11/18

Le Monde

Fortier, Jacques

Société

Un collégien de 12 ans tué par balle dans un car scolaire en Alsace

131

11/18

Le Monde

Santi, Pascale,

Le Monde

Après les attentats, libérer la parole

Vincent, Catherine, &

Science et

Cabut, Sandrine

Médecine

Revault d’Allonnes,

France

132

11/18

Le Monde

Hollande, la politique en temps de guerre

David
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133

11/18

Le Monde

Besse Desmoulières,

France

Un nouveau régime d'"état de crise"

France

Revirement politique sur la déchéance de nationalité

International

M. Hollande se délivre du "pacte de stabilité"

International

La France sollicite l’assistance de ses voisins

Raphaëlle, Bonnefous,
Bastien, & de
Montvalon, JeanBaptiste
134

11/18

Le Monde

Borredon, Laurent &
Jacquin, Jean-Baptiste

135

11/18

Le Monde

Ducourtieux, Cécile &
Roger, Patrick

136

11/18

Le Monde

Guibert, Nathalie &
Stroobants, Jean-Pierre

137

11/18

Le Monde

Riols, Yves-Michel

International

Sur la Syrie, François Hollande change de priorité

138

11/18

Le Monde

Paris, Gilles

International

Obama defend sa stratégie contre l’EI

139

11/18

Le Monde

Mandraud, Isabelle

International

Poutine revendique la paternité de la " grande coalition " prônée par
Paris

140

11/18

Le Monde

Jégo, Marie

International
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141

11/18

Le Monde

Unknown

Le Monde

La sécurité à tout prix ?

Science et
Médecine
142

11/19

Le Figaro

Chabrout, Julien

Politique

Le tournant sécuritaire ne fait pas l’unanimité a gauche

143

11/19

Le Figaro

Collomp, Florentin

International

Des Syriens hébergés sur une île écossaise

144

11/19

Le Figaro

De Chabalier, Blaise

Télévision

La littérature contre le terrorisme;Le journaliste François Busnel
consacre une « Grande Librairie » au rôle des livres pour combattre
l'islamisme intégriste.

145

11/19

Le Figaro

Cornevin, Christophe

Société

Le commando neutralisé à Saint-Denis était prêt à « passer à l'acte »;
Plus de 110 policiers d'élite ont tué mercredi matin au moins deux
terroristes dans un appartement « conspiratif ». Le commanditaire
présumé des attaques de vendredi dernier pourrait figurer parmi les
members du groupe islamiste.

146

11/19

Le Figaro

Lombard-Latune,

Société

Un femme kamikaze: une première sur le sol français

Marie-Amélie & Pech,
Marie-Estelle
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147

11/19

Le Figaro

Leclair, Agnès &

Société

Un commando « jusqu'au-boutiste »; C'est ainsi que le procureur de

Négroni, Angélique

Paris, François Molins, décrit la cellule terroriste qui a semé la mort
dans Paris.

148

11/19

Le Figaro

Berthemet, Tanguy

Société

Abaaoud, as de la mise en scène et cerveau terroriste; Selon les services
de renseignements, le Belge serait derrière plusieurs attentats ou
tentatives d'attentats en Belgique et en France.

149

11/19

Le Figaro

Leclerc, Jean-Marc

Société

Des aéroports passoires pour terroristes; Les ratés du fichier des
données passagers PNR font courir un risque majeur aux États. Un
scandale européen.

150

11/19

Le Figaro

Gonzalès, Paule

Société

Les « béances » des contrôles aux frontières de l'Europe

151

11/19

Le Figaro

de Mallevoüe,

Société

Des mesures contre la menace chimique; Un arrêté autorisant la

Delphine

fabrication d'un antidote aux « neurotoxiques organophosphorés » est
paru le 14 novembre.

152

11/19

Le Figaro

Rovan, Anne

Politique

Taubira, un malaise perceptible; La garde des Sceaux a pris ses
distances avec la déchéance de nationalité, proposée par Hollande.

153

11/19

Le Figaro

Tabard, Guillaume

Politique

CONTRE-POINT ; Bernard Cazeneuve, le maillon fort de Hollande
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154

11/19

Le Figaro

Malbrunot, Georges

International

En Syrie, l'hécatombe des gardiens de la révolution iranienne; En un
mois, Téhéran a vu une quarantaine de ses hommes mourir au combat
pour défendre son allié Bachar el-Assad. La présence iranienne
compliquera les opérations d'une « coalition unique » que François
Hollande a proposée pour anéantir Daech.

155

11/19

Le Figaro

Barotte, Nicolas

International

En Allemagne, la menace persiste et l'angoisse grandit

156

11/19

Le Figaro

Picard, Maurin

International

L'Amérique s'entre-déchire sur l'accueil des réfugiés

157

11/19

Le Figaro

Rovan, Anne & de

Politique

L’exécutif propose de renforcer l’état d’urgence

Politique

Hollande justifie ses mesures de fermeté ; Devant les maires de France,

Royer, Solenn
158

11/19

Le Figaro

Bourmaud, FrançoisXavier

le président a confirmé mercredi « une restriction temporaire des
libertés ».

159

11/19

Le Monde

Barthe, Benjamin

International

Les rebelles Syriens prêts à lutter davantage contre l'EI

160

11/19

Le Monde

Dupré, Rémi

France

l'histoire du jour; A Wembley, " La Marseillaise " chantée par les
Anglais
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161

11/19

Le Monde

Borredon, Laurent,

France

A Saint-Denis, l'assaut contre les terroristes

Piel, Simon, Seelow,
Soren, & Stroobants,
Jean-Pierre
162

11/19

Le Monde

Zappi, Sylvia

France

" On entendait des rafales d'armes automatiques et des tirs isolés "

163

11/19

Le Monde

Unknown

France

Ce qu’il faut savoir

164

11/19

Le Monde

Vincent, Élise

France

L’éternel retour des “pionniers” du djihad

165

11/19

Le Monde

Vincent, Élise

France

“Cannes-Torcy”, la cellule terroriste prémonitoire

166

11/19

Le Monde

Benoît, Viktine

France

A Molenbeek, “il est facile d’échapper à la police”

167

11/19

Le Monde

Stroobants, Jean-Pierre

France

Polémique autour des services belges de l’antiterrorisme

168

11/19

Le Monde

Cazi, Émeline

France

Le travail dantesque de la police scientifique

169

11/19

Le Monde

Cazi, Émeline

France

Les enfants des victimes des attentats pourront devenir pupilles de la
nation

170

11/19

Le Monde

Chapuis, Nicolas

France

Régionales: le PS se remettra en campagne le 23 novembre

171

11/19

Le Monde

Mandraud, Isabelle

International

Pour Poutine, la France est devenue une alliée en Syrie

172

11/19

Le Monde

Service Europe

International

Les Européens ne se sentent pas en guerre

173

11/19

Le Monde

Ducourtieux, Cécile

International

“La France n’est pas seule, l’UE est à ses côtés”

174

11/19

Le Monde

Bernard, Philippe

International

David Cameron relance le projet de frappes en Syrie
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175

11/19

Le Monde

Ayad, Christophe

International

Comment Paris s’est converti à l'interventionnisme

176

11/19

Le Monde

Sallon, Hélène

International

La revendication opportuniste de l’Etat islamique

177

11/19

Le Monde

Borredon, Laurent,

France

Sarkozy : " Trop de temps a été perdu "

France

Au Parti Socialiste, silence dans les rangs

Goar, Matthieu, &
Lemarié, Alexandre
178

11/19

Le Monde

Bonnefous, Bastien &
Revault d’Allonnes,
David

179

11/19

Le Monde

Bekmezian, Hélène

France

Spectacle " affligeant " à l'Assemblée nationale

180

11/19

Le Monde

Dutheil, Guy &

France

La sécurité est à son maximum dans les transports

International

La Turquie renforce sa traque contre l'État islamique; Longtemps

Jacqué, Philippe
181

11/20

Le Figaro

Minoui, Delphine

soupçonné de complaisance envers les djihadistes syriens, le régime turc
a opéré un tournant vis-à-vis de l'EI.
182

11/20

Le Figaro

Baché, David

International

Aux frontières du Mali, l'armée française ratisse le désert; La force «
Barkhane » mène jusqu'à dimanche une opération d'envergure pour
empêcher les groupes djihadistes de se reformer dans le nord du pays.
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183

11/20

Le Figaro

Barluet, Alain

International

Boko Haram : les services de renseignement renforcent leur
coordination

184

11/20

Le Figaro

Cornevin, Christophe

Société

Abdelhamid Abaaoud : ques tions sur l'itinéraire d'un terroriste; L'un des
principaux instigateurs des attentats a été tué à Saint-Denis lors de
l'assaut du Raid.

185

11/20

Le Figaro

Négroni, Angélique

Société

De Merah au Bataclan, l’ombre de Fabien Clain

186

11/20

Le Figaro

Unknown

Société

La kamikaze présumée s'était rapidement radicalisée

187

11/20

Le Figaro

Guénois, Jean-Marie

Société

L'« appel solennel » qui sera lu dans 2 400 mosquées

188

11/20

Le Figaro

De Mallevoüe,

Société

La cellule de déradicalisation du 93 fermée; La structure qui «

Delphine

désendoctrinait » les candidats au djihad de la région parisienne, créée
en octobre 2014 et placée sous le contrôle de la Préfecture de police,
n'est plus. Selon l'association, l'État n'a jamais versé de quoi payer les
salaires et les charges. Les autorités invoquent notamment des
problèmes administratifs.

189

11/20

Le Figaro

De Mallevoüe,

Société

Quand un djihadiste détenu placé à l'isolement appelle sa mère au

Delphine
190

11/20

Le Figaro

Gonzalès, Paule

téléphone...
Société

Perquisitions, assignations : ce que permet l'état d'urgence
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191

11/20

Le Figaro

Huet, Sophie

Société

État d'urgence : quasi-unanimité à l'Assemblée; Les députés ont voté la
prolongation jusqu'en février 2016 de ce dispositif exceptionnel, pour
faire face aux attentats.

192

11/20

Le Figaro

Leclair, Agnès

Société

Crèches, menus sans porc : la laïcité stricte de l'AMF

193

11/20

Le Figaro

Négroni, Angélique

Société

Même au repos, le policier gardera son arme

194

11/20

Le Figaro

Waintraub, Judith

Politique

Face au terrorisme, la droite revendique sa « crédibilité »

195

11/20

Le Figaro

Barluet, Alain

International

Premiers contacts militaires à haut niveau Paris-Moscou

196

11/20

Le Figaro

Louis, Cyrille

International

Nouvelles attaques anti-israéliennes; Cinq personnes ont été tuées jeudi
à Tel-Aviv et en Cisjordanie occupée dans deux agressions menées par
des Palestiniens.

197

11/20

Le Figaro

Mével, Jean-Jacques

Société

La France met Schengen sous pression

198

11/20

Le Figaro

de Mallevoüe,

Société

Valls veut une nouvelle structure pour désendoctriner les jeunes

Delphine

radicalisés

199

11/20

Le Figaro

Pluyette, Cyrille

Société

600 millions en plus pour la sécurité en 2016

200

11/20

Le Figaro

Rovan, Anne & Royer,

Politique

La communication bicéphale de l'exécutif; Hollande et Valls se

Solenn

partagent les rôles : le premier ministre prépare au pire, le président
tente de rassurer.

201

11/20

Le Figaro

Galiero, Emmanuel

Politique

Pour le Front national, le ressenti des enjeux régionaux « a changé »
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202

11/20

Le Figaro

Tabard, Guillaume

Politique

CONTRE-POINT ; Régionales : la grande peur de la droite

203

11/20

Le Monde

Follorou, Jacques

France

Les failles de la lute antiterroriste

204

11/20

Le Monde

Baumard, Maryline &

France

Craintes d’une infiltration par l’EI des routes migratoirs

International

L’Europe résolue à agir

International

Confusion après l'assaut de Saint-Denis

Follorou, Jacques
205

11/20

Le Monde

Ducourtieux, Cécile &
Stroobants, Jean-Pierre

206

11/20

Le Monde

Borredon, Laurent &
Piel, Simon

207

11/20

Le Monde

Pedroletti, Brice

International

Pékin reste discret sur l’assassinat d’un otage

208

11/20

Le Monde

Besse Desmoulières,

International

" Au bar du village, on ne parle que de ça "

Raphaëlle & Jérôme,
Béatrice
209

11/20

Le Monde

Santi, Pascale

International

Louis Samka, 26 ans : " J'étais en mode survie "

210

11/20

Le Monde

Fabre, Clarisse,

International

La vie Culturelle reprend ses quartiers, malgré tout

International

Diplomatie : la voie étroite vers une coalition unie contre l'EI

Carpentier, Laurent, &
Darge, Fabienne
211

11/20

Le Monde

Ayad, Christophe
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212

11/20

Le Monde

Hecketsweiler, Chloé,

International

Benkimoun, Paul, &
Béguin, François

219

Soins d’urgence: les leçons du 13 novembre

Table A2. The New York Times and The Washington Post Between 12 June 2016 and 19 June 2016.
#

Date

Newspaper Outlet

Byline / Author.s

Section

Title

Last, First Name

214

6/12

The New York Times

Nossiter, Adam

Foreign Desk

Garbage and resentment pile up in France as union protest labor
laws

215

6/12

The Washington
Post

DeYoung, Karen

A-section

U.S.-backed fighters cut off ISIS route

216

6/12

Warrick, Joby

A-section

In Albania, concerns over ISIS’s emergence

217

6/12

The Washington
Post
The Washington
Post

Cuomo, Andrew

Editorial

If you boycott Israel, New York will boycott you

218

6/12

The Washington
Post

Davis, Aaron C.

A-section

Last in primaries, first in outrage

219

6/12

The Washington
Post

Mroue, Bassem

A-section

In Syria, bombings near a revered shrine kill 12

220

6/12

The Washington
Post

Morris, Loveday

A-section

Fighting in a city full of bombs

221

6/12

Weiner, Rachel

A-section

U.S. citizen helped arm Syrian rebels

222

6/13

The Washington
Post
The New York Times

Martin, Jonathan

National Desk

Trump seizes on massacre and repeats call for ban on Muslim
migration

223

6/13

The New York Times

Stolberg, Sheryl Gay,
Lovett, Ian, Aguilera,
Jasmine, & Barbaro,
Michael

National Desk

For gays across America, a massacre punctuates fitful gains

224

6/13

The New York Times

Shear, Michael D.

National desk

After another hail of bullets, Obama offers a familiar lament

220
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225

6/13

The New York Times

Alvarez Lizette,
PÉREZ-PEÑA,
Richard, Thompson,
Wendy, Neuhaus, Les,
Blinder, Alan,
Callimachi, Rukmini,
Lichtblau, Eric,
Schmitt, Erich, Kenny,
Steve,. Oppel Jr,.
Richard A, Rojas,
Rick, & Victor,
Daniel.

National desk

Praising Isis, gunman attacks gay nightclub, leaving 50 dead in
worst shooting on U.S. soil

226

6/13

The New York Times

Blinder, Alan, Healy,
Jack & Oppel Jr.,
Richard A.

National desk

F.B.I. studied shooter years before attack

227

6/13

The New York Times

Callimachi, Rukmini

National desk

A tie to ISIS? Uncertainty as a strategy

228
229

6/13

The New York Times

Stack, Liam

Express

Orlando shooting: What we know and don’t know

6/13

Weigel, David

A-section

Can libertarian affect presidential race?

230

6/13

The Washington
Post
The Washington
Post

Rosenwald, Michael
S.

A-section

A deadly convergence between terrorism and mass shootings

221
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231

6/13

The Washington
Post

McCoy, Terrence,
Siddiqui, Faiz, &
Nirappil, Fenip

Metro

At D.C. pride festival, tears and resolve

232

6/13

The Washington
Post

Tsukayama, Hayley,
Berman, Mark &
Markon, Jerry

A-section

50 killed at gay club in Fla.

233

6/13

The Washington
Post

Goldman, Adam,
Warrick, Joby, &
Bearak, Max

A-section

Mateen called erratic, abusive, ‘filled with hate’

234

6/13

The Washington
Post

Boorstein, Michael

Metro

Is God punishing us with the 2016 election? Some people are
seriously starting to wonder

235

6/13

The Washington
Post

Achenbach, Joel &
Holley, Peter

A-section

‘It was just complete chaos’: Orlando massacre survivors on the
desperate struggle to stay alive. A frightened, frantic struggle to stay
alive

236

6/13

The Washington
Post

Tumulty, Karen

A-section

When tragedy hits, Americans stand divided

237

6/13

The Washington
Post

Eilperin, Juliet, Costa,
Robert & Gearan,
Anne

A-section

Responses are in keeping with candidates’ styles

238

6/14

The New York Times

Fisher, Max

World

Gays, guns and jihad: Motives blur on closer scrutiny; The
interpreter.

239

6/14

The New York Times

Poniewozik, James

Arts; Television

After Orlando shooting, talk show hosts suggest talk is not enough
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240

6/14

The New York Times

Rutenberg, Jim

Business; media

In revoking press credentials, Trump casts himself as punisher in
chief

241

6/14

The New York Times

Erlanger, Steven

Foreign desk

Worries over Turkey inflame ‘Brexit’ debate

242

6/14

The New York Times

Herszenhorn, David
M. & Lichtblau, Eric

Not specified

Orlando shooting reignites gun control debate in congress

243

6/14

The New York Times

Healy, Patrick,
Bosman, Julie, Smith,
Mitch, Seelye,
Katharine Q., Lovett,
Ian, Fernandez,
Manny, Johnson, Kirk,
& Peters, Jeremy W.

National desk

After massacre at gay club, an array of opinions about the motive
and meaning

244

6/14

The New York Times

Lichtblau, Eric &
Apuzzo, Matt

Not specified

Orlando gunman was on terror watchlist, F.B.I. director says

245
246

6/14

The New York Times

Hulse, Carl

National desk

Orlando shooting is likely to dominate congressional agenda

6/14

The New York Times

Haberman, Maggie

Politics

Orlando shooting becomes immediate talking point

247

6/14

The New York Times

Rubin, Alissa J.

Foreign desk

ISIS claims responsibility for killing of French police officer

223
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248

6/14

The New York Times

Corasaniti, Nick &
Flegenheimer, Matt

Politics

Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton’s speeches: What you missed

249
250

6/14

The New York Times

Davis, Julie H.

National desk

Obama attack a case of homegrown extremism

6/14

The New York Times

Khan, Ismail,
Nordland, Rod,
Sukhanyar, Jawad,
Alokozay, Khalid

Foreign desk

Heavy gunfire traded across Afghan-Pakistan border, escalating
tensions

251

6/14

The New York Times

Healy, Jack & Santora,
Marc

National desk

Held hostage in the restroom, and playing dead to stay alive

252

6/14

The New York Times

Luo, Michael

National desk

Another killer who could buy his guns legally, despite the red flags

253

6/14

The New York Times

Mazzetti, Mark,
Lichtblau, Eric,
Blinder, Alan,
Turkewitz, Julie,
Mashal, Mujib,.
Oppel, Richard A., &
Apuzzo, Matt

National desk

Twice scrutinized by F.B.I., Orlando killer exposes gaps in fighting
ISIS-inspired acts
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254

6/14

The New York Times

Martin, Jonathan,
Burns, Alexander,
Chozick, Amy,
Preston, Julia, &
Rappeport, Alan

National desk

Branding Muslims as threats, Trump tosses pluralism aside

255

6/14

The New York Times

Sisario, Ben

National desk

New reality at public gatherings: Dogs, metal detectors and searches

256

6/14

The New York Times

Yardley, Jim

National desk

In now-familiar rituals, world reacts to massacre with mourning and
outrage

257

6/14

Jordan, Mary

A-section

‘We are in shock, horrified’: A mosque feels the spotlight

258

6/14

The Washington
Post
The Washington
Post

Adam, Karla &
Denyer, Simon

A-section

From around the world, horror, outrage and solidarity

259

6/14

The Washington
Post

Davenport, Chris &
Harwell, Drew

A-section

Security giant where Mateen worked said it knew of 2013 FBI
investigation

260

6/14

Dvorak, Petula

Metro

The voice of hatred is amplified by tragedy

261

6/14

The Washington
Post
The Washington
Post

Craig, Tim

A-section

Kabul residents view attack as U.S. problem and ‘a completely
individual act’

262

6/14

The Washington
Post

Nakamura, David

A-section

A detour as Obama was preparing to hit campaign trail

263

6/14

The Washington
Post

Gobbons-Neff,
Thomas

A-section

The history, and celebrity, of the AR-15
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264

6/14

The Washington
Post

Sullivan, Kevin &
Hernandez, Arelis R.

A-section

Latino community hit hard

265

6/14

Milbank, Dana

A-section

‘Something going on’ is Trump exploiting tragedy

266

6/14

The Washington
Post
The Washington
Post

Goldman, Adam,
Zapotosky, Matt, &
Berman, Mark

A-section

Orlando killer spoke of dying a martyr

267

6/14

The Washington
Post

Associated Press

A-section

Severed head in Philippines is hostage’s

268

6/14

The Washington
Post

Johnson, Jenna

A-section

‘A lot of people think…’: How Trump spreads conspiracies and
innuendoes

269

6/14

The Washington
Post

Rucker, Philip,
DelReal, Jose A., &
Stanley-Becker, Isaac

A-section

Trump expands call for ban on Muslims

270

6/14

The Washington
Post

Gearan, Anne &
Sullivan, Sean

A-section

Trump, Clinton offer dueling strategies for terror threat

271

6/14

The Washington
Post

Achenbach, Joel &
Zapotosky, Matt

A-section

Hostage situation forced police to make a tough decision

272

6/14

Miller, Greg

A-section

Untitled

273

6/14

The Washington
Post
The Washington
Post

Demirjian, Karoun

A-section

Bill to ban terrorism suspects from buying guns is revived
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274

6/14

The Washington
Post

Tumultuy, Karen &
Costa, Robert

A-section

Trumpism: A personality-fueled movement resonating in an era of
anxiety

275

6/15

The New York Times

Taub, Amanda

World

Control and fear: What mass killings and domestic violence have in
common; The interpreter

276

6/15

The New York Times

Dwyer, Jim

Metropolitan desk

In a race to rescue a man on the tracks, a reminder of what’s good in
the world

277

6/15

The New York Times

Apuzzo, Matt &
Lichtblau, Eric

National desk

After F.B.I.’s inquiry, a focus on what else could be done

278

6/15

The New York Times

Haberman, Maggie

Politics

Donald Trump, in interviews, seems to abandon a pledge to ‘pivot

279

6/15

The New York Times

Healy, Patrick &
Kaplan, Thomas

National deck

Old political tactic is revived: Exploiting fear, not easing it

280

6/15

The New York Times

Rubin, Alissa J. &
Blaise, Lilia

Foreign desk

Frenchman kills 2 in ISIS’ name and says so live on facebook

281

6/15

The New York Times

Herszenhorn, David
M.

Washington

Spending bill sets off senate debate over gun laws

282
283

6/15

The New York Times

Fisher, Max

National desk

Trying to know the unknowable: Why attackers strike

6/15

The New York Times

Davis, Julie H. &
Flegenheimer, Matt

National desk

Obama condemns Trump’s response to Florida attack

284

6/15

The New York Times

Stolberg, Sheryl Gay
& Pérez-Peña, Richard

National desk

Orlando shooting survivors cope with the trauma of good fortune
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285

6/15

The New York Times

Poniewozik, James

National desk;
critic’s notebook

After yet another shooting, talk show hosts suggest talk is not
enough

286

6/15

The New York Times

Rutenberg, Jim

Business/Financial
desk

In revoking credentials, Trumps act as punisher in chief

287

6/15

The New York Times

Stack, Liam

Express

Before Orlando shooting, and anti-gay massacre in New Orleans
was largely forgotten

288

6/15

The Washington
Post

Goldman, Adam,
Berman, Mark &
Zapotosky, Matt

A-section

FBI investigates whether attacker’s wife knew about massacre plan

289

6/15

The Washington
Post

Wagner, John, Weigel,
David, & Philip, Abby

A-section

Clinton, Sanders talk after the former wins D.C. primary

290

6/15

The Washington
Post

Goldman, Adam

A-section

Saudi suspected of wanting to join 9/11 hijackers seeks to leave
prison

291

6/15

The Washington
Post

St. George, Donna

Metro

Muslim students report bias amid terror

292

6/15

The Washington
Post

Markon, Jerry &
Goldman, Adam

A-section

FBI scrutinized for dropping probes into terror threats

293

6/15

The Washington
Post

Milloy, Courtland

Metro

Mind-set is as perilous as a gun

294

6/15

The Washington
Post

Bogage, Jacob

A-section

Via Twitter hijackings, anonymous hacker goes after the Islamic
State

295

6/15

The Washington
Post

Nutt, Amy Ellis

A-section

Displaced hatred of self can push people to massacres,
psychologists say
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296

6/15

The Washington
Post

Demirjian, Karoun

A-section

McConnell: GOP ‘open’ to denying terrorists guns

297

6/15

The Washington
Post

Jaffe, Greg, Gearan,
Anne, & Nakamura,
David

A-section

A fight over nation’s values

298

6/15

The Washington
Post

Miller, Greg,
DeYoung, Karen, &
Tate, Julie

A-section

Documents provide new details of CIA’s secret prisons

299

6/15

The Washington
Post

Wiggins, Ovetta

Metro

‘I don’t listen to Donald Trump,’ governor says

300

6/15

The Washington
Post

McAuley, James

A-section

France tense after slayings

301

6/15

The Washington
Post

Achenbach, Joel &
Beachum, Lateshia

A-section

Trump’s broadside after massacre shakes Islamic group

302

6/15

The Washington
Post

Sullivan, Sean &
DeBonis, Mike

A-section

Bitter debate over shooting’s fallout

303

6/15

The Washington
Post

From news services

A-section

Untitled

304

6/16

The New York Times

Steinhauer, Jennifer

Politics

Why the Orlando shooting is unlikely to lead to major new gun
laws; News analysis

305

6/16

The New York Times

Fisher, Max

World; middle
east

When a phrase takes on news meaning: ‘Radical Islam,’ explained;
The Interpreter
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306

6/16

The New York Times

Clark, Nicola,
Gladstone, Rick, &
Youssef, Nour

Foreign desk

Searchers report finding wreckage of Egyptian Air

307

6/16

The New York Times

Rappeport, Alan

Politics

Hillary Clinton mocks Donald Trump’s national security ideas

308

6/16

The New York Times

Haberman, Maggie

Politics

Trump Takes Heat From Clinton and Obama as a poll hints at
trouble

309

6/16

The New York Times

Corasaniti, Nick

Politics

Donald Trump says he would ‘accept’ visit by Kim Jong-un

310

6/16

The New York Times

Peters, Jeremy W. &
Alvarez, Lizette

National desk;
politics takes over

A death toll fails to narrow a chasm on gay rights

311

6/16

The New York Times

Rubin, Alissa J. &
Schreuer, Milan

Foreign desk

France expands its rules allowing police to carry guns while off
duty

312

6/16

The New York Times

Parker, Ashley &
Herszenhorn, David

National desk

As gun control debate flares, Trump veers from the party line

313
314

6/16

The New York Times

Taub, Amanda

National desk

Mass attacks, domestic abuse and a pattern of total control

6/16

The New York Times

Robles, Frances &
Pérez-Peña, Richard

National desk

Gunman threatened to strap explosives to hostages, mayor says

315
316

6/16

The New York Times

Landler, Mark

National desk

Obama and Clinton differ on terror approach

6/16

The New York Times

Unknown

National desk

How terror suspects buy guns – and how they still could, even with
a ban
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317

6/16

The Washington
Post

Samuels, Robert

A-section

Sensing urgency, Muslims plan to fight Trump with vote

318

6/16

The Washington
Post

DeYoung, Karen &
DelReal, Jose A.

A-section

Trump says his insinuation about Obama and terror was right

319

6/16

The Washington
Post

Weiner, Rachel &
Nakashima, Ellen

A-section

Hacker pleads guilty in ISIS leak

320

6/16

The Washington
Post

Gibbons-Neff,
Thomas

A-section

NATO expected to keep some Afghan bases open

321

6/16

The Washington
Post

Sullivan, Kevin,
Nakashima, Ellen,
Zapotosky, Matt, &
Berman, Mark

A-section

Gunman vowed Islamic State loyalty in Facebook postings

322

6/16

The Washington
Post

Sullivan, Sean,
DelReal, Jose A., &
Philip, Abby

A-section

Trump tells top Republicans to ‘get tougher’

323

6/16

The Washington
Post

Mufson, Steven &
Davenport, Christian

A-section

Boeing’s Iran deal faces turbulence

324

6/16

The Washington
Post

Kane, Paul

A-section

How Robert Casey became a believer in gun control
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325

6/16

The Washington
Post

O’Keefe, Ed &
Demirjian, Karoun

A-section

Trump hints at changes in gun laws

326

6/16

The Washington
Post

DeBonis, Mike

A-section

Rubio rethinks leaving senate

327

6/17

The New York Times

Zipkin, Amy

Your money

Renting rooms to travelers can be a source of income later in life;
Retiring

328

6/17

The New York Times

Ali, Manik Julfikar &
Barry, Ellen

World Asia

194 held in Bangladesh mass arrests may have militant ties, police
say

329

6/17

The New York Times

Erlanger, Steven

World Europe

Britain asks if tone of ‘Brexit’ campaign made violence inevitable

330

6/17

The New York Times

Mazzetti, Mark &
Shane, Scott

World middle east

A Saudi imam, 2 hijackers and lingering 9/11 mystery

331

6/17

The New York Times

Arango, Tim

World middle east

Iraqi forces enter Falluja, encountering little fight from ISIS

332

6/17

The New York Times

Goldstein, Joseph

Metropolitan desk

Decades later, big brother comes out of hiding

333

6/17

The New York Times

Haberman, Maggie,
Martin, Jonathan, &
Steinhauer, Jennifer

National desk

Bush emerges in unlikely aid to a split party

334

6/17

The New York Times

Steinhauer, Jennifer &
Davis, Julie H.

National desk

Why the shooting is unlikely to inspire major new gun laws

335

6/17

The New York Times

Hulse, Carl

Foreign policy

Advocates for release of 9/11 documents worry about potential
delay
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336

6/17

The New York Times

Herszenhorn, David
M.

National desk

Senator’s 15-hour filibuster gains ‘path forward’ on gun control
measures

337

6/17

The New York Times

Breeden, Aurélien &
Morenne, Benoît

Foreign desk

France arrests 323 in Euro tournament’s first week

338

6/17

The New York Times

Wilson, Michael

Metropolitan desk

Funeral at last for fire chief lost to twin towers

339

6/17

The New York Times

Cave, Damien, Robles,
Frances, Alvarez,
Lizette, & Mashal,
Mujib

National desk

Orlando united: American city of many flags

340

6/17

The New York Times

Fisher, Max

National desk

When a phrase takes on new meaning: ‘Radical Islam,’ explained

341
342

6/17

The New York Times

Belluck, Pam

National desk

Physicists try for tool to predict attacks

6/17

The New York Times

Glanz, James &
Noveck, Myra

Foreign desk

Palestinian presented no danger, officer says

343

6/17

The New York Times

Searcey, Dionne

Foreign desk

Fleeing desperation in Africa on the most dangerous journey

344

6/17

The New York Times

Erlanger, Steven

Foreign desk

Shifting attention to Mediterranean, NATO fights internal dissent
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345

6/17

The New York Times

Blinder, Alan, Robles,
Frances, Pérez-Peña,
Richard, Lichtblau,
Eric, Mazzetti, Mark,
McDonald, Brent, &
Bennett, Kitty

National desk

Gunman in Orlando posted to facebook during nightclub attack,
lawmaker says

346

6/17

The New York Times

Alcindor, Yamiche,
Rappeport, Alan, &
Schweber, Nate

National desk

Sanders, still running, pledges to ‘make certain’ Trump is defeated

347
348

6/17

The New York Times

Landler, Mark

Foreign desk

51 U.S. diplomats, in dissent, urge strikes on Assad

6/17

The New York Times

Fernandez, Manny

National desk

Judge tosses bid by Texas to block refugees

349

6/17

The New York Times

Burns, Alexander &
Kaplan, Thomas

National desk

Trump’s speeches on Muslims fire up his base, but may prove
costly in election

350

6/17

The New York Times

Stack, Liam & Hauser,
Christine

Express

Orlando shooting: What we know and don’t know

351

6/17

The New York Times

Cumming-Bruce, Nick

Foreign desk

ISIS committed genocide against Yazidis in Syris and Iraq, U.N.
panel says
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352

6/17

The Washington
Post

Demirjian, Karoun &
O’Keefe, Ed

A-section

After Florida tragedy, a familiar script

353

6/17

The Washington
Post

Zezima, Katie

A-section

Across state, little optimism that support for LGBT community will
last

354

6/17

The Washington
Post

Warrick, Joby

A-section

Islamic state remains a potent threat despite U.S. progress, CIA
chief says

355

6/17

The Washington
Post

Demirjian, Karoun

A-section

House targets Guantanamo releases

356

6/17

The Washington
Post

DeBonis, Mike

A-section

GOP unveils plan to rein in president

357

6/17

The Washington
Post

Jaffe, Greg & Eilperin,
Juliet

A-section

In his Orlando speech, president assails ‘weapons of war’ – assault
rifles

358

6/17

Miller, Greg

A-section

CIA drone strikes plummet in shift to Pentagon

359

6/17

The Washington
Post
The Washington
Post

Zezima, Katie &
Nakamura, David

A-section

Obama, Biden console survivors, families of victims

360

6/18

The New York Times

Robbins, Liz

NYRegion

Orlando killings rob young New York Muslims of a cherished
holiday

361

6/18

The New York Times

Corasaniti, Nick

Politics

A touchy-feely approach from Hillary Clinton; Ad of the week

362

6/18

The New York Times

Ali, Manik Julfikar &
Barry, Ellen

Foreign desk

Mass arrests in Bangladesh yield scores of militants, the police say

363

6/18

The New York Times

Erlanger, Steven &
Yardley, Jim

Foreign desk

Growing dead over ugly tone of ‘Brexit’ vote

364

6/18

The New York Times

Herszenhorn, David
M.

National desk

Gun control compromise offered by G.O.P. senator

235

Table A2. (Continued)
365

6/18

The New York Times

Park, Haeyoun &
Mykhyalyshyn, Iaryna

National desk

Hate crimes now directed at L.G.B.T. people the most

366

6/18

The New York Times

Pérez-Peña, Richard

National desk

Orlando attack brings up history of U.S. massacres

367

6/18

The New York Times

Arango, Tim, AlJawoshi, Omar, &
Hassan, Falih

Foreign desk

Iraqi commanders proclaim victory over Islamic State in Central
Falluja

368

6/18

The New York Times

Robles, Frances &
Williams, Timothy

National desk

City’s collections to go directly for the victims

369

6/18

The New York Times

Oppel Jr., Richard A.
& Blinder, Alan

National desk

Security firm gunman worked for has received black eyes
worldwide

370

6/18

The Washington
Post

Sullivan, Kevin &
Wan, William

A-section

The volatile life of Omar Mateen

371

6/18

The Washington
Post

DeYoung, Karen

A-section

No matter who wins in November, Saudi minister says bond will
endure

372

6/18

The Washington
Post

Markon, Jerry

A-section

Amid gun scrutiny, government’s growing watch lists are in sharper
focus

373

6/18

The Washington
Post

Associated Press

A-section

Damage to black boxes likely to slow probe into EgyptAir crash

374

6/18

The Washington
Post

Gibbons-Neff,
Thomas & Ryan,
Missy

A-section

U.S. forces to stay longer in Yemen to fight al-Qaeda

375

6/19

The New York Times

Lichtblau, Eric

Politics

Specter of 1994 assault weapons ban lingers over new gun control
push
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376
377

6/19

The New York Times

Unknown

Society Desk

Katherine Campo, Warren Ryan

6/19

The New York Times

Haberman, Maggie,
Goel, Vindu,
Corasaniti, Nick, &
Martin, Jonathan

National desk

Apple, uneasy over Trump, will not support Republican convention

378

6/19

The New York Times

Rubin, Alissa J.

Foreign desk

Belgium says it blocked attack on soccer viewers

379

6/19

The New York Times

Barry, Dan, Kovaleski,
Serge F., Blinder,
Alan, & Mashal,
Mujib

National desk, the
gunman

From troubled child to aggrieved killer

380

6/19

The New York Times

Erlanger, Steven

Foreign desk

Turning to Mediterranean, NATO faces dissent

381

6/19

The New York Times

Arango, Tim, Hassan,
Falih, & Al-Jawoshy,
Omar

Foreign desk

Iraqi brother but ISIS enemy: War fractures families and sect

382
383

6/19

The New York Times

Preston, Julia

National desk

Many what-ifs in Trump plan for migrants

6/19

The Washington
Post

Kessler, Glenn

A-section

Guns, terrorism, hate, immigration: Trump’s and Clinton speeches
after massacre

384

6/19

The Washington
Post

Birnbaum, Michael

A-section

In Belgium, charges of attempted terrorism
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385

6/19

The Washington
Post

Jordan, Mary &
Hauslohner, Abigail

A-section

After Orlando, anxiety fills Muslim congregations

386

6/19

The Washington
Post

Markon, Jerry

A-section

Amid gun scrutiny, government’s growing watch lists are in sharper
focus

387

6/19

The Washington
Post

Nakamura, David

A-section

For the president, there is rarely a convenient time to take a family
vacation

388

6/19

Unknown

Unknown

Untitled

389

6/19

Unknown

Unknown

Untitled

390

6/19

The Washington
Post
The Washington
Post
The Washington
Post

Greenwald, Glenn

Outlook

The FBI was correct not to arrest Omar Mateen

391

6/19

The Washington
Post

Sullivan, Kevin &
Wan, William

A-section

The volatile life of Omar Mateen

392

6/19

The Washington
Post

Lozada, Carlos

Outlook

Why Islam is, in fact, different
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Appendix B. Codebook Used to Analyze Articles Published in Le Monde and Le Figaro

Code label: PERPET
Short definition: Background information of the perpetrators
Full definition: Detailed information about the perpetrators from the perspective of different
sources.
When to use: Apply this code to all references to the perpetrators offered by news reporters.
This also apply to quotes by people close to the perpetrators.
When not to use: Do not use this code for reference to people who were also held responsible
for other acts marked as terrorism (OTHERS).
Example: “Et le pire des scénarios, tant redouté, met en scène des profils « dormants » et sans
relief, de petits voyous et d'illuminés en apparence parfaitement insérés. Jamais le spectre
glaçant d'un terrorisme dilué dans tous les pores de la société n'a autant pris corps. Ainsi, Samy
Amimour, 28 ans, un des trois kamikazes qui a ensanglanté le Bataclan, était-il conducteur de
bus à la RATP, dont il a claqué la porte pour partir en Syrie. Ismaël Omar Mostefaï, 29 ans,
identifié par l'empreinte d'un doigt retrouvé sectionné dans la salle de spectacle, paradait quant
à lui dans des vidéos amateurs de musique rap” (Extract # 8).
Translation: “And the worst-case scenario, so dreaded, features “dormant” and featureless
profiles, little thugs and illuminated people apparently perfectly inserted. Never has the freezing
specter of terrorism diluted in all the pores of society taken so much material. Thus, Samy
Amimour, 28, one of the three suicide bombers who bloodied the Bataclan, was a bus driver with
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the RATP, whose door he slammed to go to Syria. Ismaël Omar Mostefaï, 29, identified by the
print of a finger found severed in the auditorium, paraded in amateurs videos of rap music.”

Code label: EMERGENCY
Short definition: Reference to the state of emergency
Full definition: The decision by president to enact and extend the state of emergency
When to use: Use this code when the author refers to past and current uses of this
legislation
When not to use: Do not use this code for reference to any other legal actions (LAWS or
COUNTERTERRORISM).
Example: “Au-delà du projet de loi prolongeant pour trois mois l'état d'urgence, qui sera
soumis mercredi au parlement et " adapt - era - son contenu à l'évolution des technologies et des
menaces ", notamment concernant les perquisitions et assignations à résidence, M. Hollande
entend " faire évoluer notre Constitution " pour instituer un régime d'" état de crise ", distinct de
ceux prévus par l'article 16 et par l'article 36 sur l'état de siège” (Extract # 132).
Translation: “Beyond the bill extending for three months the state of emergency, which
will be submitted to parliament on Wednesday and "will adapt - its content to the
evolution of technologies and threats", in particular concerning searches and summons to
residence, Mr. Hollande intends to "change our Constitution" to institute a regime of
"state of crisis", distinct from those provided for by article 16 and article 36 on the state
of siege.”
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Code label: OTHERS
Short definition: Comparisons to other acts marked as terrorism
Full definition: Reference to perpetrators of other attacks, even failed attacks, that brings into
perspective the significance of the 13 November 2015 attacks
When to use: Use when the articles mention other perpetrators
When not to use: do not use when reference to perpetrators of the Bataclan (PERPET) or to
other attacks (COMPARISON)
Example: “Mais depuis quelques semaines, la stratégie djihadiste a changé. Fin septembre, un
Japonais a été tué par des hommes armés au Bangladesh. Quelques jours après, c'était au tour
d'un travailleur humanitaire italien de tomber sous les balles de djihadistes au Bangladesh
encore. Puis le 30 octobre, un avion civil russe était visé dans le Sinaï égyptien causant la mort
de ses 224 occupants. Avant l'attentat jeudi dernier dans la banlieue sud de Beyrouth (44 morts).
Et enfin ceux de Paris, le lendemain soir” (Extract # 48).
Translation: “But in recent weeks, the jihadist strategy has changed. At the end of September, a
Japanese [man] was killed by gunmen in Bangladesh. A few days after, it was the turn of a
humanitarian aid worker to fall under the bullets of jihadists in Bangladesh again. Then on 30
October, a Russian civil plane was targeted in the Egyptian Sinai causing the death of its 224
occupants. Before the attack last Thursday in the south banlieue of Beirut (44 deaths). And
finally those of Paris, the following night.” (emphasis my own).
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Code label: BATACLAN
Short definition: Details about the events
Full definition: Sections of articles that discuss details about the massacre at Pulse
When to use: Use when the articles explains what happened the night of the events
When not to use: do not use when describing other events (COMPARISON) or when giving an
account from survivors of the events (SURVIVOR)
Example: “C'est une première en France en matière d'attentat. Plusieurs kamikazes se sont fait
exploser, dans la soirée du vendredi 13 novembre, au terme d'assauts meurtriers menés aux
abords du Stade de France, à Saint-Denis, et dans cinq lieux à Paris, rue de la Fontaine-au-Roi,
rue Bichat, boulevard Voltaire, rue de Charonne et dans la salle de spectacle du Bataclan, après
la prise en otage du public. Ces attaques, dites " complexes ", au regard de modus operandi en
plusieurs étapes, sont inspirées d'une forme de violence ayant cours depuis plusieurs années
dans des zones de conflit telles que l'Afghanistan, l'Irak ou la -Syrie, où règne une forme de violence dont la France se croyait jusqu'alors protégée” (Extract # 20).
Translation: “This is a first in France in terms of attack. Several suicide bombers blew
themselves up on the evening of Friday, November 13, after deadly assaults carried out near the
Stade de France, in Saint-Denis, and in five places in Paris, rue de la Fontaine-au-Roi, rue
Bichat, boulevard Voltaire, rue de Charonne and in the Bataclan concert hall, after the public was
taken hostage. These so-called "complex" attacks, in terms of a modus operandi in several stages,
are inspired by a form of violence that has been going on for several years in conflict zones such
as Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria, where a form of violence reigns from which France believed itself
to be protected until then.”
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Code label: CANDIDATE
Short definition: Responses by candidates to the presidential primaries
Full definition: Response to the attacks given by politicians who are running for the primary
election in the majority parties and also running to the regional elections
When to use: Use when politicians in France are quoted
When not to use: Do not use when president is quoted (PRESIDENT)
Example: “Vendredi soir, les principaux ténors du parti Les Républicains (LR) ont exprimé leur
soutien au gouvernement ainsi qu'au chef de l'Etat dans cette crise sans équivalent sous la Ve
République. " Je soutiens la décision prise ce soir de décréter l'état d'urgence et la fermeture des
frontières ", a indiqué Nicolas Sarkozy dans un communiqué peu après l'intervention de
François Hollande, ajoutant que " dans ces circonstances tragiques, la solidarité de tous les
Français s'impose ". Pour l'ancien président de la République, " les terroristes ont déclaré la
guerre à la France. Notre réponse doit exprimer une fermeté et une détermination de chaque
instant” (Extract # 24).
Translation: “Friday evening, the main tenors of the Republicans (LR) party expressed their
support for the government as well as for the head of state in this unparalleled crisis under the
Fifth Republic. "I support the decision taken this evening to declare a state of emergency and the
closure of borders," said Nicolas Sarkozy in a statement shortly after François Hollande's
intervention, adding that "in these tragic circumstances, the solidarity of all French are needed ".
For the former President of the Republic, "the terrorists have declared war on France. Our
response must express firmness and determination at all times”
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Code label: PRESIDENT
Short definition: Presidential responses to the events
Full definition: Response to the events given by President Hollande and other presidents of
various nation-states
When to use: use when Hollande or others are quoted
When not to use: do not use when other candidates to the primaries and regional elections are
quoted
Example: “A l'Elysée, un conseil des ministres a été convoqué d'urgence, et le président
François Hollande décide de prendre très vite la parole. "Au moment où je vous parle, dit-il, la
voix un peu altérée par l'émotion, des attaques sont en cours... C'est une horreur. " Puis le chef
de l'Etat annonce qu'il vient de décréter " l'état d'urgence " et " la fermeture des frontières ".
Avant d'affirmer : " Ce que les terroristes veulent c'est nous faire peur, nous saisir d'effroi. Il y a
de quoi avoir peur, sentir de l'effroi. Mais il y a aussi y a une nation qui saura vaincre les
terroristes".” (Extract # 23).
Translation: “At the Elysee Palace, a council of ministers was urgently summoned, and
President François Hollande decided to speak very quickly. "As I speak to you," he said, his
voice a little altered by emotion, attacks are in progress ... It's a horror." Then the head of state
announces that he has just decreed "a state of emergency" and "the closure of borders". Before
affirming: "What the terrorists want is to scare us, to seize us with fear. There is something to be
afraid of, to feel fear. But there is also a nation that will know how to conquer the terrorists".”
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Code label: BORDER
Short definition: Re-establishing border control and references to immigration
Full definition: The different decisions and debates about the necessity to reinforce or reestablish border control within the Schengen Zone
When to use: Use when people in positions of authority like politicians working at the national
and international level refer to control at the borders and immigration
When not to use: Do not use when state of emergency is mentioned (EMERGENCY)
Example: “Paris change tout. " Markus Söder, le ministre des finances de Bavière, a sonné la
charge contre la politique accueillante de la chancelière, Angela Merkel. " Une nouvelle ère
commence. Le continent doit mieux se protéger de ses ennemis qui ne reculent devant rien. Le
temps des migrations non contrôlées et de l'immigration illégale ne peut pas continuer. (...) Il
serait bon qu'Angela Merkel reconnaisse que l'ouverture non limitée dans le temps des frontières
était une erreur ", explique ce -dirigeant de l'Union chrétienne-sociale en Bavière (CSU) dans
l'édition dominicale du quotidien Die Welt” (Extract # 109).
Translation: “"Paris changes everything." Markus Söder, Bavarian Finance Minister, has
sounded the charge against the welcoming policies of Chancellor Angela Merkel." A new era
begins. The continent must better protect itself from its enemies who will stop at nothing. The
time of uncontrolled migration and illegal immigration cannot continue. (...) It would be good for
Angela Merkel to recognize that the unlimited opening of the borders was a mistake ", explains
this leader of the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) in the Sunday edition from the daily
Die Welt.”
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Code label: TERRORISM
Short definition: Use of the term terrorism
Full definition: Use of the term terrorism in newspaper articles to explain preventive and
assessments of acts marked as terrorism and to report on the perception of terrorism
When to use: Use this code when the term terrorism is used in news
When not to use: Do not use this code for reference to the attacks (BATACLAN), other events
(COMPARISON), and to deployment of military (ARMY)
Example: “À ce volet technique de la judiciarisation du renseignement s'ajoute le problème de
la correctionnalisation des actes de terrorisme. Si elle est plus rapide et moins exigeante qu'une
procédure criminelle, elle est de plus en plus dénoncée par les magistrats qui la réprouvent car
les peines de prison correspondantes sont limitées à dix ans” (Extract # 29).
Translation: “In addition to this technique of judicialisation of intelligence, there is the problem
of correcting acts of terrorism. If it/she is faster and less exigent than a criminal procedure, it/she
is more and more denounced par magistrates who condemn it because corresponding prison
sentences are limited to ten years.”

Code label: RELIGION
Short definition: Reference to religion
Full definition: Use when newspaper articles mention religion as a way to mark the identity of
the perpetrators
When to use: Use this code when people are quoted to talk about Islam, Christianity, or other
religions.
When not to use: N/A
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Example: “Après ces attentats, qu'attendez-vous de la communauté musulmane de France?”
[question asked by the reporter]
Je les appelle à une prise de parole forte. Pour expliquer que ces actes odieux n'ont rien à voir
avec leur religion, pour condamner les terroristes, combattre la radicalisation et défendre les
valeurs républicaines dans lesquelles ils se reconnaissent. Il faut que les autorités religieuses se
prononcent, fortement. Elles sont les plus crédibles à le faire. Ce n'est pas les stigmatiser que de
le dire” (Extract # 122).
Translation: “After these attacks, what do you expect from the Muslim community in France?”
[question asked by the reporter]
I call on them to speak out loudly. To explain that these heinous acts have nothing to do with
their religion, to condemn terrorists, fight radicalization and defend the republican values with
which they identify. The religious authorities must speak out, strongly. They are the most
credible to do so. Saying so is not stigmatizing them.”

Code label: NATIONALITY
Short definition: Reference to the nation and citizenship
Full definition: References made to the national identity and citizenship in the newspapers
When to use: Use when newspapers refer to the nation or the country or when people quoted
make reference to the nation
When not to use: Do not use this code for reference to European Union debates about
immigration (BORDER)
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Example: “Depuis des années, la République recule face au salafisme et à la radicalisation. Elle
doit désormais faire face avec fermeté. Il ne doit pas y avoir de paix en France pour ceux qui
méprisent et combattent la France. Nous vaincrons” (Extract # 27).
Translation: “For years, the Republic advances backwards against Salafism and radicalization.
It/She must nowadays face with firmness. There shouldn’t be peace in France for those who
despise and fight France. We will vanquish.”

Code label: FIRST
Short definition: Reference to primary definers
Full definition: Account given by experts to the attacks
When to use: Use this code when police officers, hospital staff, among others present during the
responses to the attacks explain what happened during the attacks
When not to use: Do not use when description about the shooting (BATACLAN) or other
events, or when accounts are given by survivors (SURVIVOR).
Example: “L'Assistance Publique-Hôpitaux de Paris a déclenché, vendredi soir, le " plan blanc
", un dispositif prévu pour les situations sanitaires d'urgence et de crise. Dans la loi depuis
2004, il permet de mettre en place des moyens humains et matériels pour absorber l'afflux de
patients ou de victimes. Il avait déjà été lancé pour faire face à des épidémies de grippe et de
gastro-entérite” (Extract # 19).
Translation: “The Assistance Publique-Hôpitaux de Paris triggered the "white plan" on Friday
evening, a device intended for emergency and health crisis situations. In the law since 2004, it
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makes it possible to deploy human and material resources to absorb the influx of patients or
victims. It had already been launched to deal with epidemics of influenza and gastroenteritis.”

Code label: MEDIA
Short definition: Reference to media
Full definition: Mentions of social media use surrounding the attacks, and mentions or citation
of other news media outlets
When to use: Use this code when police officers, hospital staff, among others present during the
responses to the attacks explain what happened during the attacks
When not to use: Do not use when description about the shooting (BATACLAN) or other
events are made by survivors.
Example: “Le dispositif est désormais tristement rodé. Dès la propagation sur les réseaux
sociaux des informations sur les attentats multiples qui ont secoué Paris, vendredi soir, les
rédactions audiovisuelles se sont mises en mode « édition spéciale ». « Nous avons basculé dès
21 h 55. Tous les journalistes de la rédaction se sont mobilisés et la couverture a commencé »,
commente Hervé Béroud, directeur de l'information de BFMTV” (Extract # 37).
Translation: “The device is now sadly polished. As soon as the information on the multiple
attacks that shook Paris was disseminated on social media Friday evening, the audiovisual
editorial staff went into “special edition” mode. “We switched from 9:55 pm. All the journalists
in the editorial staff got involved and the coverage started,” comments Hervé Béroud, news
director of BFMTV.”
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Code label: MILITARY
Short definition: Military deployment
Full definition: Reports from military interventions and deployment
When to use: Use this code when military officers or other government officials explain the
actions taken by the military
When not to use: Do not use when newspaper describe and explain the state of emergency
(EMERGENCY)
Example: “Les services français et américains ont notamment annoncé une collaboration
renforcée dans la lutte contre Daech. La France déploie cette semaine son porte-avions
nucléaire, le Charles-de-Gaulle, en Méditerranée, ce qui doit tripler ses capacités de frappe et
de renseignement aérien sur la zone” (Extract # 83).
Translation: “The French and American services have notably announced a reinforced
collaboration in the fight against Daesh. France is deploying its nuclear aircraft carrier, the
Charles-de-Gaulle, in the Mediterranean this week, which should triple its strike and air
intelligence capabilities in the area.”
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Appendix C. Codebook Used to Analyze Articles Published in The New York Times and The
Washington Post

Code label: PERPET
Short definition: Background information of the perpetrator
Full definition: Detailed information about the perpetrator, Omar Mateen, from the perspective
of different sources.
When to use: Apply this code to all references to Mateen offered by news reporters. This also
apply to quotes by people close to the perpetrator and relatives.
When not to use: Do not use this code for reference to people who were also held responsible
for other acts marked as terrorism (OTHERS).
Example: “Mr. Mateen, who lived in Fort Pierce, Fla., was able to continue working as a
security guard with the security firm G4S, where he had worked since 2007, and he was able to
buy guns. The federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives said Mr. Mateen
had legally bought a long gun and a pistol in the past week or two, though it was not clear
whether those were the weapons used in the assault, which officials described as a handgun and
an AR-15 type of assault rifle” (Extract # 13).

Code label: OTHERS
Short definition: Comparisons to other acts marked as terrorism
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Full definition: Reference to perpetrators of other attacks, even failed attacks, that brings into
perspective the significance of the 12 June 2016 shooting
When to use: Use when the articles mention other perpetrators
When not to use: Do not use when reference to perpetrator of the Pulse shooting (PERPET)
Example: “In December when a couple in San Bernardino, Calif., left their home armed with
assault rifles, they made sure to post their oath of allegiance on Facebook, where law
enforcement agents later found it. And just minutes before he opened fire on a cartoon exhibit
featuring images of the Prophet Muhammad in Texas in May 2015, Elton Simpson sent out a
series of Twitter messages making clear where his allegiances lay” (Extract # 15).

Code label: PULSE
Short definition: Details about the events
Full definition: Sections of articles that discuss details about the massacre at Pulse
When to use: Use when the article describes what happened the night of the events
When not to use: Do not use when describing other events (OTHERS) or when giving an
account from survivors of the events (SURVIVOR)
Example: “For three sickening hours on Sunday morning, a life-or-death game of deception
played out in a bathroom where the assailant holed up with hostages after killing dozens of
people inside the Pulse nightclub” (Extract # 39)

Code label: SURVIVOR
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Short definition: Account from people present at Pulse
Full definition: First-hand experience from people who survived the massacre
When to use: Use when people were quoted for escaping the shooting
When not to use: Do not use when first responders are quoted (FIRST)
Example: “''He's shooting everyone that's already dead on the floor, making sure they're dead,''
Mr. Colon said. ''I look over, and he shoots the girl next to me. And I'm just there laying down
and I'm thinking 'I'm next, I'm dead.' So I don't know how, but by the glory of God, he shoots
toward my head but it hits my hand, and then he shoots me again and it hits the side of my hip. I
had no reaction. I was just prepared to just stay there laying down so he won't know that I'm
alive''.” (Extract # 72).

Code label: CANDIDATE
Short definition: Responses by elected officials
Full definition: Responses to the shooting by Hillary Trump, Donald Trump, and other elected
officials
When to use: Use when elected officials are quoted
When not to use: Do not use when the president of the U.S.A. and those of other nations
respond to the acts (PRESIDENT)
Example: “Trump, who advocates putting a temporary ban on Muslims entering this country,
saw his poll numbers rise significantly in the wake of the San Bernardino attack, as well as after
a series of terrorist assaults in Paris last November.
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That may be why presumptive Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton struck a purposeful tone in
her response to the Orlando mass shooting, although she, like Obama, did not make reference to
a specific religion” (Extract # 24).

Code label: PRESIDENT
Short definition: Presidential responses to the events
Full definition: Response given by president Obama and other presidents of nation-states to the
shooting
When to use: Use when Obama or others are quoted
When not to use: Do not use when other elected officials to the presidency are quoted
(CANDIDATE)
Example: “Mr. Obama pleaded with Americans during his remarks not to ''give in to fear or turn
against each other,'' a somewhat muted reference to Mr. Trump's previous call for a ban on
Muslims entering the United States.
''In the face of hate and violence, we will love one another,'' Mr. Obama said. Rather than giving
in to fear, the president said, ''we will stand united, as Americans, to protect our people, and
defend our nation, and to take action against those who threaten us''.” (Extract # 12).

Code label: LAWS
Short definition: Reference to legal actions
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Full definition: Suggestions offered by people in positions of authority to change and actually
enact laws in response to the shooting, including the use of government watchlists such as no-fly
lists, and travel ban
When to use: Use this code when references to legal actions were made visible at the local,
national, and international level
When not to use: N/A
Example: “Six months after Republicans in Congress defeated a measure that would have closed
the so-called terror gap after the San Bernardino, Calif., attack, Senate Democrats moved swiftly
on Monday to renew the debate over tightening federal gun laws.
As a first step, the Democrats demanded that Republicans take up legislation aimed at banning
the sale of guns or explosives to people who have appeared on watch lists, or who have been
suspected by the Justice Department of ties to terrorist organizations” (Extract # 30).

Code label: TERRORISM
Short definition: Use of the term terrorism
Full definition: Use of the term terrorism in newspaper articles to explain preventive and
assessments of acts marked as terrorism and to report on the perception of terrorism
When to use: Use this code when the term terrorism is used in news
When not to use: Do not use this code for reference to the attack (PULSE), other events
(OTHERS)
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Example: “Iowans, they learned in January, were preoccupied with terrorism and the economy;
Wisconsinites with education and health-care costs. In April, the nation dissected which
candidate had the right "New York values".” (Extract # 6).
“The deadly attack at an Orlando nightclub early Sunday is raising serious concerns among
global security experts and criminologists about a convergence between terrorism and the
American phenomenon of mass shootings.” (Extract # 18).

Code label: RELIGION
Short definition: Reference to religion
Full definition: Use when newspaper articles mention religion as a way to mark the identity of
the perpetrators
When to use: Use this code when people are quoted to talk about Islam, Christianity, or other
religions.
When not to use: N/A
Example: “American Muslim groups condemned the shooting. ''The Muslim community joins
our fellow Americans in repudiating anyone or any group that would claim to justify or excuse
such an appalling act of violence,'' said Rasha Mubarak, the Orlando regional coordinator of the
Council on American-Islamic Relations” (Extract # 13).
Headline: “Is God punishing us with the 2016 election? Some people are seriously starting to
wonder” (Extract # 22).
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Code label: NATIONALITY
Short definition: Reference to the nation and citizenship
Full definition: References made to the national identity and citizenship in the newspapers
When to use: Use when newspapers refer to the nation or the country or when people quoted
make reference to the nation
When not to use: Do not use this code for reference to call for the enactment of security
measures (LAWS)
Example: “He repeatedly stretched the facts, for example, in describing the United States as
overrun by dangerous migrants. He claimed the country has an ''immigration system which does
not permit us to know who we let into our country,'' brushing aside the entire customs and
immigration enforcement infrastructure” (Extract # 42).

Code label: FIRST
Short definition: Reference to first responders
Full definition: Account given by first and second responders to the shooting
When to use: Use this code when police officers, hospital staff, among others present during the
responses to the attacks explain what happened during the shooting
When not to use: Do not use when description about the shooting (PULSE) or other events are
made by survivors (SURVIVOR)
Example: “Authorities declined to offer details. But a senior U.S. law enforcement official said
officers delayed their assault on the gunman because the active-shooter scene turned into a
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hostage negotiation once the gunman called 911. For three hours, the gunman was on the phone
with police and no shots were fired.
"That is when you do wait," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because
he was not an authorized spokesman. "It was appropriate".” (Extract # 20)
------The End------
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